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Investors accept that there is uncertainty, or risk, associated with equity investment 
returns. Consequently, equities are normally priced so that they provide a premium to 
the returns available on risk-free investments. Equity returns, however, are cyclical. 
There can be long periods when equity returns greatly exceed risk-free returns; there 
can be long periods when the premium disappears altogether. This thesis explores the 
influences and driving forces in equity markets, with a particular emphasis on the 
UK equity market. Both rational and irrational influences are examined and 
discussed.  
 A General Literature Review examines the general progression in academic 
thinking in the area of equity pricing over four decades and takes a close look at the 
concepts of market efficiency and the challenges mounted by behavioural finance. 
The “equity risk premium puzzle” is also examined. Chapters 3 to 6 contain 
empirical studies of the variation in UK equity returns over time from four angles. 
The chapters look, respectively, at: macro-economic influences on the equity market; 
the relationship between equity returns and market volatility; the impact of variation 
in risk-free returns; a full decomposition of both ex-ante and ex-post equity returns. 
 Reassuringly, the results confirm that the UK equity market is driven, in the 
main, by economic factors. However, the results also indicate that the full set of 
influences on the equity market is complex. The analyses undertaken suggest that 
significant swings occur in the risk premium element of expected equity returns. The 
results also suggest that there are periods when the UK equity market may be in 
disequilibrium with other financial markets. 
 It is not the contention that many of the puzzles that have confronted equity 
market researchers over recent decades are now resolved by the analyses undertaken 
and presented in this thesis. It is to be hoped, however, that a useful platform has 
been built from which further investigation and analysis can be taken forward. In 
particular, it is suggested that comprehensive surveys of long-term expectations 
could lead to a better understanding of equity market mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter sets out the aim and objectives of the thesis, discusses the historical 
background to equity investment and explains the structure to be found herein. 
 
1.1 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The concept of the equity risk premium represents a cornerstone in modern financial 
market theory. Equity investors should expect an investment return in excess of that 
available from risk-free investments as compensation for the additional uncertainty 
attached to future cash flows. 
 
Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1976) in the US and Dimson and Brealey (1978) in the 
UK provided the first comprehensive assessments of the risk premium that equity 
investors have achieved. Both studies concluded that the risk premium, measured 
arithmetically, has averaged approximately 9% p.a. historically. Indeed, as a 
consequence of these findings, a risk premium of the order of 6% to 9% was 
recommended as the norm to be used in financial modelling.  
 
The subsequent three decades have witnessed intense debate as to whether a 
premium of this order is a realistic expectation for the future. Mehra and Prescott 
(1985), in identifying “the equity premium puzzle”, were at the forefront in 
questioning the scale of the reward earned by equity investors.  
 
The same three decades have also witnessed mounting challenges from behaviourists 
such as Shiller (1981), Summers (1986) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985). The debate 
has focussed on the volatility of the equity market, the apparent propensity of 
investors to overreact and the substantial swings in equity returns that can occur 
through time as a result. The market Crash of October 19
th
 1987 merely served to fan 
the flames of the debate. 
 
 2 
 The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to analyse how, and why, equity returns – and 
equity risk premia in particular – vary significantly over time. More specifically, the 
objectives are: 
 
(a) to explore the key elements of the theoretical debate surrounding 
equity return variation; 
 
(b) to analyse the historical variation in UK equity returns from four 
different angles, including a full decomposition of ex-ante and 
ex-post returns into rational elements. Questions to be explored 
include: 
 
(i) is there evidence of a rational linkage between the 
equity market and the variation in the macro-
economy? 
(ii) what is the relationship between equity returns and 
observed volatility? 
(iii) is the volatility of the equity market “excessive”, as 
some observers would advocate, or can volatility be 
explained by changes in fundamental factors? 
(iv) what equity risk premium could have been expected 
in the past, given prevailing macro-economic 
conditions? 
(v) what equity risk premium was actually earned in the 
past and what factors explain the difference between 
this ex-post measure and the ex-ante measure? 
 
(c) to discuss the implications of the findings. 
 
1.2 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Ordinary shares, equities, or common stock - as they are referred to in the United 
States – are issued by limited liability companies as risk capital. UK company law 
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requires ordinary shares to have a nominal value but this nominal value bears little 
relation to the market value of the shares at any time. 
 
Ordinary shareholders have voting rights and collectively, therefore, have control of 
the company. They have the right to share in any distribution of dividend, in 
proportion to their percentage shareholding, and they have the right to a proportion 
of any residual assets in the case of dissolution. 
 
A key characteristic of equities – which is a particular focus of this thesis – is that 
both future dividend income and future share values are at all times uncertain. It is 
for this reason that equity investors seek a higher expected return than that which is 
available on alternative risk-free investments. This higher return is referred to as the 
equity risk premium. 
 
1.2.1 The long history 
Table 1.1, which draws on data to be found in Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006), 
summarises the long-term performance of equities in both the United Kingdom and 
the United States since exchanges were first established.  
Table 1.1 Summary statistics for LSE and NYSE equities 
                  
    Arithmetic  Geometric  Standard    
    Mean (%)  Mean (%)  Deviation (%) 
           
  Total period (1701-2000)        
   LSE 3.1  2.1  15.7   
   NYSE 5.6  3.9  18.4   
           
  Eighteenth century        
   LSE 1.4  0.5  14.4   
   NYSE 7.6  6.6  15.0   
           
  Nineteenth century        
   LSE 1.5  1.2  8.5   
   NYSE 4.7  3.2  17.7   
           
  Twentieth century        
   LSE 6.9  4.9  21.8   
   NYSE 6.3  4.3  19.6   
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The statistics were compiled by splicing together indices constructed with different 
methodologies and samples; some biases and inconsistencies are therefore inevitable 
in the results. Note that the indices used measure capital appreciation alone, not total 
returns. 
 
The table shows that the long-term, annual, geometric capital appreciation of London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) equities over the total period was 2.1; the equivalent average 
for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) equities was 3.9%. The annual standard 
deviations in annual performances were 15.7% and 18.4% respectively. 
 
It is particularly interesting to note that the appreciation rate in LSE equities was 
much lower than that of NYSE equities over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
but more than matched the appreciation rate of NYSE equities over the twentieth 
century. The standard deviation in returns for both markets was higher during the 
twentieth century than during earlier periods. 
 
1.2.2. Valuation of equities 
Whilst quoted equities have existed for over 300 years, there is little evidence of any 
valuation theory prior to the twentieth century. Indeed, history shows that, 
periodically, equity markets appear to have been driven in the main by intense 
speculation. Such speculation was certainly evident in the US equity market during 
the 1920s, for example, fuelled by the widespread conviction that “God intended the 
American middle class to be rich” (Galbraith, 1955: 19). The Great Crash of 1929, 
and the subsequent ten-year Great Depression, arguably provided the trigger for 
practitioners and academics to set their minds to establishing a realistic theory of 
equity valuation. 
 
Practitioners who led the way included Graham and Dodd (1940), whose Security 
Analysis became the authoritative reference work for the investment profession. 
Graham and Dodd observed that, during the speculative period of the 1920s, equity 
investors abandoned a valuation approach based on past records and tangible assets 
and switched to a new-era concept of valuation based entirely on expected earnings 
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trend. The resultant approach, the authors argued, concealed two weaknesses that 
could result in “untold mischief”: 
 
(a) the fundamental distinction between investment and speculation 
was abolished and: 
(b) investors ignored the price of a stock in determining whether or 
not it was a desirable purchase. 
 
It was Graham and Dodd‟s plea that investors should revert to a more realistic 
valuation approach. In particular, they argued that investors should capitalise 
average earnings at some suitable figure, where the latter is related to the going long-
term interest rate. 
 
The 1930s also witnessed the development of an approach that was more actuarial in 
style than the commonsensical, and arguably conservative, approach of Graham and 
Dodd. That is, the theoretical “present value” approach. 
 
The concept of present value and discounting was not a twentieth century invention. 
Staubus (1965) cites, for example, the published work of Sir Isaac Newton in the late 
seventeenth century, which included the present values of annuities and other related 
tables. Likewise, John Playford‟s Vade Mecum, a companion of information for use 
in conducting business affairs, was published around the same time and also 
contained discount tables. 
 
The first reference to present value theory, as applied to equities, is attributed to 
Wiese (1930) who stated that: “The proper price of any security, whether a stock or 
a bond, is the sum of all the future income payments discounted at the current rate of 
interest in order to arrive at present value” (Wiese, 1930: 5) 
 
The real pioneer in this field was John Burr Williams (1938) who identified that 
“investment analysis until now has been altogether unequal to the demands put upon 
it [and this] should be clear from the tremendous fluctuations in stock prices that 
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have occurred in recent years.” He consequently set out “To outline a new sub-
science that shall be known as the Theory of Investment Value and that shall 
comprise a coherent body of principles like the Theory of Monopoly, the Theory of 
Money and the Theory of International Trade” (Burr Williams, 1938: Preface). 
 
Like Wiese, Williams argued that equity investment value is the present value of all 





  where:  π0 =  Historic dividend 




 and:      t  < 1 if g < i 
 
Gordon (1962) was later responsible for popularising the present value approach, 
introducing what has become commonly known as the Gordon growth model, viz:- 
 
 Share price (P) = Expected dividend (D)/(r – g) 
 where:  r = appropriate discount rate 
  g = expected long-term growth 
Rearranging, provides an expression for the implied equity rate of return:- 
 
 E(r) = D/P + g 
 
The Gordon valuation methodology forms the basis of the empirical analyses 
described in Chapters 3, 5 and 6. 
 
1.2.2 Slow development in the UK 
Despite a long history of equity trading, the development of any valuation theory was 
relatively slow to develop in the UK. It is interesting to note, for example, that in an 
address to the Institute of Actuaries in 1960, Weaver and Fowler (1960) felt the need 
to highlight the fact that: “the assessment of industrial ordinary shares has not yet 
been discussed by the Institute” (Weaver and Fowler, 1960: 281) 
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The most authoritative investment manual of that period, compiled by Whyte (1950), 
also provides the flavour of an unrefined approach to equity investment and an 
under-developed understanding of equity risk and return:- 
 
 “…….the scope for gain is often great, the pitfalls are many……..Investment 
in equity shares is essentially a matter for dynamic and not for static thought. In 
some cases rational forethought is feasible. In other cases any view of future 
prospects can be little better than guessing…” 
 
 “…..the difference between [the equity] yield and the yield currently ruling 
on other investments is frequently termed the „risk premium‟. It is a reflection of the 
risks involved; of the hopes and fears for the future. Thus, if the gilt-edged yield on 
irredeemable stocks happens to be 3
1
/2%, and the yield on an equity share is 5%, the 
difference of 1
1
/2% will be viewed as the risk premium; a measure of what investors 
think is a fair reward for the extra risk involved” (Whyte, 1950: 103). 
 
Prior to the 1960s, therefore, dividend yield and cover tended to be the focus for 
equity appraisal.  The earnings yield of companies was also sometimes used as a 
valuation benchmark. The end of the 1950s heralded a new era, however, marked by 
a reversal in the equity-gilt yield gap. Investors started to appreciate the true long-
term value of equities, thanks to the work of Gordon and others, described above. 
That is, the total return from equities is represented by the sum of the dividend yield 
and expected growth. And it is this total return – not the dividend yield alone – which 
should offer a premium to the risk-free alternative.  
 
The introduction of Corporation Tax in the UK in 1965 was also responsible for a 
shift in emphasis from equity dividend yields and cover to price-earnings ratios, 
bringing UK valuation more into line with US practice. Use of price-earnings ratios, 
in nominal and relative terms, remains today the commonest approach to equity 
valuation used by investors. 
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1.2.4 Equity return variation 
History shows that, however the valuation of equities has changed over time, equity 
investors have had a roller-coaster experience. Table 1.1 showed that equity returns 
have varied considerably over the past three centuries. Substantial variation is often 
also experienced over shorter periods, as Table 1.2 illustrates. Viewed on a geometric 
basis, the twenty year period from end-1977 through to 1997 provided handsome 
returns to equity investors, both in nominal and real terms. The equity risk premium 
was also significantly rewarding. In contrast, equity returns failed to match inflation 
during the 1968-1977 decade. Over the past decade, equities have provided a positive 
real return but have failed to match the returns provided by bonds i.e. a negative 
equity risk premium. 
 
Table 1.2 Annual average returns 
                        
    …….......Arithmetic…...……  …………....Geometric……....     
    Equities Bonds 
Risk 
premium   Equities Bonds 
Risk 
premium   RPI   
               
  
1968-
1977 21.8 9.0 12.8  11.3 7.0 4.0  11.5   
               
  
1978-
1987 21.3 13.3 8.0  21.0 12.5 7.6  8.0   
               
  
1988-
1997 16.2 13.9 2.3  15.4 12.8 2.3  4.5   
               
  
1998-
2007 7.3 9.6 -2.3  6.1 8.6 -2.3  2.8   
               
  TOTAL            
  PERIOD 16.6 11.4 5.2  13.3 10.2 2.8  6.6   
                        
                 Raw data source: DataStream 
 
1.3 RATIONALE AND STRUCTURE 
This thesis attempts to analyse in detail the variation in equity returns through time. 





1.3.1 A note on analytical approach 
The empirical analyses of returns in UK markets presented in Chapters 3, 5 and 6 of 
this thesis utilise the Gordon growth model (see section 1.2.2 above). Share prices 
are assumed to represent the present value of all future dividends, where those 
dividends are discounted at a rate that is composed of a risk-free rate and a risk 
premium. It also assumes that future dividends grow indefinitely at a constant rate. 
 
The attraction of the Gordon model is its simplicity and its intuitive appeal, 
particularly where it is being used to model expected returns from a mature, 
developed market. It is acknowledged, however, that more complex, multi-stage 
growth models should be used where immature, fast growing companies or markets 
are being analysed or where abnormal growth patterns are envisaged. 
 
The Gordon growth model also assumes a pure cash dividend stream which stretches 
indefinitely into the future and which grows at a rate that is a function of the growth 
in future corporate earnings. It is acknowledged that this, too, can be an over-
simplistic assumption. Share buy-backs are now often substituted for cash dividends, 
notably in the US. Equally, dividend growth can be interrupted or distorted by 
government action. The imposition of dividend controls in the UK prior to 1980 is an 
example of the latter. Equally, the taxation regime implemented by a government can 
have a substantial impact on the present value of market assets to certain categories 
of investors. The removal of dividend tax privileges from the UK pension funds in 
1997 provides a good example of this phenomenon. 
 
Some commentators, such as Fabozzi (1999), also highlight the fact that the dividend 
discount model assumes that the investor‟s horizon matches the time used in the 
model, an assumption that does not always reflect reality. Again, this is fully 
acknowledged. Indeed, there is no attempt in the analyses presented in this thesis to 
construct valuation models which reflect the idiosyncrasies of investors. There is a 
strong argument, for example, for hypothesising that investors‟ horizons vary over 
time and, moreover, that different behavioural traits will come to the fore at different 
times. Should this be the case, the valuations indicated by the long-term Gordon 
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intrinsic valuation model will inevitably deviate from the valuations suggested by 
methods which attempt to model changes in investors‟ preferences, perceptions and 
time horizons. 
 
It is this fact which, if anything, highlights the attractions of using the Gordon 
growth model in analyses of this type. The Gordon model offers a theoretically 
sound, consistent intrinsic valuation. It indicates the valuation that should be placed 
on equities given the assumptions and the inputs to the model. Or, viewed in reverse, 
it can be used to indicate the return that is on offer, given market prices and given the 
assumptions and inputs. Although significant deviations can be expected from 
theoretical intrinsic values, it can be hypothesised further that, over a long period of 
time, underlying trends in market and theoretical intrinsic values will converge.  
 
It could be argued, for example, that expected long-term equity returns may not be 
formulated by investors in the way presented in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, it could be 
argued further that the long-term averages and trends in expected returns and risk 
premia calculated in this way are likely to converge with those of investors‟ actual 
ex-ante expected returns and risk premia, however the latter may have been 
determined. Moreover, the “abnormal” peaks and troughs in expected risk premia, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 6, may be regarded to be, in part, an indication of 




1.3.2. Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a general review of previous work related to the area under 
investigation. Inevitably, this includes a discussion of the concepts of efficiency and 
rationality within equity markets as well as the challenges to the efficiency 
hypothesis. Chapter 2 also looks in detail at the “equity risk premium puzzle” and the 
numerous reasons promoted by Cochrane (1997), Cornell (1999) and others in 
explaining this puzzle. Studies undertaken in recent years to determine ex-ante 
values for the risk premium are also summarised. 
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Chapters 3 to 6 contain accounts of empirical studies carried out to explore various 
aspects of return variation in the UK equity market. Previous literature relevant to 
each specific study is reviewed in the first part of the relevant chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between equity markets and underlying macro-
economic variables. Key US and UK studies are identified and discussed. An 
analysis of the linkages between the UK equity market and movements in underlying 
macro-economic variables is then presented. The methodology used is built on that 
adopted by Fama (1990) in exploring relationships in the US equity market.  
 
If it is assumed that equity prices reflect the discounted value of future dividends, 
then some relationship should be observed between prices and changes to both 
expected future dividends and the rate at which such dividends are discounted. 
Unexpected changes in GDP growth or industrial production, for example, would 
have implications for the growth of most companies quoted within the stock market. 
In the short-term, it is likely that the impact on equity prices would come from a 
change in the rate at which future dividends are discounted (i.e. a change in the 
equity risk premium, a part of the denominator in the discounting process). A more 
pronounced, sustained change in macro-economic conditions might also influence 
long-term dividend growth expectations (i.e. equity prices might change because of a 
change in the numerator). 
 
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 seeks to identify whether these theoretical links 
between equity prices and the macro economy exist. Reassuringly, the analysis does 
indeed show that the UK equity market is driven, in the main, by rational economic 
factors, such as levels of economic activity and movements in long-term interest 
rates. 
 
Chapter 4 explores the nature of equity market volatility and its predictive 
capabilities. Investment management is usually presented as the process of selecting 
an efficient combination of available assets based on the expected returns and risk 
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characteristics of those assets. And risk is usually defined in terms of historic 
standard deviation or variance. But can historic volatility be relied on as a predictor 
of future returns. Or, is this assumption an over-simplification? 
 
Summaries of previous studies undertaken in this specific area, such as those of 
Merton (1980), French et al (1987), Schwert (1989) and Priestley (2001), are 
summarised and discussed. An analysis of UK market volatility for the period 1963-
2003 is also presented. The study investigates the relationship between volatility and 
equity returns, concluding that historic volatility is a poor predictor of future excess 
returns and that there is a strong, negative relationship between excess equity returns 
and contemporaneous volatility. A GARCH analysis confirms that the most 
significant element of this latter relationship is the correlation between returns and 
“unanticipated” volatility. 
 
A partial decomposition of equity returns is presented in Chapter 5. The intention of 
this study is to look more closely at the “excessive” volatility arguments of Shiller 
(1981) and to show that, in fact, a substantial portion of UK equity market variability 
can be attributed to a variation in discount rates. In other words, variation in risk-free 
returns (i.e. usually the main component in the discounting process) accounts for 
much of the “excessive” volatility suggested by Shiller. The study assumes, like 
Shiller, that at any point in time investors had perfect foresight of future dividends. 
But instead of discounting these expected dividends at a constant discount rate, the 
study assumes, realistically, that over time the discount rate will vary, partly because 
of changes in risk-free returns available. Such an assumption is shown to result in 
significant volatility, even if a constant risk premium is assumed for the additional 
component of the discount rate. A second stage of the analysis looks at implied 
discount rates if the actual UK equity market levels are taken to represent the present 
value of all known future dividends. The analysis suggests that, in addition to the 
variation in the risk-free element of the discount rate over time, there are substantial 
swings in the ex-ante equity risk premium. 
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A full decomposition of UK equity and bond market returns is presented in Chapter 
6. Ex-ante and ex-post returns and premia are analysed for the period 1963-2005 and 
decomposed into specific elements. To the best of the author‟s knowledge, the 
detailed methodology employed – whilst building on the basic Gordon growth 
approach – is unique. The study views the UK index-linked market as an integral part 
of the theoretical equilibrium between the UK financial markets and data from that 
market provides important input to the study. A significant difference was found 
between ex-post and ex-ante estimates of the annual equity risk premium, the latter 
being three percentage points lower than the former. Much of this difference can be 
attributed to the fact that equities enjoyed an unexpected re-rating (i.e. lowering in 
dividend yields) over the period. 
 
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings from each of the empirical studies and 
presents the main conclusions of the thesis. The implications for future research are 
also identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 – GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Equity markets can display considerable volatility and equity returns can be subject 
to substantial cyclical and secular variation. The key questions are: 
 
 What factors cause this variation in returns? 
 Are these factors rational, irrational, or a mix of the two? 
 Do these factors change over time? 
 
It is not the intention in the following review to provide a comprehensive survey of 
previous work undertaken on all aspects of equity return variation. The intention is: 
 
(a) To discuss the general progression in academic thinking in the area of 
equity pricing, over the past four decades in particular. Previous studies 
relating to specific aspects of the analyses presented in Chapters 3 to 6 
will be discussed at the start of the relevant chapters. 
(b) To highlight key analyses within each sub-section and, to identify 
contrasting views. 
(c) To build a platform for empirical analyses of returns from the UK equity 
market. The empirical analyses in Chapters 3 to 6 focus on market returns 
and the variation in those returns. As such, the discussion in this chapter 
focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on top-down (i.e. market level), 
rather than cross-sectional, empirical research. 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been at the core of academic debate on 
asset pricing over the past four decades. And many challenges to the EMH have been 
mounted over this period in a bid to “explain” what might appear to be unusual or 
irrational behaviour or observations. The EMH necessarily, therefore, becomes the 




2.2 THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
An efficient market is one in which “security prices at any time „fully reflect‟ all 
available information” (Fama 1970). Or, from a more pragmatic point of view: 
 
“A market is efficient with respect to information set t if it is impossible to make 
economic profits by trading on the basis of information set t.” (Jensen 1978: 96). 
 
Tests of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) revolve around the definition of the 
information set. Three forms of the EMH are identified in the literature: 
 
(a) The weak form. Prices fully reflect the information implied by all prior price 
movements.  
(b) The semi-strong form. As well as reflecting all past news, prices will act 
instantaneously and without bias to new published information. 
(c) The strong form. Prices not only reflect all published information but also all 
relevant, knowable information not yet published. 
 
Empirical testing of the market pricing mechanism has been undertaken for over 100 
years. In a pioneering work, Bachelier (1900) derived the theory that speculative 
prices must follow a random walk. He then compared the statistical distribution of 
price behaviour expected from his theory with observed distributions of price 
changes of certain government securities on the Paris Bourse. A close match between 
the observed distributions and expectations was found. 
  
2.2.1 Early tests of the weak form 
The advent of computerisation in the second half of the 20
th
 century enabled 
researchers to undertake far more rigorous testing of stock market prices. Kendall 
(1952), for example, analysed patterns in 19 UK actuaries‟ indices over the 1928 to 
1938 period. He computed serial correlations for each series, lagging the data over 1 
to 19 weeks, and concluded that such serial correlation as was present in the series 
was so weak as to dispose of any possibility of being able to use them for prediction: 
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“Investors can, perhaps, make money on the Stock Exchange, but not, apparently by 
watching price-moments and coming in on what looks like a good thing” (Kendall, 
1952: 113). 
 
There were, however, some observations that required further explanation. The 
aggregate series (e.g. All Industrials), in addition to the Investment Trusts and Stores 
series, did display some significant serial correlation. Kendall concluded that this 
“rather disturbing” evidence could be caused through the aggregation methodology 
and further inferred that wherever possible econometricians should study individual 
series rather than aggregates. 
 
Alexander (1961) questioned whether the weekly intervals used by Kendall were 
appropriate, arguing that short-term fluctuations might very easily swamp any 
underlying trends. More specifically, he surmised that Kendall‟s correlations – close 
to zero in most cases – could possibly be a consequence of the combination of the 
negative contributions of the reactions and the positive contributions of the trends. If 
this was the case, the first-order serial correlations of daily price changes might have 
been negative, the first order correlation of weekly changes might have been close to 
zero while the first order serial correlations of monthly or bimonthly changes might 
have been significantly larger than zero. 
 
Alexander tested this possibility, using the same data as Kendall. Serial correlations 
were computed on the same actuaries‟ series, using intervals of 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 
weeks. While occasional high value correlations were observed over periods of more 
than one week, the overall conclusion was that the results did not give any substantial 
support to the hypothesis that longer period intervals lead to increased correlations. 
All in all, he concluded, the random walk hypothesis was confirmed. 
 
Attacking the problem from another angle, Alexander set out to test for non-
randomness by assuming that the existence of trends in stock market prices may be 
“masked by the jiggling of the market” (Alexander, 1961: 255). He consequently set 
about filtering out all movements smaller than a specified size and examined the 
remaining movements. As an example, a 5% filter test would trigger the following 
actions:  go long and stay long if the market moves up by more than 5%; go short 
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and stay short if the market falls by more than 5%. All moves of less than 5% were 
ignored. 
 
Filter tests using various filters, ranging from 5% to 50%, were applied to the Dow 
Jones and Standard & Poor‟s industrial averages for the period 1897 to 1959. 
Notional profits, before commission, were calculated and compared with the results 
of a buy and hold policy. A sample of the results is shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1  The Alexander results 
                    
  Period Filter size: 5% 10% 20% 30% 50% Buy& Hold   
            
  1897 – 1914 Profit/year (%) 20.5   4.6   7.8 3.2 -3.9   3.2   
  1914 – 1929 Profit/year (%) 15.8 10.0 10.3 8.6 -2.1 14.1   
  1929 – 1959 Profit/year (%) 36.8 16.8   7.8 7.0  8.5   3.0   
                    
 
The results uniformly favoured the smaller filters over the buy and hold method, 
albeit that no adjustment was made for transaction costs. Alexander concluded that 
this success stemmed from a characteristic of stock price behaviour other than that 
implied by the upward long term trend alone. In other words, while price changes 
may appear to follow a random walk over time, a move, once initiated, tends to 
persist. 
 
A number of criticisms were advanced following publication of Alexander‟s results, 
the most serious being that his methodology introduced persistent bias. 
Consequently, Alexander revisited his analysis, making allowance for the biases that 
had been highlighted. The changes made substantially reduced the profitability of the 
filters, in some cases replacing profits with losses. Indeed, only rarely did the filter 
results compare favourably with the buy and hold strategy. Alexander concluded: 
“The big bold profits of Paper 1 must be replaced with rather puny ones. The 
question still remains whether even these profits could plausibly be the result of a 
random walk. But I must admit that the fun has gone out of it somehow” (Alexander, 
1964: 423). 
 
2.2.2  Early tests of the semi-strong form 
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The semi-strong form of the efficient market model is concerned with the way in 
which new information is assimilated in stock prices. More specifically, it is 
concerned with both the speed and the magnitude of the reaction. 
 
An important, early research study in this area was undertaken by Ball and Brown 
(1968), who set about exploring the reaction of stock prices to new information. The 
“new information” used in the study was the “good news” or “bad news” associated 
with the publication of corporate annual income numbers. Data for 261 US 
companies were analysed over the period 1957-1965. 
 
The first stage of the analysis involved determining the “normal” change in any 
company‟s annual income for any given change in aggregate market income. 
Historical company income data were regressed on aggregate market income data 
and the resultant coefficient was taken to be a useful indicator of future expectations, 
given any forecast change in aggregate market income. Thus subsequent changes in 
corporate income could be categorised as either “good news” or “bad news”. 
 
“Good news” and “bad news” portfolios were constructed and their relative 
performance examined for the one year period prior to the announcement date. The 
results showed that there was consistent relative performance in the direction 
anticipated. In other words, “good news” stocks consistently outperformed prior to 
announcement; “bad news” consistently underperformed. Moreover, 85 to 90 per 
cent of the net effect of the new information appeared to be assimilated prior to the 
actual news announcement. Clearly, market participants were making use of other 
sources of information during the year to predict successfully what the eventual 
outcome might be. 
 
Other approaches to testing the semi-strong form of the EMH have involved 
examining the performance success of expert investors. Do the funds managed by 
such investors, benefiting from access to all new, published information, consistently 
outperform performance benchmarks or passive funds? 
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Jensen (1968) carried out one such analysis, looking at the performance of 115 US 
mutual funds over the period 1955 – 1964. Benchmark returns were set, and 
subsequent performance analysed, using the standard market model of Sharpe, Litner 
and Treynor: 
 
 Rj – Rf = αj + βj(Rm – Rf) +µj 
 
A positive value for the intercept αj would indicate that the expert investor has an 
ability to forecast security prices; a negative value would indicate that the investor 
tends to perform even worse that a portfolio constituted by random selection. The 
error term, µj, in the above model was anticipated to be zero and serially 
independent. 
 
The results over the period analysed were as summarised in Table 2.2 
 
Table 2.2  The Jensen results 
                      
  Item  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum   
               
  α  -0.011  -0.009  -0.008  0.058   
  β  0.840  0.848  0.219  1.405   
  r
2
  0.865  0.901  0.445  0.977   
                      
 
 
The results highlight: 
 
 the below-average systematic risk of the average fund 
 the close fit of the data, as indicated by the average r2 of 0.865 
 the poor average performance achieved by the fund managers, as 
indicated by the average α of -0.011 
 
The average alpha of -0.011 – an average, annual return of 1.1% less than that 
warranted by the average level of systematic risk – showed clearly that the funds 
were not able to forecast security prices well enough to recover research expenses, 
management fees and commission expenses. 
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The alphas were also estimated on the basis of returns calculated gross of all 
management expenses. The average alpha was again negative, at -0.4% per annum, 
suggesting that the funds were not able to increase returns enough over the 20 year 
period examined to recoup even their brokerage commissions (the only expenses 
which were not added back to the fund returns). 
  
2.2.3  Tests of the strong form 
The strong form of the EMH suggests that all available information – both public 
and private – is fully reflected in security market prices. It would be impossible to 
make abnormal returns consistently in such a market by making use of information 
not already made public. 
 
The Jensen investigation, described above, supports the semi-strong form of the 
EMH; that is, it seems impossible to gain abnormal returns consistently using 
publicly-available information. The results can also be interpreted as evidence that 
the strong form of the EMH does not hold inasmuch as professional money managers 
do not appear to be able to profit from any access to privileged or “inside” 
information. 
 
The difficulty in testing the strong form of the EMH, of course, is the fact that insider 
trading is now illegal in most markets. Part V of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993, for 
example, seeks to prevent insider trading in the UK whilst the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act, backed up by many subsequent SEC rulings, seeks to control illegal, 
insider trading within the US. Empirical work has therefore tended to be concentrate 
on studies of legal insider trading, that is legitimate trading of a company‟s securities 
by company officials and as reported to the SEC. 
 
An early study of this nature was undertaken by Jaffe (1974) who studied the impact 
of insider trades in the US equity market between 1962 and 1968. The information 
regarding trades was obtained from the Official Summary of Insider Trading, the 
monthly report listing the transactions of corporate officials. Jaffe concluded that 
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insiders do possess special information and that significant abnormal returns could be 
earned through intensive trading in the relevant stocks. 
 
A more comprehensive study was undertaken by Finnerty (1976). A total of over 
30,000 „insider‟ transactions was examined from the period 1969-1972, 9,602 buy 
transactions and 21,487 sell transactions. Insider buy portfolios and insider sell 
portfolios were formed for each month of the three year period and subsequent 
outperformance for various holding periods was measured using the Jensen (1968) 
market model approach. 
 
The subsequent performances of the portfolios were as anticipated: the buy portfolios 
outperformed their benchmark for all holding periods; the sell portfolios 
underperformed their benchmark for all holding periods. In both cases, the most 
significant abnormal performance occurred in the first month following the 
formation of the portfolios. 
 
Finnerty concluded that insiders are able to outperform the market by making use of 
privileged information and that the strong form of the EMH could be refuted.  
 
The first attempt to obtain evidence on the degree of profitability of insider trading in 
the UK market was undertaken by Pope et al (1990). The data set used comprised 
directors‟ transactions recorded in the Stock Exchange‟s Weekly Official Intelligence 
for periods between April 1977 and December 1984. 
 
Pope et al tracked the performances of BUY portfolios and SELL portfolios within 
the sample in addition to tracking the performance of the total sample over several 
sub-periods. The total sample produced cumulative abnormal returns of between 4% 
and 6% over six month periods following disclosure of insider trades. Short trading 
in the SELL portfolios would have made a superior contribution to that of the BUY 
portfolios. Over the period 1983/84, for example, the cumulative abnormal returns on 




Empirical studies have not confined themselves entirely to investigations of “legal” 
insider trading. Keown & Pinkerton (1981), for example, investigated evidence of 
insider trading relating to merger announcements during the 1970s. Data was 
gathered for 194 US firms that were the targets for bid activity over the period 1975 
to 1978. Prices were gathered for a period of 126 trading days prior to the bid 
announcement and 31 trading days post announcement. 
 
The cumulative residual for the total sample turned positive 25 days prior to the 
announcement date and approximately one half of the total cumulative residual was 
achieved prior to the announcement, as Table 2.3 shows. The authors concluded that 
illegal trading on non-public information of this type abounds and that it is possible 
to earn significant excess returns from its use. They also concluded that their results 
supported the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis inasmuch as the 
market reaction to the new public information is completed by the day after the 
announcement. 
 
Table 2.3  Merger event study results 
            
  Day Daily t-stat Cumulative   
   Residual (%)  Residual (%)   
        
  -15 0.079 0.38 2.677   
  -10 0.424 2.18 4.124   
  -5 0.670 2.90 6.764   
  -4 1.260 4.93 8.025   
  -3 1.060 3.71 9.084   
  -2 1.620 5.09 10.704   
  -1 2.551 5.93 13.255   
  0 12.020 11.53 25.275   
  1 1.443 3.21 26.718   
  5 0.231 1.19 26.831   
  10 -0.144 1.15 27.042   
            
 
2.2.4  Early conclusions 
The early evidence therefore suggested that the weak and semi-strong forms of the 
EMH hold, at least in terms of the more pragmatic definition of the EMH provided 
by Jensen. Mechanical trading systems cannot be used to generate superior returns 
 23 
consistently. Moreover, new information appears to be assimilated into security 
prices quickly and, arguably, “correctly” with the result that the application of 
fundamental analysis also fails to produce regular abnormal profits. Tests of the 
strong form of the EMH have been less prolific and more difficult to interpret in 
view of the legal and regulatory background. However, the evidence suggests that 
markets are not efficient in the strong form. 
 
Any conclusion relating to the early tests of the EMH is best summarised by Fama 
(1970): 
 “…...the evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive, and 
(somewhat uniquely in economics) contradictory evidence is sparse. Nevertheless, 
we certainly do not want to leave the impression that all issues are closed. The old 
saw, „much remains to be done‟ is relevant here as elsewhere” (Fama, 1971: 416). 
 
2.3  RETURN PREDICTABILITY 
Part of the challenge to the EMH that has been mounted over the past three decades 
has been the identification of anomalies. Research falling into this category includes 
tests for return predictability arising from:- 
 
 Under-reaction/over-reaction 
 Valuation indicator levels  
 Mean reversion 
 Winner/loser strategies 
 
Whilst embracing different terminology, tests in this area all essentially attempt to 
identify whether, contrary to the EMH, security prices do not always follow a 
random walk. Moreover, is it possible to exploit any such non-randomness? 
 
2.3.1  Under-reaction to earnings announcements 
The semi-strong form of the EMH argues that new information is swiftly assimilated 
into security prices. The speed of assimilation is such that investors cannot 
consistently exploit that information to earn abnormal returns. 
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Evidence started to emerge in the 1970s, however, which suggested that securities 
yield systematic excess returns following earnings announcements. Moreover, these 
excess returns persisted. In other words, unexpected news, good or bad, did not 
appear to be immediately incorporated in security prices. 
 
Ball (1978) reviewed twenty studies that appeared consistently to support the under-
reaction argument and disputed the findings. He suggested that experimental design 
was probably the cause of the apparent effects. In particular, the standard two 
parameter market model used in most of the testing omits variables that do contribute 
to the equilibrium level of prices. The identification of apparent “anomalies”, he 
argued, was simply an identification of mis-specification of the model.  
 
Bernard & Thomas (1989) also set about replicating earlier studies and confirmed 
evidence of post-announcement drift. US companies were ranked according to the 
degree of earnings surprise and subsequent drift was found to increase 
monotonically. The top decile, for example, would have produced an abnormal 
return of approximately 4.2% over the 60 days subsequent to earnings 
announcements. Arguing that these results presented “several vexing, conceptual, 
and econometric questions” they concluded that the phenomenon could be attributed 
to pricing errors related to unavoidable transaction costs. 
 
2.3.2  Dividend yield as a predictor 
The predictive power of dividend yields has been analysed by many researchers, 
including Fama and French (1988a, 1988b). Fama and French studied the returns on 
portfolios of NYSE stocks for return horizons from one month to four years. 
Regressions of returns on yields typically explained less than 5% of monthly or 
quarterly return variances but a much larger component of long-horizon returns. For 
example, regressions of returns on yield were shown to explain more than 25% of the 
variances of two to four year returns. Out-of-sample results confirmed the in-sample 
evidence that the explanatory power of yields increased with the return horizon. 
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Fama and French concluded that there are transitory or “temporary” components of 
prices. Shocks to expected returns generate shocks in the opposite direction to 
current prices. On average, the immediate shock to prices equates to the cumulative 
future price changes generated as these “revised” returns are delivered.  
 
2.3.3  Mean reversion 
Mean reversion studies have also looked at the apparent tendency for “erroneous” 
market moves eventually to be corrected. An important and comprehensive study of 
this type was undertaken by Poterba and Summers (1988) on both US and non-US 
data. 
 
Mean reversion implies that there may be observed periods of serial autocorrelation 
in prices during which prices and fundamental values diverge. However, over longer 
time periods this divergence is corrected. One approach to assessing the randomness 
or non-randomness of returns, adopted by Poterba and Summers, is the use of the 
variance–ratio test. Put simply, if a stock price follows a random walk then the return 
variance should be proportional to the return horizon. For example, the variance of 
monthly returns would be expected to be one twelfth the value of the variance of 
annual returns. The general model adopted by Poterba and Summers compared the 
variance of monthly returns derived from returns over varying periods with the 
variance of monthly returns derived from annual returns, viz:-  
 





 where: k= number of months in period examined 
 
This statistic would converge to unity if returns over any period are uncorrelated but 
would fall below one if the mean reversion trends, described above, were present. 
 
Poterba and Summers analysed four data sets and obtained the following results 
 
(a) Monthly returns on the NYSE indices for the 1926-1985 period 
- evidence of positive autocorrelation at intervals of less than one 
year; evidence of negative serial correlation for periods of more than 
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one year. Eight year returns, for example, found to be around four, 
rather than eight, times as variable as one year returns. 
 
(b) Market returns over intervals from 24 to 96 months from 1871-1985 
 - evidence of negative serial correlation at long lags but pre-1925    
    evidence weaker than post 1925 evidence. 
 
(c) Returns from 17 non-US markets over varying periods since 1919 
- most markets displayed negative serial correlation at long intervals. 
Positive serial correlation at short intervals also found to be pervasive. 
 
(d) Monthly returns on 82 individual US securities for the period 1926 to  
           1985 
- some evidence of mean reversion, but weaker than evidence for  
         markets. 
 
Like Fama and French, therefore, they found persuasive evidence of transitory 
components in stock prices. In speculating as to the causes of this phenomenon, 
Poterba and Summers were inclined to the view that these components did not arise 
through any ex-ante change in returns but rather through the actions of noise traders. 
They concluded that: 
 
  “Only by comparing models based on the presence of noise traders 
with models based on changing risk factors can we judge whether financial markets 
are efficient in the sense of rationally valuing assets, as well as precluding the 
generation of excess profit” (Poterba and Summers, 1988: 54). 
 
Balvers et al (2000) recently contributed wider evidence of mean reversion in stock 
markets by analysing both Morgan Stanley Capital International and IMF data across 
18 countries over the period 1969 to 1996. Their conclusions were:- 
 
 An absence of mean reversion is rejected across markets at the 5% or 
1% significance level. 
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 This finding is confirmed with both sets of data and adds to the 
controversial evidence of mean reversion first provided for US stock 
prices by Fama & French and Poterba & Summers, as discussed in 
2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 
 Following a shock to stock prices, it takes approximately three to 
three and a half years for these prices to revert halfway to their 
fundamental values. 
 Contrarian investment strategies can be developed to generate 
economically significant excess returns. 
 
2.3.4  Winner –v- loser strategies 
The predictability of security prices has also been examined closely from a 
behavioural angle, the hypothesis being that most people overreact to unexpected and 
dramatic news events. (A broader discussion of Behavioural Finance is contained in 
Section 2.5). 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) tested this hypothesis by examining the returns to 
„winner‟ and „loser‟ portfolios for the period between 1926 and 1982. Portfolios of 
common stocks were constituted at any date from the best and worst performing 
stocks over the previous 36 months and the excess performance of each portfolio 
measured over the subsequent 36 months. Sixteen non-overlapping periods were 
examined. 
 
The results were found to be consistent with the over-reaction hypothesis. Loser 
portfolios outperformed the market, on average, by 19.6% over the three year 
measurement periods; the winner portfolios tended to underperform by 5%. A very 
strong January effect was observed. Interestingly – and in agreement with the claims 
of the acknowledged father of value investing, Benjamin Graham – most of the over-
reaction unravelled over the second and third years of the test periods. 
 
Jagadeesh & Titman (1993) were among others who found evidence of the success of 
shorter-term momentum strategies. US stocks were grouped into winners and losers 
 28 
over six month periods between 1965 and 1989. It was found that buying the winners 
and selling the past losers would have generated substantial excess returns over 
subsequent six month periods. The authors argued that this was possibly evidence of 
overreaction on the part of investors who move prices away from long-term value 
temporarily. Alternatively, they argued it could be evidence that the market under-
reacts to information about short-term prospects but over-reacts to information about 
long-term prospects. 
 
2.3.5  Predictability – some later evidence 
An important addition in recent years to the literature on the success of the dividend 
yield as a predictor has been provided by Goetzmann and Jorion (1995). A re-
examination of the evidence, using much longer market histories, confirms that 
dividend yield does appear to have some, albeit marginal, ability to predict stock 
market returns. The authors argue, however, that the evidence may be affected by 
survivorship. 
 
More specifically, an analysis of UK stock market data over the total period 1871 to 
1992 showed that there was no evidence of predictability. The results for sub-periods 
showed significantly different results. Predictive ability over the 1871-1926 period 
appeared to be weak and, if anything, negative (i.e. high yield predicted lower return) 
while predictive ability over 1927 -1992 was strong and in the direction anticipated. 
 
Goetzmann and Jorion suggested that one explanation for these results may be that 
there was an irrational fear of equities in the pre-World War I era and that a clear 
structural break can be observed around the 1920s. Alternatively, they suggested the 
predictability results could be explained in terms of survivorship. In particular, the 
evidence of predictability for post 1926 data appeared to be driven by an outlier – 
1974 – a period when there were genuine concerns about the futurity of the existing 
financial system. An exceptionally high dividend yield in 1974 was followed by a 
burst of exceptionally strong stock market performance. 
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Clearly, the evidence is open to interpretation but one conclusion could be that 
survivorship tends to bias inference in favour of finding that dividends help predict 
long-horizon returns. The authors concluded: 
 
“If the chances of a market disappearing are truly zero, then the predictability we 
found in recent UK data is consistent with the market overreaction hypothesis. 
Otherwise, the predictability of future returns based on dividend yields may be 
overstated” (Goetzmann and Jorion, 1995: 506). 
 
A tool much-favoured by UK investment practitioners during the 1980s and 1990s 
was the gilt-equity yield ratio (GEYR). A high level of the GEYR indicated that 
holdings in equities should be reduced and holdings of gilts increased; a low level 
indicated the opposite. These decision rules were commonly based on GEYR levels 
of 2.4 and 2.0 respectively. 
 
The GEYR earned a considerable reputation for its ability to predict successfully 
switching opportunities between equities and gilts. Academic studies (see Clare et al, 
1994, for example) tended to support the GEYR as a successful predictive tool. 
However, there was little attempt to explain the rationale behind the GEYR through 
any detailed decomposition. 
 
This failure was corrected later in the 1990s when the GEYR became the subject of 
much closer scrutiny following a period of poor performance as a predictive tool. 
Levin and Wright (1998) and FitzGerald (2003), for example, have more recently 
attempted to decompose the GEYR by applying the basic Gordon valuation model: 
 
 P0 = d1/(r – g) 
 
and assuming that the discount rate used by equity investors is the sum of the risk-
free rate (the gilt yield) and a risk premium. 
 
The following summarises FitzGerald‟s analysis. Rearranging the model shows:- 
 
Expected equity return = equity dividend yield + expected dividend growth. 
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The risk premium can therefore be stated as:- 
 
Equity risk premium = equity yield + expected dividend growth – gilt yield 
 
A rearrangement of this relationship leads to an expression for the yield gap, an 
indicator more commonly used prior to the adoption of the yield ratio: 
 
Yield gap = expected dividend growth – risk premium 
 
The yield gap will therefore tend to narrow when a high risk premium is available 
and widen when the premium on offer shrinks. The expected dividend component in 
this relationship does, of course, introduce considerable noise. Real dividend growth 
cannot be expected to remain constant over time; the size of the component will also 
vary with inflation. Consequently, there is a danger that the indicator can be 
misinterpreted. FitzGerald argued that the yield ratio has in the past provided a 
partial solution to this problem by providing a crude inflation adjustment to the yield 
gap. Dividing both sides of the yield gap equation by the equity yield gives: 
 
Yield ratio = 1 + yield gap/equity yield.  
 
Because the equity yield has historically been positively correlated with inflation, the 
yield ratio has, until recently, proved to be a better indicator of relative returns than 
the yield gap. But it was argued that the decision rules applicable for much of the 
1980s and 1990s are no longer relevant in a new era of low interest rates and low 
inflation, since the “normal” range has shifted downwards significantly. 
 
Levin and Wright (1998) also noted that the GEYR is particularly sensitive to 
changes in inflation expectations and examined the success of revised decision rules 
which took account of changes in expectations. A strategy utilising revised rules 
outperformed the traditional approaches and a buy and hold strategy by a wide 
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margin. No claims are made, however, that the success of their revised approach 
destroys the credibility of the EMH. Indeed, Levin and Wright stated: 
 
 “We do not enter this debate [as to the cause of any predictable component 
of returns] except to point out that the superior trading performance of our GEYR 
adjusted trading rule may not be attributable to market inefficiency” (Levin and 
Wright, 1998: 10). 
 
 
2.4  EXCESS VOLATILITY 
Further questioning of the EMH arrived in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the form 
of variance testing and variance bounds analysis. Put simply, the claim was that the 
volatility of security prices appears was far greater than what should be expected if 
securities were efficiently priced. 
 
2.4.1  Early work 
LeRoy and Porter (1981) were the first to mount this challenge with respect to the 
equity market. They argued that if prices are viewed in the traditional way, as the 
present value of a future earnings stream, and assuming that no earnings are retained, 
then stock prices should be less volatile than the volatility of the earnings. Stock 
prices can be viewed as “a kind of” weighted average of earnings, and an average is 
generally less volatile than its components. 
 
They argued, moreover, that stock prices are an average of expected, rather than 
actual, earnings and since expected earnings can plausibly be assumed to regress 
towards a mean in the increasingly distant future, it follows that expected earnings 
should show less dispersion than actual earnings, further reducing the anticipated 
dispersion of stock prices. 
 
LeRoy and Porter also developed and tested a theory for defining the bounds on the 
volatility of security prices. The upper bound is the volatility that would be evident if 
there were no means of forecasting future earnings; the lower bound is the volatility 
if there were leading indicators that provided perfect forecasting ability. 
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Tests were performed on earnings and price data for the S & P Composite Index, GE, 
GM and AT&T. The conclusions were: 
 
 The data for two of the individual stocks were consistent with the 
theory that stock prices should be less volatile than earnings but the 
coefficient of dispersion for AT & T and the S & P Index was several 
times higher than that of earnings. 
 The upper bound test for volatility was “flagrantly violated” in all four 
data sets. 
 Based on both aggregated and disaggregated data, stock prices 
appeared to be more volatile than is consistent with the efficient 
capital markets model. 
 
2.4.2  The Shiller argument 
Shiller (1981) tackled the same problem. As in the LeRoy and Porter study, prices at 
any time were assumed to represent the present value of all future cash flows, in this 
case dividends. However, if a series of ex-post rational prices is constructed (i.e. the 
level of the market index at any point is calculated by discounting all the known 
dividends occurring thereafter), it is found to display far less volatility than the stock 
market actually displayed. 
 
Analysing US market data from 1871, Shiller concluded that price volatility was at 
least five times higher than the volatility of dividends would imply: 
 
 “The failure of the efficient markets model is thus so dramatic that it would 
seem impossible to attribute the failure to such things as data errors, price index 
problems, or changes in tax laws” (Shiller, 1981: 434). 
 
The following simulation illustrates the thrust of the basic Shiller argument. In this 
case, a variation of the Shiller methodology is applied to the UK equity market over 
the period from 1963-2005. The main difference in methodology is that nominal, 
rather than real, series are used in the analysis. The final effect, however, is similar. 
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Figure 2.1 charts the actual FTSE All-Share Index against a simulated “notional” 
equivalent. The latter was derived as follows.  
 
It was assumed that the actual FTSE All-Share Index level at the end of 2005 was 
“correct” and was a true reflection of the discounted dividends expected from 2006 
onwards. The actual annual divided growth experienced over the 43 year period is, of 
course, known, as is the average annual return earned over the period. It is assumed 
further that investors in the past had perfect foresight of future long-term dividend 
growth and that any shorter-term volatility in the stock market level was caused by 
shorter-term fluctuations in annual dividend growth. 
 
The notional index is constructed by working backwards from 2005, calculating an 
index level at the end of each year which represents the discounted value of the 
dividend and capital value anticipated for the following year. Thus the end 2004 
notional index level is the discounted value of the anticipated 2005 dividend and the 
end-2005 index level. The end-2003 notional level is the discounted value of the 
anticipated 2004 dividend and the simulated end-2004 index level, and so on. 
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Figure 2.1 shows that the actual index proved to be far more volatile than the 
simulated values. Moreover, the actual index appears to stray away from trend and 
for such a divergence to be sustained for lengthy periods. 
 
Figure 2.2 highlights this divergence. During the bear market of 1974 the UK market 
appeared to fall to just 30% of its long-term “trend” value. A correction was 
eventually completed by 1984. Through much of the 1980s and 1990s the stock 
market appears to have been sustained at levels well above long-term trend until a 
major correction was experienced over the 2000-2002 period. 
 
2.4.3  Varying the discount rate 
A key feature of Shiller‟s initial work and the simulation described above is that the 
discount rate used is assumed to remain constant, at the average of the total return 
earned by investors over the total period under examination. 
 
Some recognition was given to the fact that such “excess volatility” may be 
attributable to changes in interest rates (i.e. the discount factor). But the problem that 
Shiller identified was that expected real interest rates could not be identified directly. 
Indeed, he argued further that the movements in expected interest rates that would 
justify the variability in stock prices would have to be very large – much larger than 
the movements in nominal interest rates over the sample period. 
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Grossman & Shiller (1981) did subsequently examine further what would happen if 
the constant discount assumption was relaxed. The appropriate discount rate, they 
argued, is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and 
consumption in the future. Moreover, if the variability of stock prices implies that 
this marginal rate varies, it must be assumed that consumers have a better method for 
forecasting future consumption than using only current consumption. Grossman and 
Shiller consequently used a constant relative risk aversion utility of consumption 
function to determine varying discount rates over the 1889-1979 period.  
 
With the risk aversion coefficient in their model set at certain levels, Grossman and 
Shiller found that the volatility of discounted “perfect foresight” dividends was fairly 
similar to the volatility of the actual market, at least until about 1950. 
 
Kleidon (1986) found that subsequent work on later data was not successful in 
extending the Grossman and Shiller findings in this area. 
 
2.4.4  Straying from fundamental value 
An important contribution to the debate on apparent, excess volatility was made by 
Summers (1986). Summers argued that market prices do stray frequently and 
substantially from fundamental values. As evidence, the author cited the discounts 
available on closed end funds, the anomalous pricing in the British gilt market and 
the large takeover premiums that are frequently paid, even in cases where there are 
no obvious economic advantages to combination. 
 
Summers‟ analysis suggested that “a more catholic approach” should be taken to 
explaining the behaviour of speculative prices. More specifically, it may be possible 
to model the process by which errors are incorporated into asset prices: 
 
 “Such an approach seems preferable to insisting on the basis of very weak 




In more recent research, Bulkley and Harris (1997) re-examined the question as to 
whether excess price volatility might be caused by excess volatility in earnings 
expectations. Regression analysis was undertaken on US stock information, based on 
a model of the form: 
 
  egit = α + βeg
f
it + εit 
 
 where: egit = actual annual average earnings growth of firm i over five years   
  from the start of year t 
  eg
f
it = analysts‟ forecast of long run earnings growth for the same   
  period 
   
Under rational expectations the slope coefficient in the above regression should 
approximately average unity. For a sample of about 500 companies, tested over the 
period 1982-1989, the β coefficient found was just 0.19. The coefficient of 
determination was zero. Further analysis revealed that greater overall forecasting 
accuracy could have been achieved by disregarding the forecasts for individual 
companies and replacing them with the average forecast for all companies. 
 
Whether this poor forecasting ability accounts at least in part for excess price 
volatility, requires proof of some price dependency on earnings. Bulkley and Harris 
showed that, in fact, there was a highly significant relationship between cumulative 
returns and analysts‟ forecasting errors. In other words, the prospects for high growth 
firms tended to be overstated and the firms‟ shares subsequently underperformed. 
The opposite phenomenon was observed for the lower growth firms. When the 
authors analysed stock market performances for the extreme cases in their sample – 
the fastest growing 5% and the slowest growing 5% - they found a cumulative 
difference of 60% over a five year period in favour of the lower growth firms. 
 
2.5 THE CHALLENGE FROM BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE - THE BASIC 
TENETS 
In summary, there are three main planks to the efficient market hypothesis: 
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 Investors, in general, behave rationally. Moreover, it is argued, 
evidence of predictability and other phenomena discussed in sections 
2.3 and 2.4 can normally be explained by rational variation in 
expected returns (Fama 1991). More specifically, such rational 
variation in expected returns can be attributed to either shocks to 
tastes for current versus future consumption or to technology shocks. 
 
 In circumstances when noise, or the actions of irrational investors, 
drive prices away from fundamental value, arbitragers will step in and 
return prices to their “true” fundamental levels. 
 
 The consequence for investors in such an environment is that it is not 
possible to earn abnormal economic returns consistently. 
 
Few would dispute the last of these tenets. Numerous academic tests, such as the 
early tests described in section 2.2 have provided support for the weak and semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Additionally, most traditional active 
managers know only too well how difficult it is to beat their performance benchmark 
consistently (see the evidence contained in Malkiel, 2003, for example). By contrast, 
there are, no doubt, many hedge fund managers who would claim that they are 
regularly delivering proof that they can take advantage of superior trading techniques 
and/or exploiting pricing anomalies in order to gain superior returns regularly. 
Notwithstanding these claims, the evidence as to whether abnormal economic returns 
can be earned consistently by them without exposure to abnormal risks is still 
inconclusive. Indeed, evidence is emerging of a very significant positive correlation 
between abnormal returns and value at risk (see Bali et al, 2007, for example). 
 
A more intense debate has centred on the first of the above tenets, however: to what 
extent do investors always behave “rationally”? Moreover, does “efficiency” imply 
that securities are always “correctly” priced at their true fundamental valuation, 
given the information available at that point in time? 
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2.5.1  Behavioural traits 
By the late 1970s even Jensen, the arch supporter of the efficient market hypothesis, 
was led to conclude that: “……we seem to be entering a stage where widely 
scattered and as yet inconclusive evidence is arising which seems to be inconsistent 
with the theory” (Jensen, 1978: 95). 
 
At around this time, also, there was a growing interest in the evidence compiled by 
cognitive psychologists on the way in which people form beliefs, preferences and 
expectations. Taversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981, 1986) were at the forefront of 
the exploration in this field of behavioural finance. 
 
The focus of the attack on the efficient market hypothesis by behavioural theorists is 
the concept of “rationality”. Indeed, Statman (1999) provides an interesting summary 
of the “battle” between standard finance and behavioural finance: 
 
“People are „rational‟ in standard finance: they are „normal‟ in behavioural 
finance. Rational people care about utilitarian characteristics but not value-
expressive ones, are never confused by cognitive errors, have perfect self-control, 
are always averse to risk, and are never averse to regret. 
 Standard finance asks for too much when it asks for market efficiency in the 
rational sense…….. We would [all] benefit from the insights of behavioural finance 
by accepting market efficiency in the beat-the-market sense but rejecting it in the 
rational sense” (Statman, 1999: 26). 
  
 
The following discussion, which is based largely on the survey compiled by Barberis 
and Thaler (2003), and contained in Constantinides et al (2003), briefly describes 
some of the key findings of cognitive psychologists working in this area. 
 
Overconfidence 
People tend to be over-optimistic and, consequently, over-confident. This leads to 
investors overestimating both their chances of success and also their degree of 
knowledge. 
 
Barber and Odean (1999) argue that this overconfidence explains the high level of 
trading on financial markets. In an extensive study of trading by investors at discount 
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brokerages, the authors found that trading profits were insufficient to cover trading 
costs. Moreover, the securities bought tended to underperform the subsequent 
performance of securities sold. 
 
Representativeness 
Investors often appear to base investment decisions on perceived patterns in markets 
and to place too little weight on logical probabilities. This illusion can manifest itself 
in the extrapolation of past trends into the future or can lead investors to believe that 
“good” companies must make “good” investments. 
 
Representativeness also leads to the bias of sample size neglect. Investors facing new 
opportunities will often form judgements based on too few observations. Conversely, 
some investors who may have knowledge of the true probability distribution of 
events may be affected by the “gambler‟s fallacy”, the belief that trends must 
inevitably reverse. Sample size neglect may lead to investors failing to take profits 
because of a belief that a recent trend must continue whilst, in contrast, the 
“gambler‟s fallacy” may result in investors failing to take advantage of a trend that 
has newly become established. 
 
Conservatism 
Conservatism is the opposite of representativeness. The latter may lead investors to 
assume that a limited set of observations is representative of a known model while 
conservatism may lead investors to underweight recent evidence. In other words, 
they are reluctant to concede that a new trend is confirmed until they have the benefit 
of a much larger set of observations. 
 
Regret 
Regret is the feeling of sorrow that arises after making a decision that turns out to be 
wrong. Regret risk is the risk that a feeling of regret may come about. Examples of 
the avoidance of regret in the investment world are: 
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 Herding as a result of peer group pressure. In many situations 
investors may choose to follow the actions of fellow investors since 
this is viewed as the “safe” thing to do. In turn, this may result in 
market bubbles. 
 
 The reluctance to replace money managers who have underperformed. 
This often arises because of a fear on the part of fiduciaries that the 





Framing is the manner in which an investor conceives the possible outcomes 
associated with a decision. Tversky and Kahnemann (1981) argued that “the frame 
that a decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the norms, habits, and personal 
characteristics of the decision-maker” (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1981: 1124). 
Rational choice, the authors argued, should not reverse with changes of frame. 
However, they observed that choices do change: investors often shift their view of 
the relative desirability of options when viewing the possible options from a different 
standpoint. 
 
The following example, presented by Montier (2003), illustrates how context 
sensitivity can lead to conflicting results. 
 
Consider the following concurrent decisions: 
 
The first decision is to choose between 
 
(a) a sure gain of £2,400 or 
(b)  a 25% chance of a £10,000 gain and a 75% chance of gaining nothing 
 
The second decision is to choose between 
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(c) a sure loss of £7,500 or 
(d) a 75% chance of a £10,000 loss and a 25% chance of losing nothing 
 
Tests show that most people would choose (a) as their first decision. Whilst (b) offers 
a higher expected return (£2,500), the prospect of an extra £100 is not enough to 
tempt most people to chance gaining nothing. With the second decision it is found 
that most people would choose (d): they would take the opportunity to avoid a loss 
altogether. 
 
If the outcomes of the two decisions are taken together, however, we find that the 
joint decision process has resulted in an anomalous overall outcome. Thus: 
 
Choices (a) and (d) have an overall expected outcome of £2,400 - £7,500 = -£5,100 
Choices (b) and (c) have an overall expected outcome of £2,500 - £7,500 = -£5,000 
 
The discarded choices together offer the lower expected loss. 
 
2.5.2 The limits of arbitrage 
Behavioural finance argues therefore that there are a number of psychological factors 
at work which suggest that investors do not always behave rationally. In other words, 
the first of the main planks of efficient market theory - as introduced at the start of 
section 2.5 – often does not hold: it is claimed that investors frequently behave 
irrationally. 
 
What about the second plank of the theory, that the action of arbitragers will ensure 
that any deviations from “true” fundamental value are eliminated? Here too, 
behavioural finance, suggests that this assumption can be challenged. Pure efficiency 
theory would characterise arbitrage as a risk-free activity that requires no capital. 
 
Much of the arbitrage activity in today‟s financial markets is undertaken by hedge 
funds and proprietary trading desks. In turn, a significant proportion of this activity 
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can be said to be imperfect arbitrage. That is, the trading is not in perfect substitutes 
and, therefore, there is a risk that, for good fundamental reasons, apparent 
mispricings are not corrected. The Long-term Capital Management collapse provides 
an extreme and salutary lesson on the risks associated with imperfect arbitrage. 
 
This phenomenon cannot be used as an argument against efficient market theory 
since the traders should always be aware that there is no guarantee of profits. 
However, it is claimed that, even where arbitrage activity uses perfect substitutes, a 
considerable time might elapse before any pricing efficiency is corrected. 
Consequently, arbitragers may be forced to close out positions at a loss. 
 
Horizon risk therefore is the risk that the time that elapses before a mispricing is 
corrected is longer than anticipated. An arbitrage return of 5% earned over an 
expected correction period of 60 days, for example, represents an attractive 
annualised return of 34.6%. If the correction period in fact averages 120 days then 
the annualised return falls to 18.6%; at 240 days the comparable return is 7.7%. In 
some cases, the correction period may be even longer, even eliminating the net 
profits of the arbitragers. In extreme cases, the mispricing may worsen, forcing the 
arbitragers to close positions as capital providers withdraw funding in the face of 
rising losses. 
 
Apparent, sustained mispricings are well documented in the literature (see, for 
example, Thaler, 2005). The closed end fund puzzle, twin stock pricing anomalies 
and the anomalous pricing of technology stock carve-outs are commonly cited 
examples. 
 
Figure 2.3, for example, shows the actual stock market value of Royal Dutch 
Petroleum shares relative to their “true” market value. The latter is 1.5 times the 
value of Shell Transport and Trading since the two companies merged their interests 
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The Figure shows that there have been periods of significant and sustained deviation 
from the theoretical relationship that should exist between the two companies. An 
arbitrager buying Royal Dutch and shorting Shell in 1979, for instance, in view of 
the anomalous 10% discount of the former, would have experienced a worsening 
position over the next three years. Indeed, the discount widened to over 30% and, in 
fact, did not close entirely until 1984. Conversely, an arbitrager looking to take 
advantage of the relative cheapness of Shell in 1993 would have had to wait until 
2001 for the pricing anomaly to be corrected.  
 
This anomaly is commonly identified as noise trader risk. Whatever the underlying 
reason, there is a risk that a relative mispricing will deteriorate in the short term if, as 
in this case, two assets are perfect substitutes. Moreover, where there is a history of 
sustained mispricing – as in this case and others – many short-term arbitragers will 
avoid taking positions in view of the short term risk. 
 
Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading were unified within a Royal 
Dutch Shell parent company in July 2005. Royal Dutch Petroleum shareholders 
received 60% of the share capital of the new Royal Dutch Shell whilst Shell 
shareholders received 40%. Whilst the two types of shares are largely identical, some 
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differences in pricing can still occur because the dividends on the two types are 
denominated in different currencies and subject to different tax treatments. 
 
 
2.6  TIME VARIATION IN EXPECTED RETURNS 
As discussed in 2.4.3, an inherent weakness in early volatility testing was the 
assumption that expected returns are constant. But later research acknowledges that 
this assumption is unrealistic and that expected returns (discount rates) do vary over 
time. Moreover, this variation in expected returns is the source of significant 
volatility.  
 
Chapter 5 of this thesis discusses a partial decomposition of expected equity returns, 
building on the approach adopted by Shiller (1981). Chapter 6 discusses a full 
decomposition of returns in which changes in expected return are attributed to 
changes in the following factors: 
 real rates of interest 
 the inflation risk premium 
 long-term real dividend growth expectations 
 the equity risk premium 
 
The last of these factors, the equity risk premium, has been the subject of 
considerable debate and scrutiny in recent years and the progression of the debate 
over what has become known as the “risk premium puzzle”  is worthy of inclusion 
here. 
 
2.6.1  The equity risk premium 
The equity risk premium is the annual return earned on ordinary shares (common 
stock) over and above the risk-free rate. The latter can be defined in various ways, 
including the return available on short-term instruments, such as Treasury Bills, or 
the return available on long-term government bonds. Another variation in definition 
arises from the fact that the risk premium can be measured arithmetically or 
geometrically, the latter measure always being lower than the former. 
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Early assessments of the equity risk premium relied on ex-post measures. Ibbotson 
and Sinquefield (1976), for example, measured the annualised returns on US equities 
and Treasury Bills experienced over the period 1926-74 and computed a risk 
premium of 6.1% p.a. when measured geometrically, or 8.8%, when measured 
arithmetically. 
 
The first authoritative work on the equity risk premium in the UK market was 
produced by Dimson and Brealey (1978). The authors measured the ex-post, 
arithmetic risk premium over the period 1919 to 1977. The De Zoete equity index 
was used as the equity benchmark; the Treasury Bill rate was used as the measure of 
the risk-free rate. The average annual premium for the period examined was found to 
be 9.2% p.a., a result very similar to that of Ibbotson and Sinquefield, 
 
Dimson and Brealey‟s aim in measuring the risk premium over a long period was to 
provide “a guide as to what investors expect the risk premium to be in the future” 
(Dimson and Brealey, 1978: 14). Indeed, a risk premium of the order of 6%-9% was 
subsequently assumed for many years by academics and practitioners alike. In other 
words, the experience of the past was commonly used as an unbiased estimate of the 
future. 
 
2.6.2 A puzzle identified 
This practice started to come under severe challenge in the 1980s. In particular, 
academics identified a large discrepancy between the returns predicted by 
consumption-based pricing models and the empirical findings. This discrepancy was 
described by Mehra and Prescott (1985) as the “Equity Risk Premium Puzzle”. 
Cochrane (1997) and Cornell (1999) have both presented useful interpretations of the 
arguments along the following lines. 
 
Economic theory suggests that the risk premium available on a security can be 
described by a model of the form: 
 
Risk premium = γcov(∆c,r) = γζ(∆c)ζ(r)corr(∆c,r) 
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Where: γ     = utility function (degree of risk-aversion) 
∆c     = proportional change in consumption 
 r     = return from risky security 
 ζ(r)     = variability in asset return 
 ζ(∆c)     = variability in consumption 
 corr(∆c,r) = correlation between asset returns and changes in consumption. 
 
The required risk premium will increase according to the degree of risk-aversion, the 
riskiness associated with asset returns and consumption changes and the correlation 
between consumption changes and asset returns. The last factor can be explained by 
the fact that investors will be more attracted to (and therefore require a lower 
premium from) assets which will provide greater returns when consumption growth 
declines and vice versa. 
 
Dividing both sides of the above equation by the variability in asset returns provides 
us with an expression for the Sharpe ratio, thus: 
 
Sharpe ratio = Risk premium/ζ(r) = γζ(∆c)corr(∆c,r) 
 
Empirical work suggests that the ex-post risk premium is of the order of 9% p.a. and 
that the historical standard deviation in equity returns is 18%. The observed Sharpe 
ratio therefore is around 0.5. 
 
The problem identified is that the figure of 0.5 is more than 10 times greater than 
what theory suggests the number should be. Cochrane suggests that the following are 
reasonable inputs to the model above. Variability in consumption growth of 
approximately 1% per annum, a correlation coefficient of around 0.2 and a risk 
aversion coefficient between 1 and 2, the latter being the standard range commonly 
used in economic models. Putting these together gives a theoretical Sharpe ratio of 
just 0.004 – a value less than 1% of the observed value. 
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It is this apparent gulf between empirical estimates of the Sharpe ratio and the 
consumption-based asset pricing model that Mehra and Prescott (1985) described as 
the risk premium puzzle. 
 
Numerous reasons have been promoted in explaining this puzzle, including: 
 
(i) The correlation between asset returns and changes in consumption is higher 
than generally assumed. Certainly, there is a case for assuming that this 
correlation is higher over longer periods. A decade-long rise in the stock 
market, for example, is highly likely to lead to greater consumption. But, as 
Cochrane points out, even plugging in a correlation of corr(∆,r) = 1, ζ(∆c) = 
0.01 and γ < 10 implies a Sharpe ratio less than 0.1. 
 
(ii) Fear of market crashes pushes up the ex-ante risk premium, as conjectured by     
Reitz (1988). Also, the returns of stock markets such as the US and UK, 
which have survived for many decades, will show a survival bias. 
 
     (iii) Investors may be far more risk averse than economists normally assume. That       
            is, γ in the Sharpe ratio relationship above is too low. However to obtain a    
            Sharpe ratio of 0.5 would suggest that a γ value of around 250 is needed, a  
figure that is extremely difficult to justify. Consider, for example, the  
relationship between interest rates and consumption growth: 
 
Real risk-free rate = constant + γE(∆c) 
 
A γ value of 250 would imply that large variations in interest rates must 
accompany variation in consumption growth. This is not an observed 
phenomenon.  
 
(iv) The required premium is higher than suggested by standard economic models    
owing to behavioural influences such as myopic loss aversion. Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) suggest that investors are more sensitive to losses than to gains. 
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Moreover, investors evaluate their portfolios frequently. This combination, 
they argue, leads to investors demanding a high premium as a reward for 
accepting high variability. 
 
(v) The period investigated by Mehra and Prescott, 1889-1978, may not be 
representative of the very long term. Indeed, Siegel (1992) extended the 
period of analysis both backward and forward and concluded that the 
observed equity risk premium was much lower both before and after the 
1889-1978 period. The US ex-post premium, for example, was found to 
average 1.7% over the period 1800-1888 and 3.8% from 1979-1990. This 
compares to the average premium observed for the 1889-1978 period of 
6.3%. An explanation is provided by the fact that much higher risk-free rates 
prevailed both before and after the period in question whilst average equity 
returns were largely constant. This result was observed for both the US and 
the UK. 
 
2.6.3  Ex-post measures challenged 
It was common, accepted practice, even a decade ago, to use a measure of the 
historical equity risk premium for applications such as the capital asset pricing 
model. In recent years, however, users have become increasingly aware of the 
potential dangers in assuming that history is a reliable guide to the future. More 
specifically, interest and research has focused on what historical expectations might 
have been, rather than the ex-post outcomes. 
 
Forward-looking estimates of the equity risk premium have consequently been 
lowered over the past decade. Welch (2000), for example, surveyed 226 financial 
economists in late 1998, asking them to forecast the average annual risk premium 
over the next 30 years. The mean forecast was 7.1%; the median was 7.0%; and the 
range ran from 1% to 15%. The author also highlighted the fact that the most popular 
finance textbook available at that time, Brealey and Myers‟ “Principles of Corporate 
Finance”, recommended that its readers applied a risk premium figure of 8.2% - 
8.5%. Welch updated his earlier survey in 2001. On this occasion, the mean forecast 
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for the premium was found to be 5.5%, 1.6% below the expectation of three years 
earlier. 
 
Much of the earlier evidence was based on findings from the US and UK stock 
markets. More recently, studies have been extended to include analyses of returns 
from other markets. Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003), for instance, have provided 
a 103 year history of risk premia for 16 stock markets. The geometric mean premium 
was found to average 3.8%; the arithmetic mean averaged 5.9%. 
 
The authors stressed, however, that even premia based on long histories are not 
necessarily good guides to the future. Moreover, they identified a substantial increase 
in premia over the second half of the 20
th
 century for 14 of the 16 markets and 
attributed this to: 
 rapid technological and management enhancements 
 declining transaction and monitoring costs, which helped to underpin 
equity prices 
 declining inflation and interest rates during the last two decades of the 
century 
 declining required returns owing to diminished business and 
investment risk. 
 
The authors argued that this combination of factors is unlikely to be repeated and that 
historical risk premia should be adjusted downwards in developing forecasts for the 
future. A forward-looking, compound premium of around 3% p.a. (5% arithmetic 
mean) was suggested. 
 
2.6.4  Ex-ante analyses 
The discussion here has concentrated on the main debate surrounding the risk 
premium puzzle and, in particular, the evidence thrown up by studies of the historical 
premium experienced by investors worldwide. A number of studies have been 
undertaken in recent years into reconstructing historical expectations for the risk 
premia, taking into account economic and market data available at each point of 
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estimation. In other words, researchers have investigated the ex-ante, rather than the 
ex-post, equity risk premium. 
 
Blanchard (1993) simulated expected returns and equity risk premia for the US 
market from 1929 to 1993, applying regression analysis to four main variables: 
lagged inflation and nominal interest rates, dividend yields and lagged, real capital 
gains on equities. His simulations indicated that premia rose from 3% to 5% in the 
early 1930s, peaked at more than 10% in the late 1940s and dropped to 2% – 3% by 
the end of his analysis. 
 
Arnott and Bernstein (2002) applied a Gordon valuation approach to the US market 
for the period 1810 - 2001 and concluded that the historical average expected 
premium was 2.4% pa., albeit that the premium displayed a wide range of values 
over the 192 year history. The authors concluded that “it is dangerous to shape 
future expectations based on extrapolating…..lofty [ex-post] historical returns” 
(Arnott and Bernstein, 2002: 80). 
 
Fama & French (2002) undertook a similar analysis of ex-ante risk premia in the US 
market for the period 1872-2000. They found that for much of the period – from the 
start to around 1950 – ex-ante returns were very similar to ex-post returns.  However, 
a very different story emerged for the later period. A Gordon valuation approach 
indicated an average expected return of 2.6% for the period 1951 – 2000, actual ex-
post returns for that period averaged 7.4%. Fama & French also concluded, therefore, 
that “the average stock return of the last half-century is a lot higher than expected” 
(Fama and French, 2002: 637).    
 
FitzGerald (2001) applied similar techniques to the UK financial markets. The 
average ex-ante premium for UK equities for the period 1950-1999 was found to 
average just 1.4% compared with an ex-post average return of 9.2% pa. FitzGerald 
concluded that “there is no justification for assuming that the historical equity risk 
premium will be repeated” (FitzGerald, 2001: 16).    
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A more recent analysis of the ex-ante equity premium in the UK has been undertaken 
by Vivian (2007) who applied the Fama & French (2002) methodology. This 
confirmed that historical ex-ante premia appear to have been much lower than ex-





A comprehensive analysis of ex-ante expectations in the UK financial markets and a 
full decomposition of both ex-ante and ex-post returns in both the equity and bond 
market is contained in Chapter 6 of this thesis. A detailed discussion of the 
methodologies adopted by the authors cited above, and others, is also provided. 
 
 
2.7  THE FULL CIRCLE 
This chapter began with a discussion of the efficient market hypothesis and 
subsequently looked at the challenges to the hypothesis. What conclusions may be 
reached? 
2.7.1  The efficiency debate 
In recent years, Fama (1991, 1998) has responded to the challenges to EMH. In two 
major reviews of the literature he concluded, not surprisingly, that despite claims of 
anomalous and irrational behaviour in equity markets, there is insufficient evidence 
to abandon the EMH. His main arguments are: 
 
 The EMH suggests that the expected value of abnormal returns is zero. It may 
well be possible to observe cases of overreaction or underreaction, but these 
happen by chance. Moreover, anomalies tend to spilt fairly evenly between 
overreaction and underreaction. 
 
 The evidence on long-term anomalies does not suggest that the EMH is no 
longer a viable working model for three main reasons. Firstly, the evidence 
often arises because researchers have dredged for anomalous results. 
Secondly, many apparent anomalies, such as long-term return reversals, can 
be explained by rational asset pricing models such as Fama and French‟s 
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three-factor model. Thirdly, anomalies tend to disappear when alternative 
approaches are used to measure them. 
 
 Behavioural models have been developed to explain how the judgement 
biases of investors can produce apparent overreaction and underreaction. The 
Barberis, Schleifer and Vishny (BSV) model and the Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subramanyam (DHS) model are two such models. However, the evidence 
does not indicate that these models can explain apparent anomalies any better 
than the market efficiency model and rational analysis. 
 
Malkiel (2003) also scrutinised the market efficiency debate and the evidence that 
apparently discredits the EMH and has also reached the conclusion that many of the 
predictable patterns that have been discovered may simply be the result of data 
mining. But he also looked more closely at „seemingly irrefutable cases of 
inefficiency‟, notably the stock market crash of October 1987 and the internet bubble 
of the late 1990s. 
 
With regard to the one-third drop in market prices which occurred in October 1987, 
Malkiel acknowledges that behaviourists would argue that such a phenomenon can 
only be explained by psychological considerations. Such an explanation is normally 
based on the evidence that the basic elements of the market valuation equation did 
not change rapidly or significantly over the period in question. 
 
Malkiel argues, however, that a number of rational factors could have affected 
investors‟ views about the proper value of the stock market around that time. The 
first factor he identifies is the rise of nearly 150 basis points in long-term Treasury 
bond yields in the two weeks prior to the Crash. Additional risk factors identified and 
associated with the run-up to the Crash included the threat of a “merger tax” being 
imposed by Congress and the threat of actions to encourage a fall in the dollar 
exchange rate. Whilst not arguing that psychological factors were totally irrelevant in 
explaining the 1987 Crash, therefore, Malkiel argues that much greater weight should 
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be placed on the rational reaction of investors to these significant changes taking 
place in the external environment. 
 
Malkiel has more sympathy with the behaviourists‟ arguments in relation to the 
internet bubble of the late 1990s. He agrees that, in retrospect, valuations were based 
on „outlandish and unsupportable claims‟ (Malkiel, 2003: 75). Moreover, he argues, 
there were no obvious arbitrage opportunities available at that time. The fact is that 
investment professionals were – with the benefit of hindsight – egregiously wrong, 
and the extent of any „bubble‟ was only clear in retrospect. Indeed, investors seeking 
to profit from arbitrage opportunities at that time (i.e. by shorting overvalued internet 
stocks) faced considerable short-term risks. The rational policy for arbitragers – who 
tend to have short horizons – would have been to „go with the flow‟. 
 
Malkiel‟s overall conclusion is that the stock market is broadly efficient. Professional 
investors are not able to outperform market benchmarks consistently and the 
evidence is that markets are remarkably efficient in the utilisation of information. He 
does concede, however, that market efficiency is not perfect. Pricing irregularities do 
occur, and predictable patterns can emerge and persist for short periods. Moreover, 
extreme „anomalies‟, such as the internet bubble are the exception rather than the 
rule. 
 
2.8  THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
As discussed in section 2.4, some of the challenges to the EMH have been built on 
over-simplified assumptions, notably an assumption that expected equity returns 
remain fairly constant over time. At the heart of this thesis, however, is the 
assumption that expected returns from the equity market do vary over time. Returns 
available on alternative assets, including risk-free assets, do vary over time and must 
affect required equity returns. Additionally, it will be assumed that the risk premium 
required must vary over time as economic and/or political prospects change. In short, 
this thesis will assess the degree to which market behaviour that hitherto has been 
described as anomalous or irrational can be “explained” by rational circumstances. 
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The literature in this area throws up at least three important observations: 
 
(a) Financial markets are driven by expectations. Thus, it is dangerous to 
assume that ex-post experience is a reliable guide to what those 
expectations might have been. 
 
(b) The large variation over time in the observed ex-post values of the risk 
premium suggests that expectations can also vary widely over time. 
 
(c) Equity values represent present values of future long-term expectations. 
Critically, small changes in expectations can result in a significant short-
term variation in equity values. 
 
The four empirical studies of equity market behaviour that follow make use of, and 
build on, the work of the past decades, as presented above. The studies analyse 
behaviour at the total market level. Much of the historical analysis discussed in this 
chapter has centred on the US financial markets, whereas the empirical studies in this 
thesis will concentrate on the UK markets. Whilst many ideas and techniques may be 
transferable from one market to the other, it is possible that significant differences in 
scale, structure and investor objectives may result in different observed behaviour 
patterns within the different markets.  
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CHAPTER 3  EXPLAINING EQUITY RETURN VARIATION 
-THE MACRO APPROACH 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 reviewed the general literature relating to stock market efficiency and the 
challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The discussion also focussed on the 
debate relating to the variation in expected returns and whether such variation can be 
attributed to rational or irrational forces. 
 
An obvious starting point in attempting any empirical analysis of the variation in 
expected returns and prices is an examination of the linkages between stock market 
performance and the macroeconomic environment. And the intrinsic valuation model 
developed by John Burr Williams (1938) and Gordon (1962) provides a useful tool 
for hypothesising as to just what forces might drive expected returns and equity 
prices. Macroeconomic variables relating to growth in the economy might be 
expected to influence the numerator (i.e. future cash flows), for example, while 
variables relating to real interest rates might be expected to influence the 
denominator (i.e. the discount rate). In reality, of course, the valuation process is 
likely to be far more complex than these superficial observations would suggest. It 
could be argued, for instance, that cyclical variation in economic growth should not 
influence long-term expectations significantly and that any impact on valuations 
initially comes about through changes in the risk premium element of the discount 
rate. That is, the impact is on the denominator rather than the numerator, a suggestion 
supported by Cochrane (2005). 
 
Notwithstanding the apparent linkage between equity valuations and macroeconomic 
forces, there is limited evidence in the UK relating equity market variation to the 
variation in macro-economic variables. This is surprising given the fact that the 
price-earnings ratio – which, in effect, is a shortcut approach to intrinsic valuation – 
is by far the commonest valuation tool in use by analysts and money managers and 




The purpose of this chapter is to examine the key US and UK research published in 
this area and, in particular, to extend and apply to the UK equity market the 
methodology developed by Fama & French (1989) and Fama (1990) for measuring 
the explanatory power of a range of macro-economic variables. The work of these 
authors in this area has been identified by Cochrane (2005) as providing “the 
comforting link” between stock and bond markets, inasmuch as movements in 
variables such as the „term spread‟ appear to forecast returns from both markets. 
 
3.2  US STUDIES 
A considerable body of research relating US equity returns to changes in the macro-
economic environment started to appear in the 1980s. The following is a discussion 
of some of the key works that emerged. 
. 
3.2.1  Chen, Roll & Ross (1986) 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) set out to close the “embarrassing gap” that they 
identified between the theoretically exclusive importance of systematic state 
variables and our ignorance of their identity. By the modern diversification argument 
that is implicit in capital market theory, it is only these general, systematic factors 
which will influence the pricing of large stock market aggregates. 
 
Their study assumed that stock prices are explained by the standard dividend 
discounting process, viz: 
P = E(c) 
         K 
where c is the dividend stream and k is the discount factor. The systematic forces 
needing to be identified are those that change the discount factor and the expected 
cash flows. Changes in the riskless interest rate and/or the risk premium will 
therefore influence returns. Changes in the term structure will also influence discount 
rates. Expected cash flows were viewed as being influenced by both nominal and real 
forces. Expected inflation influences both the expected nominal values of expected 
cash flows as well as the discount rate. Chen et al also argued, however, that 
unanticipated inflation can also influence asset values owing to relative price 
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changes. Changes in the expected level of real production affect the real value of 
cash flows and therefore stock returns. 
 
The analysis focused on monthly changes in the returns on portfolios of stocks. The 
monthly series of annual growth rates in industrial production was included because 
stock prices involve the valuation of cash flows over long periods in the future and 
may not be highly related to contemporaneous monthly changes. 
 
The variables analysed are shown in the table below. 
Table 3.1  Macro variables 
              
  MP(t)  Monthly growth in industrial production 
  YP(t)  Annual growth in industrial production 
  E[I(t)]  Expected inflation    
  UI(t)  Unexpected inflation    
  RHO(t)  Real interest rate    
  DEI(t)  Change in expected inflation   
  URP(t)  Risk premium    
  UTS(t)  Term structure    
              
 
 
Unanticipated inflation was estimated using inflation forecasts implied in Treasury 
bill rates (as discussed in  Fama & Gibbons, 1984). 
 
The variable URP was intended to capture changes in risk premia and was defined as 
the difference between the redemption yields available on “Baa and under” corporate 
bonds and long-term government bonds. 
 
Changes in the term structure were also identified as possible indicators of changes 
in prevailing risk premia. The term structure variable, UTS, was defined as the 
difference between long-term government bond yields and Treasury bill yields. 
 
Relationships between changes in the above state variables and notional returns on 
New York Stock Exchange indices were analysed for the period from 1953 to 1983. 
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The results indicated that stock returns can be explained by a factor model of the 
form: 
R = a +  bmpMP + bdeiDEI + bUIUI + bUPRUPR + bUTSUTS + e 
where the betas are the loadings on the state variables. In recognition of the fact that 
stock returns appear to be related to firm size, and in an attempt to improve the 
discriminatory power of the analysis, portfolios were formed on the basis of firm 
size. Returns on the portfolios were then tested against the state variables shown in 
the above model. 
 
MP, UI and UPR were found to be significant over the entire sample period, while 
UTS was marginally so. The inflation-related variables, DEI and UI, were found to 
be highly significant in the 1968-77 period and insignificant both earlier and later. 
 
Equally-weighted and value-weighted market indices were then added to the 
analysis, in turn, to test the pricing influence of the market overall. Neither had a 
significant effect, indicating that the overall influence of the market is relatively low 
when compared with the influence of the underlying state variables. 
 
Finally, the influence of exposure to changes in real per capita consumption and 
changes in oil prices were examined. Neither factor was found to be of significance. 
 
Chen et al concluded that there is convincing evidence that stocks are priced 
according to their exposure to state variables and changes in those state variables and 
that these variables can be identified through the application of simple and intuitive 
financial theory. 
 
3.2.2  Roll (1988) 
Roll (1988) set out to investigate the paradigm which ascribes asset-price movements 
to: 
(i) unpredictable movements in pervasive economic factors 
(ii) unpredictable changes in a firm‟s market environment (i.e. industry 
information) and 
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(iii)  unpredictable events specific to the firm itself 
 
Roll used both a single factor (market) model and a multi-factor APT model to 
examine the relationship between asset price movements and systematic influences. 





s were found to be, respectively, 0.179 for the market model and 0.244 
for the APT. Of the 2030 stocks included, 77.4 percent had a higher R
2
 with the 
multi-factor model. Roll did not attempt to identify the factors within the APT 
model, merely noting that the first factor was very highly correlated with the overall 
market and that the remaining four factors were uncorrelated with this first factor and 
with each other. Roll also examined whether R
2
s are higher for larger firms as a 
result of their greater diversification but the evidence did not support this hypothesis. 
 
The impact of systematic influences on different industries was also analysed. 
However, the explanatory power of systematic influences was found to be similar 
from one industry to the next. 
 
The third element of the pricing paradigm is the influence of unique, specific 
information on prices. Roll surmised that, given the limited R
2
s uncovered for 
systematic and industry influences, much of the movement in assets must be 
“explained” by specific news. Or, put another way, R
2
s found by using CAPM or 
APT models should rise substantially if data for days on which specific news was 
announced were to be excluded from the analysis. The results were, in fact, found to 
be “extremely disappointing”. The average CAPM R
2
 was found to be 0.163 with all 
data and 0.177 with non-news data. The average APT R
2
 was found to be 0.205 with 
all data and 0.221 with non-news data. The distributions of the news data and the 
non-news data, however, were found to be significantly different, (the kurtosis fell 
sharply when news events were excluded). This led Roll to conclude that asset price 
changes might occur as a result of a mixture of traders acting on private information 
and occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information. 
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3.2.4 Fama & French (1989) 
Fama and French (1989) examined the relationship between the variation through 
time of expected returns and business conditions. The specific questions asked were: 
 
(a) Do the expected returns on bonds and stocks move together? In particular, 
do the same variables forecast bond and stock returns? 
(b) Is the variation in expected bond and stock returns related to business 
conditions? 
 
Data for securities on the New York Stock Exchange during the period 1926 – 1987 
were analysed. The results indicated that expected excess returns on corporate bonds 
and stocks did indeed move together. Dividend yields successfully forecast both 
stock and bond returns. Predictable variation in stock returns was also found to be 
tracked by variables commonly used to measure default and term (or maturity) 
premia in bond returns. The default spread was defined to be the difference between 
the yield on a market portfolio of corporate bonds and the yield on Aaa bonds. The 
term spread was defined to be the difference between the Aaa yield and a one-month 
bill rate. 
 
Fama and French argued that the default spread is a business-conditions variable: 
high during periods when business is persistently poor and low when the economy is 
persistently strong. They viewed the term spread as an indicator of shorter-term 
market conditions: it is low near business cycle peaks and high near troughs. The 
three indicators – dividend yield, default spread and term spread – therefore forecast 
stock and bond returns and the implied variation in expected returns is negatively 
related to long- and short-term variation in business conditions. 
 
Two possible explanations were offered for these observations. First, when business 
conditions are poor, income is low and expected returns on bonds and stocks might 
be high to encourage substitution from consumption to investment. When business 
conditions are good and income is high investors are satisfied with lower expected 
returns. The other possible reason presented was that the variation in expected 
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returns with business conditions is due to variation in the perceived risks of bonds 
and stocks. 
 
3.2.5  Balvers et al (1990) 
A considerable body of research had emerged by the end of the 1980s, including the 
Fama and French study discussed above, which related to the predictability of stock 
returns. Explanations for predictability fell primarily into two areas: (a) irrationality, 
such as fads, speculative bubbles, or noise trading or (b) rational variation in 
expected return over time. The purpose of the Balvers et al study was to present a 
robust, theoretical explanation for the latter. 
  
At the heart of their model was the assumption that, in attempting to maximise 
utility, investors attempt to smooth consumption by adjusting their required return on 
assets. Consequently, returns should be predictable to the extent that aggregate 
output is predictable. This phenomenon, it was argued, is consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis since attempts to exploit the predictability will increase variation 
in consumption, thus decreasing expected utility. The proposition to be tested, 
therefore, was that current period output measures should predict part of the future 
variability in asset returns. 
 
Empirical testing of their model with US market and economic data produced 
evidence of a 20 per cent level of return predictability, based on annual returns, and a 
50 per cent level of predictability for overlapping five year periods. 
 
3.2.6  Fama (1990)  
Fama (1990) expanded on the Fama and French (1989) study and identified three 
sources of variation in stock returns: 
 
(a) predictable return variation due to variation through time in the discount 
rates that price expected cash flows (as identified by Fama & French, 
1989), 
(b) shocks to expected cash flows and 
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(c) shocks to discount rates. 
 
The variables used to describe each source were as follows:- 
 
(a) Expected returns 
D(t)/V(t) – the dividend yield on the value-weighted NYSE portfolio 
DEF(t) – the default spread, defined as the difference in the yields on a broad           
portfolio of corporate bonds and the yield on Aaa bonds. 
TERM(t) – difference between Aaa corporate bond yields and one-month T-bill 
yields 
 
(b) Shocks to expected cash flows 
P(t, t + x) – the growth in industrial production up to x quarters ahead. 
Preliminary testing showed that industrial production explained as much, and 
sometimes more, return variation as other real-activity variables. 
 
(c) Shocks to discount rates (expected returns) 
DSH (t, t + 1) – residual from first order autoregression fit to the default spread 
series 
TSH (t, t + 1) - residual from first order autoregression fit to the term spread 
series. 
[no shock variable is derived for the yield since “shocks” are largely caused by 
changes in the stock prices themselves] 
 
Stock data for the period 1953-1987 from the New York Stock Exchange were 
analysed. Real returns were regressed against the term spread and either the 
dividend yield or the default spread. The results for annual observations are 
summarised below. 
R(t, t+T) = b0 + b1X(t) + b2TERM(t) + b3DSH(t, T+T) + b4TSH(t, T+T) + e 
 
 where: X(t) is either D(t)/V(t) or DEF (T) 
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Table 3.2  Multiple regression results 
          X(t) =D(t)/V(t)         X(t) = DEF(t)   
        b   t(b)     b   t(b)   
  Constant  -  0.35 -3.15  -0.13 -2.11   
  X(t)     9.55  3.93  26.52  3.34   
  TERM(t)     2.81  1.84   3.42  2.20   
  DSH(t, t+T)  -12.69 -1.74  -8.54 -1.38   
  TSH(t, t+T)     0.51  0.72  -0.14 -0.21   
           
  R
2
    0.33    0.28    
                  
 
The yield, default spread and term spread were all shown to be significant as 
predictors of future returns. However, the evidence relating to the shocks to 
DEF(t) and TERM(t), particularly the latter, was weak. TSH(t, t+T) was therefore 
omitted when the production growth variable was added into the regressions viz: 
 
R(t, t+T) = b0 + b1X(t) + b2TERM(t) + b3DSH(t, T+T) + b4P(t, T+x) + e 
 




Table 3.3  Multiple regressions including leading production growth 
                  
       X(t) =D(t)/V(t)     X(t) = DEF(t)   
       b   t(b)     b   t(b)   
  Constant  -0.31 -4.19  -0.13 -3.11   
  X(t)   7.62  4.42  19.71  3.73   
  TERM(t)   0.32  0.24   0.63  0.46   
  DSH(t, t+T)               6.34  1.24   9.79  2.25   
           
  P(t, t+3)   0.01  0.01  -0.16 -0.28   
  P(t+3, t+6)   0.77  2.68   0.71  1.82   
  P(t+6, t+9)   1.46  3.99   1.37  3.62   
  P(t+9, t+12)   2.13  8.26   2.16  7.91   
  P(t+12, t+15)   2.57  4.29   2.72  4.17   
           
  R
2
   0.59    0.56    
                  
 
The results with industrial production added in showed that the yield and default 
spread retained their significance. Growth in industrial production up to a full year 
ahead was also strongly correlated with real stock returns. The losers in the 
regression were the term spread and shocks to the default spread. 
 64 
Fama concluded that a large fraction of the variation in stock returns is explained by 
time-varying expected returns and forecasts of real activity. He did observe, 
however, that the regressions may overstate explanatory power given that the 
variables were chosen on the basis of goodness of fit rather than as the directives 
from a well developed theory. He noted further that some of the “explained” 
variation in return may not be rational. Fama conjectured, however, that if the 
variables that drive the rational variation in stock prices were somehow revealed then 
the R
2
 values found in the analyses summarised above may even understate the 
rational proportion of the variation in returns. 
 
3.2.7  A vector autoregression approach 
The use of contemporaneous and lagged regressions, such as in the Fama analysis 
described above, has appeal because of its relative simplicity. However, it was met 
with criticism because of its inability to identify the channels through which news 
variables affect asset prices. 
 
It could be argued, for example, that a variable such as industrial production may be 
associated with stock market movements. But there is a need to identify whether it is 
changes in industrial production itself which is causing changes in expected cash 
flows or whether both industrial production and stock prices are responding to 
changes in interest rates. 
 
Vector autoregresssion (VAR) is an increasingly popular technique for analysing 
such relationships. A VAR has two or more dependent variables. Moreover, each of 
the variables is analysed in relation to lagged values of itself and all the other 
variables. It is common to set the same lag length (e.g. 4) for each of the variables in 
each of the equations. The VAR approach has gained a good reputation for its 
forecasting ability. However, VAR can be viewed controversially inasmuch as it is 
atheoretical. That is, it simply models a relationship between each variable and 
lagged values of itself and all the other variables; it does not attempt to explain the 
theoretical relationship in a macroeconomic sense.  
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Campbell and Ammer (1993) used a VAR approach in analysing the relationships 
between asset returns, interest rates, inflation and other information used by 
investors. Unexpected excess equity returns were expressed in terms of revisions to 
future cash flows (dividends), real interest rates and future excess stock returns. 
Specifically:- 
 
 et+1 - Etet+1 = (Et+1 – Et){∑ρj∆dt+1+j - ∑ρjrt+1+j - ∑ρjet+1+j} ……..3.1 
 
 where:  et+1  = log excess return in period t+1 
   Et  = expectation at time t 
dt+1  = real dividend paid in period t+1 
   rt+1  = log real interest rate from t to t+1 
   ρ      = log-linear approximation parameter 
 
The VAR approach defined a vector of state variables that helped to forecast the 
excess returns. Included in the vector were: the excess stock return (et), real interest 
rate (rt), change in 1 month bill rate (∆y1,t-i), 10 year and 2-month yield spread (sn,t), 
log of the dividend yield (dt-pt) and the relative bill rate (rbt), defined as the 
difference between the current bill rate and a 1-year backwards moving average. 
Thus, the state vector was stated as: 
 
zt = [et , rt , ∆y1,t , sn,t  ,dt – pt , rbt] 
 
and was assumed to follow a first-order VAR process 
 
zt+1 = Azt + wt+1 
 
where: A represented the coefficient matrix of the VAR and w was the error 
vector. 
 
The key results for A over the period 1952 - 1987 are shown in Table 3.4. The table 
shows the most significant results from the 36 vector coefficients. Yield, for example 
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was found to be the best predictor of excess return while real interest rates, the yield 
spread dividend yield and real bill rate followed  persistent AR(1) processes.  
 
Table 3.4  Vector results 
          
  Variable Key relationship Coefficient  Standard error 
       
  et+1 dt  - pt  0.363  0.213 
  rt+1 rt  0.431  0.070 
  ∆y1,t+1 sn, t  0.078  0.040 
  sn,t+1 sn, t  0.860  0.037 
  dt+1 – pt+1 dt - pt  0.999  0.004 
  rbt+1 rbt  0.889  0.058 
          
 
Campbell and Ammer extended this analysis by estimating changes in excess returns 
from the error vector and by decomposing variance into the components implied by 
the equation 3.1 above. The R
2
 for forecasting excess stock returns was admitted to 
be “quite modest”, at just 7%. Variance in news about future dividends was 
estimated to account for 15% of total stock variance while news about future excess 
returns was attributable for around 70% of total variance. Real interest rates appeared 
to play only a minor role. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
3.2.8  Schwert (1990) 
Table 3.5  Annual observations - Period 1919-1988 
                  
        (t) =D(t)/V(t)        X(t) = DEF(t)   
           
       b   t(b)      b    t(b)   
  Constant    -0.20 -2.60     0.02  0.61   
  X(t)     5.83  4.21     6.37  2.03   
  TERM(t)    -0.10 -0.07    -1.14 -0.71   
  DSH(t, t+T)  -19.05 -5.55  -20.14 -4.96   
           
  P(t, t+3)    -0.51 -2.20    -0.43 -1.75   
  P(t+3, t+6)    -0.22 -0.93    -0.16 -0.59   
  P(t+6, t+9)     0.04  0.16     0.17  0.63   
  P(t+9, t+12)     0.55  2.16     0.49  1.60   
  P(t+12, t+15)     0.62  3.01     0.64  2.98   
           
  R
2
     0.39      0.34    
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Schwert (1990) set out to investigate the stability of the relations estimated by Fama  
(1990) using different data for a much longer period, 1919-1988. The results for the 
total period are shown in Table 3.5. The results for two sub-periods, 1919-1952 and 
1953-1988 are shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. The results for 1953-1988 are similar to 
Fama‟s. The yield variable was highly significant, as was the growth in industrial 
production up to a year ahead. 
 
Table 3.6  Annual observations - Period 1919-1952 
                  
       (t) =D(t)/V(t)        X(t) = DEF(t)   
           
       b   t(b)      b    t(b)   
  Constant   - 0.21 -0.89     0.01  0.10   
  X(t)     5.95  1.54   12.18  2.68   
  TERM(t)    -1.61 -0.64    -4.79 -2.17   
  DSH(t, t+T)  -17.35 -4.57  -22.69 -5.86   
           
  P(t, t+3)    -0.31 -1.32    -0.29 -1.23   
  P(t+3, t+6)   - 0.08 -0.31   - 0.11 -0.38   
  P(t+6, t+9)     0.04  0.13     0.21  0.75   
  P(t+9, t+12)     0.48  1.73     0.22  0.69   
  P(t+12, t+15)     0.45  2.45     0.42  2.61   
           
  R
2
    0.44      0.49    
                  
 
 
Table 3.7  Annual observations - Period 1953-1988  
                  
       (t) =D(t)/V(t)        X(t) = DEF(t)   
           
       b   t(b)      b     t(b)   
  Constant  -0.31 -3.87  -0.03 -0.55   
  X(t)   7.32  4.75  -2.23 -0.44   
  TERM(t)   0.50  0.31   2.11   1.06   
  DSH(t, t+T)   2.81  0.52   6.28   0.77   
           
  P(t, t+3)  -0.62 -1.08  -0.94 -1.35   
  P(t+3, t+6)   0.16  0.34    0.18   0.30   
  P(t+6, t+9)   1.26  3.21    1.30   2.48   
  P(t+9, t+12)   2.15  5.03    2.18   3.73   
  P(t+12, t+15)   2.38  3.56    2.31   3.10   
           
  R
2
   0.56     0.44    
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Yield was also found to be reasonably significant over the earlier period, 1919-1952, 
although, interestingly, the shock to the default spread showed up as the most 
significant variable in explaining return variation. The market appeared to anticipate 
changes in industrial production up to 15 months ahead. 
 
Schwert concluded that the fact that stock returns can be related to future real activity 
over a much longer period strengthens Fama‟s own conclusions since pre-1953 data 
would undoubtedly contain much more measurement error than later data. 
 
3.2.9  Kothari & Shanken (1992) 
Kothari & Shanken (1992) noted that previous research, such as Fama (1990) and 
Schwert (1990) has typically used proxies for rational expectations, such as ex-post 
actual data. As a result, the true expectation is measured with error. 
 
The authors attempted to complement earlier work by using two sets of variables -  
dividend yield and the growth rate in investment - as proxies for initial expectations 
of dividend growth. They noted the evidence, as in Barro (1990), that changes in 
investment are significantly predictable. Testing also revealed a significant positive 
correlation between contemporaneous investment growth and dividend growth. 
 
The return in a period was considered to be the sum of the expected return, any 
deviation from expected dividend growth during the year and the present value of 
any changes to longer-term growth expectations. 
 
In practice, the authors restricted themselves to a three year model: 




U(GD)      = unanticipated dividend growth in the return year 
∆E(FGDj) = change in value attributable to a change of growth expectations in    
        year j [j takes a value 1, 2, 3] 
aj      = discount factor 
e      = disturbance term that captured variation in changes beyond year 3. 
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A simplified form of the above model, using contemporaneous and future dividend 
growth rates, was applied to US market data for the period 1927-1985. The following 
results were obtained: 
 
Return = 0.04 - 0.05GD + 1.01FGD1 – 0.16FGD2 + 0.24FGD3 




 = 0.506. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
Since this regression result used ex-post, rather than ex-ante data, the results were 
distorted by measurement error. Ideally, the independent variables should have 
contained only information that arrived during the return year. The authors therefore 
expanded their analysis to capture measurement errors contained in the ex-post data. 
The proxies used to achieve this were the dividend yield (which is negatively 
correlated with growth expectations), the growth in private non-residential 
investment in the return year (GI) and one year ahead (FGI) and the actual market 
returns in the three years following the return year. 
 
Return = -0.11 + 0.55GD + 0.69FGD1 – 0.02FGD2 + 0.41FGD3  -0.71GI + 5.56D/P –0.12FR1 
   (0.08) (0.15)   (0.16)         (0.16)   (0.16)       (0.19)     (1.85)      (0.13)        
 
-0.40FR2 –0.18FR3 + 0.37FGI 




 = 0.721. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
Adding in the “ex-ante proxies” raised the R
2
 from 51% to 72%. Most of the 
estimates were statistically significant, notable exceptions being FGD2 and FR1. 
 
Kothari and Shanken argued that their methodology – in particular the use of future 
returns in the regression modelling – simply and effectively mitigated the problems 
associated with realised cash flow variables. 
 
3.3  KEY UK STUDIES 
UK studies of the relationship between equity returns and macro-economic data have 
been based on the methodologies developed in the US, as described above. A 
discussion of the most significant investigations follows. 
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3.3.1  Cheng (1995) 
The objective of the Cheng (1995) study was to analyse the relationship between UK 
security returns and economic indicators and to identify the set of economic variables 
which corresponded most closely with factors obtained using traditional factor 
analysis. Such analysis attempts to find the relationship between returns and a range 
of pricing factors. The study used canonical correlation methods, which allowed 
investigation of two sets of variables, in this case economic variables and stock 
market variables. 
 
Monthly security returns were collected for the period 1965 to 1988 and analysed 
using an Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model of the type: 
 




Rt  = random security return in period t 
E(Rt)  = expected return in period t 
bi = sensitivity of the return to fluctuations in factor Fi 
ε = the unexplained or “unsystematic” component of return 
 
As the author admitted, one of the difficulties in applying a factor analysis of this 
type is that it does not offer any theoretical or empirical grounds for identifying the 
economic nature of the factors. 
 
The analysis, nevertheless, identified two stock market factors, one displaying a far 
higher factor loading than the other. Further regression testing in fact revealed that 
only the more significant factor, together with the risk-free rate, were important for 
pricing over the period, findings that were consistent with the capital asset pricing 
model. Cheng noted, however, that the APT factor model only “explained” 11% of 
the variation in security returns over the 24 year period which, he argued, could be 
attributed in part to problems such as non-stationarity and non-linearity. 
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The second part of Cheng‟s study examined a set of UK market and economic 
variables in order to estimate the number and loadings of the factors that represent 
the UK economy. The variables were subjected to maximum-likelihood factor 
analysis and the conclusion was reached that there are three major factors underlying 
the UK economy. The first factor encompassed general market-wide variables, 
including share indices, the second factor included variables such as the longer 
leading and lagging economic indicators whilst the third factor embraced variables 
such as GDP and industrial production. 
 
The final part of Cheng‟s analysis was to link and compare the set of security return 
factors obtained with the set of economic factors. The strongest linkage was found 
between the first, most significant, security return factor and the first economic 
factor. Since the first economic factor is driven, in turn, by stock market share 
indices, Cheng inevitably reached the conclusion that market return plays the 
dominant role in influencing security returns. 
 
3.3.2  Black and Fraser (1995) 
Black and Fraser (1995) explored the extent to which the conditional risk associated 
with the UK equity market can be captured by financial variables which proxy for 
business conditions in the economy. The study assumed that excess equity returns 
have a non-linear dependence on risk which, in turn, can be described by a 
generalised class of autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) model of 
the form: 
 
Rt = Ø + Өht + ε 
 














Rt = excess return on the portfolio at time t (the study analysed results for both 




  = conditional error variance – a function of the past squared error (єt
2
-1) and 
the last period‟s conditional variance 
 
It-1 = information set available at time t-1 
 
Excess return was defined as the total return in any period (capital performance plus 
dividend yield) less the return available on three-month Treasury bills. The 
conditional variance of the UK equity market, found from fitting the GARCH model 
to the excess return data, was shown to increase over periods of falling share prices 
(e.g. 1972-74 bear market and 1987 Crash) and decrease during sustained bull 
periods. 
 
Black and Fraser extended the analysis by including three indicators of future 
business conditions in the excess return equation. Adopting in part the methodology 
of Fama (1990), the ex-ante variables used to predict business conditions were 
dividend yield (FTADY), term spread (TERMSP) and default spread (DFALTSP). 
All three were assumed to be inversely related to business conditions. Thus the 
excess return equation became: 
 
Rt = Ø + Өht + Ø1TERMSPt-1 + Ø2DFALTSPt-1 + Ø3FTADYt-1 + εt 
 
The notable feature arising from the GARCH analysis was that, in this case, the 
parameter in the above equation applying to the conditional variance was no longer 
significant. However, the three indicators of future business conditions were seen to 
be significant, implying that they can capture, at least in part, the time variation in 
expected excess returns. The authors‟ broad conclusion, therefore, was that the 
results are supportive of the business conditions hypothesis, as developed by Balvers 
et al (1990). 
 
3.3.3  Pesaran and Timmermann (2000) 
Whilst recognising the significance of earlier work, Pesaran and Timmermann (2000) 
argued that researchers of equity return predictability needed to avoid the 
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construction of models which benefited from hindsight. That is, models need to 
reflect genuine, ex-ante predictability. To this end, they argued, models need to 
reflect the “real time” behaviour of investors, taking into account the fact that the 
relative importance of business factors can change over time, as may the belief of 
investors as to which set of factors is the most meaningful at any time. 
 
The authors therefore distinguished between three hierarchies of regressors. At the 
highest level was the set of “core variables”, so-called because they are assumed to 
be important on theoretical grounds. These core variables are always included in any 
analysis. 
 
The regressors in the second, or “focal”, set are always worthy of consideration for 
inclusion in view of their ability to capture changes in risk premia available owing to 
business fluctuations. Some of these regressors may be excluded at any time, 
however, depending on the objectives of the modelling process. 
 
The first and second set of regressors form the “base set.” A third and final set is 
considered as potentially relevant only if there is clear evidence that the base set fails 
to serve its purpose. 
 
Table 3.8  Three regressor sets 
                    
  First set (A) Second set (B)   Third set (C)    
              
  FT All-Share yield Change in 3 month T-bill rate Change in industrial production   
              
  3 month T-bill rate Change in consols yield Change in money supply (M0)   
              
  Retail price inflation "January effect" dummy Change in oil price    
                    
 
 
The authors analysed monthly excess returns from the UK market over the period 
1965-93. The excess returns were regressed on all the variables shown in Table 3.8 
and a further three dummy variables for the periods January 1975, February 1975 
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and October 1987. Performances during these periods were considered to be extreme 
outliers. 
 
The significance of the regressors is shown in Table 3.9. In all cases, the signs were 
as expected from theory and from previous US studies. The dividend yield showed a 
positive correlation with excess returns possibly, the authors argued, because of 
mean reversion, investor over-reaction or persistent time-varying risk premia. The R
2
 
of the regression was 0.33; this fell to 0.12 when the dummies were removed.  
 
Pesaran and Timmermann also explored the impact of allowing the choice of 
regressors from the second and third sets to vary over time, the choice being 
determined by the type of model selection criterion being used. Previous literature 
related to this area had suggested the Schwarz, Akaike and R
2
 approaches, all three 
of which are likelihood based and assign different weights to the „parsimony‟ and 
„fit‟ of the models. The authors found that the Akaike and R
2
 approaches tended to 
give similar outcomes and included a greater number of regressors than the Schwarz 
approach. Their analysis also suggested that the best forecasting model changed 
considerably over time. (A useful discussion of model selection criteria, including 
reference to the Pesaran and Timmermann methodology is contained in Dell‟Aquila 
and Ronchetti, 2006). 
 
Table 3.9  Significance of regressors 
              
  Regressors   t-stats   
         
  Jan 1975 dummy    8.62   
  Feb 1975 dummy    3.95   
  Oct 1987 dummy   -5.12   
  January dummy    1.88   
  FT All-Share yield    2.70   
  3 month T-bill rate    0.06   
  Retail price inflation   -1.77   
  Change in 3 month T-bill rate   0.25   
  Change in consols yield  -1.63   
  Change in industrial production   2.43   
  Change in money supply (M0)  -2.29   
  Change in oil price   -4.31   




Table 3.10 compares the results of a buy-and-hold strategy in the UK equity market 
with those that would have been achieved by switching between equities and T-bills, 
according to the predicted outlook for equities. Results are shown for policies based 
on the three approaches discussed above and on a model which utilised all the 
regressors over the entire period. No leverage was permitted, nor was shorting in 
either of the assets (equities and T-bills). 
 
As the results show, a buy-and-hold strategy in the equity market would have 
provided the superior return over the entire period. However, the Sharpe ratios 
(excess return/standard deviation) would have been far superior for the switching 
portfolios, even after transaction costs. The analysis identified two periods (1973-5 
and 1981) when there appeared to be persistently negative excess returns. Avoidance 
of equities during these periods in part explains the superior risk-return trade-off of 
the switching portfolios. The authors conceded that it was not possible to establish 
conclusively how, or why, negative risk premia appeared to exist during these 
periods but suggested that factors such as „noise trading‟ or „psychological‟ factors 
may offer explanations. 
Table 3.10  Switching results, 1970 - 1993 
                
     Mean S.D. Sharpe   
     Return (%) of return (%) ratio   
          
  Market portfolio (FT A-S) 20.96 36.55 0.297   
  T-bills   10.12   2.63 n/a   
          
  Switching portfolios:       
          
  Akaike   18.18   9.70 0.830   
  Schwarz   20.27 11.28 0.899   
  R
2
   18.22   9.87 0.821   
  All regressors  16.74 16.98 0.390   
                
Note: results exclude transaction costs 
 
3.3.4  Lovatt and Parikh (2000)  
Lovatt and Parikh (2000) applied the Fama (1990) methodology to the UK market 
for the period 1980 to 1994. The choice of the period 1980-94 was guided by two 
considerations. First, the authors wanted a good number of observations before and 
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after the market fall of October 1987 so that the bull market, followed by the market 
fall, would be set in a longer-term context. Secondly, the authors decided to limit the 
period to one in which monetary policy had been consistently used to control 
inflation, hence the decision to start the sample period in the year following the 
election of the Conservative Government. 
 
The dependent variables used were the monthly, quarterly and annual real total 
returns on the FT-All Share Index calculated on a moving monthly basis. The 
independent variables used were the FT-All Share dividend yield, the default spread 
of corporate bonds, the term spread, shocks to the default spread and quarterly 
percentage changes in industrial production. Shocks to the default spread were 
measured by the residuals from a first-order regression fit to the observations. 
 
The results are shown in Table 3.11. As in Fama‟s model, the annual results were 
better than the monthly and quarterly estimations. The yield coefficient and the 
production coefficient were positive, as anticipated; however, the coefficient related 
to the term spread was surprisingly negative. The authors concluded that, in general, 
the model provided a reasonably good explanation for real equity returns. 
 
Table 3.11  Fama’s model applied to the UK 
                    
     Monthly  Quarterly  Annual   
     t-ratio  t-ratio  t-ratio   
            
  Constant   -3.65  -3.02  -1.56   
  Yield    3.78   3.06   1.85   
  Term spread  -2.36  -1.97  -0.71   
  Shock to default spread -3.17  -1.85  -4.05   
  IP(t, t+3)    1.76   1.96   1.12   
  IP(t+3, t+6)   3.89   3.10   1.69   
  IP(t+6, t+9)   1.41   3.07   2.95   
  IP(t+9, t+12)   2.08   1.36   2.75   
  IP(t+12, t+15)   2.07   3.08   3.27   
  IP(t+15, t+18)   1.69   1.37   3.05   
  IP(t+18, t+21)   0.86   1.51   1.85   
  IP(t+21, t+24)   0.48  -0.36   1.97   
            
  R-squared    0.15   0.24   0.35   
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.Table 3.12  Alternative Lovatt/Parikh model 
          
    t-ratio   
       
  Constant  -1.32   
  Dividend yield  2.49   
  Inverted yield curve -1.61   
  Expected GDP growth  1.02   
  Expected inflation -1.37   
       
  R-squared   0.24   
          
 
Lovatt and Parikh did nevertheless highlight the problem with the Fama model for 
forecasting purposes, notably that it made use of leading variables. They tackled this 
problem by making use of expectational data. „Historic‟ forecasts of real GDP and 
inflation were obtained from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. 
Real GDP was anticipated to have a positive influence on returns; inflation was 
anticipated to be inversely related to returns, inasmuch as higher expected inflation is 
associated with higher expected interest rates. 
 
The results derived using this alternative model are shown in Table 3.12. The model 
explained a slightly smaller proportion of the variance than the annual version of the 
Fama model and not all the estimated parameters were significant 
 
 
3.4 A NEW ANALYSIS OF UK MARKET RETURNS, 1963-2003 
The second half of this chapter will present an up-to date analysis of the linkages 
between the UK equity market and macroeconomic variables. As in Lovatt and 
Parikh (2000), the Fama (1990) methodology will form the basis of the analysis. The 
period analysed, however, is not confined to that of the last Conservative government 
and embraces torrid economic and market conditions as well as the calmer conditions 
that prevailed during most of the period analysed by Lovatt and Parikh. The range of 




The analysis looks at the relationship between real equity returns and 
macroeconomic changes for: 
 
 Quarterly periods 
 Annual periods, non-overlapping (i.e. calendar years) 




3.4.1 The Fama variables 
At the heart of the approach adopted by Fama (1990), discussed in section 3.2, is the 
assumption that equity prices represent discounted values of future cash flows. In a 
perfect world prices would rise steadily and investors would receive the constant 
returns implied in the discount rate. In an imperfect world, however, returns will 
vary. It is assumed that this variation has three sources: 
 
(a) predictable variation due to variation in the discount rates, the expected 
returns 
(b) shocks to the discount rate 
(c) shocks to expected cash flows. 
The variables used to examine return variation were as follows. 
 
Dependent variable 
Real returns on the value-weighted NYSE market portfolio 
Expected returns 
(i) Dividend yield on the NYSE market portfolio 
(ii) Default spread, defined as the difference between the yield at time t on a 
portfolio of corporate bonds and the equivalent yield on a portfolio with 
Aaa ratings 
(iii) Term spread, defined as the difference between the yield at time t on the 
corporate bond portfolio and the one-month Treasury bill rate. 
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These three variables capture the variation in expected returns in response to 
business conditions. In other words they attempt to capture a measure of the risk 
premium on offer. When business conditions are strong, confidence is high, default 
and term spreads narrow and dividend yields tend to fall. The reverse is the tendency 
when business conditions are poor. 
Shocks to expected returns 
(i) Shock to the default spread as measured by the residual from first order 
autocorrelation fit  
(ii) Shock to the term spread as measured by the residual from first order 
autocorrelation fit 
Yield shocks cannot be used since these are largely driven by price changes. 
Shocks to expected cash flows 
(i) Growth in industrial production up to 4 quarters ahead. 
 
3.4.2  UK variables 
A discussion is presented here of a new and equivalent analysis of UK equity market 
variability. The variables selected are shown in Table 3.13. Sources of raw data and 
methodologies applied to obtain derived data are shown in Table 3.14. The 
dependent variable in the analysis is the real total return on the UK equity market (as 
represented by the FTSE All-Share Index). Returns are regressed against the 
remaining indicators and “shocks” are as defined in Table 3.13.  
 
The FTSE All-Share index was used to represent the UK market since this is the 
broadest index available. It captures approximately 98% of available market 
capitalisation at any point of time. It is recognised that an extended analysis which 
examined relationships between macroeconomic variables and different segments of 
the market – by viewing the industrial segment financial segments separately for 
example – might reveal additional, interesting results. However, given the high, 
historical correlation between such segments and the total market index – 96% in the 
case of the industrials (see Figure 3.1) - it was concluded that this initial analysis 
should utilise the total market benchmark. 
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Whilst the Fama (1990) methodology was considered to be the most appealing and 
authoritative of those employed in this area, it was felt that the range of indicators 
could be extended. Market volatility was included, therefore, as an additional 
indicator of uncertainty and, therefore, of potential risk premia. Additional „shocks to 
expected returns‟ incorporated in the analysis relate to unanticipated changes in 
volatility and both long and short term interest rates. Additional „shocks to cash 
flows‟ incorporated are changes in corporate real earnings and dividends, changes in 
GDP and changes in consumer expenditure. Exchange rate movements are, of 
course, important to the UK corporate sector. However, since exchange rate 
movements would eventually impact corporate earnings, it was not considered 
necessary to include separate exchange rate series in the analysis. Further, more 
detailed analyses might nevertheless consider their inclusion, especially if 
relationships in more specific sectors (e.g. manufacturing) are being investigated. As 
in Fama (1990), shocks were measured as the residuals from first order correlation 
values.  
 
It was also considered worthwhile including inflation in the analysis, given the 
dramatic impact that changes in inflation have had on the UK economy over the 
period under investigation and also the perceived negative correlation between 
inflation and real corporate profitability. 
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Table 3.13  Variables selected for UK analysis 
            
  Dependent variable    
        
  MRR(t, t+1) Market real, total return (FTSE All-Share index)   
        
  Indicators of "predictable" expected return   
        
  DIVY(t)  Market dividend yield at time t   
  DEF(t)  Default spread at time t   
  TERM(t)  Term spread at time t   
  VOL(t)  Volatility at time t   
        
  "Shocks" to expected returns    
        
  DEFSH(t, t+1) Unanticipated (% pt) change in default spread    
  TERMSH(t, t+1) Unanticipated (% pt) change in term spread   
  VOLSH(t, t+1) Unanticipated (%pt) change in volatility   
  CONSH (t, t+1) Unanticipated (% pt) change in consols yield   
  TBILLSH(t, t+1) 
Unanticipated (% pt) change in Treasury bill 
yield   
        
  "Shocks" to cash flows    
        
  RCECH(t, t+1) Real corporate earnings change   
  RCDCH(t, t+1) Real corporate dividends change   
  GDPCH (t, t+1) GDP volume growth   
  IPCH(t, t+1) Industrial production change   
  CONEXCH(t, t+1) Consumer expenditure change   
        
  Other      
        
  RPICH(t, t+1) Retail price index change   
        
  Note: "Shocks" are derived as the residuals from first order autocorrelation values  
            
Dividend yields and notional, corporate earnings and dividends were compiled, or 
derived from, FTSE Actuaries data. The following methodology and adjustments 
were applied: 
 
(i) Dividend yields were recorded “gross” prior to 1998 but have been 
recorded “net” since 1998, reflecting the dividend tax changes 
introduced in 1997. The immediate effect at the changeover was to 
reduce the gross yield for the FTSE All-Share index by 18%. For 
consistency in this analysis, published yields since 1997 have been 
grossed up by a factor of 0.82. 
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(ii) Notional corporate earnings were derived from: (Index level/index 
P/E). The P/E was not derived for the FTSE All-Share index prior to 
1993; the FTSE Industrials data were therefore used. A series based 
on FTSE All-Share data was used from 1993, the two derived series 
being spliced together at that point. Notional corporate dividends were 
derived from: (Index level x index yield/100). FTSE All-Share data 
were used. 
 
(iii) Companies report some months after the end of their trading year. 
Final dividends are not paid until some months after being reported. 
The derived earnings and dividend series were therefore transformed 
to “real time” by lagging by six months in each case. For example, the 
dividends and earnings reflected in the index data at mid calendar year 
are taken to represent broadly the earnings and dividends associated 
with the previous December year-end trading year. 
 
As discussed above, the „shocks to expected returns‟ used in the analysis were the 
residuals from first order autocorrelation values. For example, an autocorrelation 
analysis suggested that the term spread at time t+1 would be expected to be: 
 
 0.112 + 0.880*(term spread at time t) [R
2
 = 0.781] 
 
The „shock‟ recorded at time t+1 was the difference between the observed value and 
this predicted value i.e. the unpredicted element. 
 
Table 3.15 shows the means, standard deviations and autocorrelation lag coefficients 
for each of the variables defined. The period analysed is end-1963 to end-2003. Note 
that there is little autocorrelation in market real returns whilst dividend yields, default 






Table 3.14  Data sources 
        
  Item Source   
  FTSE All-Share Index FT publications/DataStream   
      
  FTSE All-Share Yield FT publications/DataStream   
      
  FTSE All-Share P/E (from 1993) FT publications/DataStream   
      
  FTSE Industrials P/E FT publications/DataStream   
      
  Consols (2
1
/2) Yield Bank of England Quarterly/Financial Statistics   
      
  Long-dated gilt yield (20 years) Bank of England Quarterly/Financial Statistics   
      
  Treasury Bill yield (91 days) Bank of England Quarterly/Financial Statistics   
      
  Company Debenture yield Bank of England Quarterly/Financial Statistics   
      
  Long-dated index-linked yield (from 1981) Bank of England Quarterly/Financial Statistics   
      
  Retail Price Index (all items) National Statistics   
      
  Gross Domestic Product (volume) National Statistics   
      
  Index of Production (total industries) National Statistics   
      
  Household Consumer Expenditure National Statistics   
      
  Derived data    
      
  Item Methodology   
  Index of real company earnings Notional earnings derived from Index/Index PE.   
   Lagged 6 months and deflated by the RPI.   
      
  Index of real company dividends Notional dividends derived from (Index * Index   
   yield). Lagged 6 months and deflated by the RPI.   
      
  UK equities – total return index (quarterly)   
One quarter of dividend yield (using start index 
and end quarter notional dividend) added to capital   
   performance in any quarter.   
      
  Consols (2
1
/2%) – total return index One quarter of start income yield added to   
   capital performance in any quarter   
      
  3 month Treasury Bills – total return index One quarter of quoted interest yield at start used   
      
  Default spread Difference between yield on company debentures   
   and long-dated gilt yield   
      
  Term spread Difference between consols yield and T-bill yield   
      
  Volatility Standard deviation in daily market returns   
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Table 3.15  Means, standard deviations and autocorrelations – quarterly data 
           Lag :-           
   Mean Sdev  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
MRR(t, t+1)  0.020 0.106    0.040 -0.010  0.030 -0.120 -0.110  0.000 -0.020  0.020 
               
DIVY(t)   0.045 0.013   0.880  0.740  0.630  0.520  0.450  0.420  0.400  0.360 
DEF(t)   0.983 0.448   0.710  0.650  0.610  0.530  0.440  0.420  0.380  0.320 
TERM(t)   0.993 2.023   0.880  0.780  0.670  0.580  0.510  0.430  0.360  0.300 
VOL(t)   0.136 0.068   0.350  0.310  0.260  0.270  0.270  0.300  0.110  0.100 
               
DEFSH(t, t+1) -0.001 0.319  -0.220  0.090  0.150  0.120 -0.050  0.120  0.060  0.040 
TERMSH(t, t+1)  0.000 0.947   0.020  0.030  0.000 -0.040  0.050  0.000 -0.060 -0.020 
VOLSH(t, t+1)  0.000 0.064  -0.070  0.160  0.110  0.120  0.120  0.230 -0.020  0.080 
CONSH (t, t+1)  0.004 0.710  -0.040  0.070  0.040 -0.050 -0.040  0.050  0.050  0.130 
TBILLSH(t, t+1) -0.002 1.092   0.150  0.030 -0.100  0.020 -0.110  0.110 -0.010  0.020 
               
RCECH(t, t+1)  0.006 0.042   0.480  0.300  0.200  0.060 -0.100 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 
RCDCH(t, t+1)  0.003 0.028   0.120  0.130  0.100  0.230  0.100  0.090  0.010  0.200 
GDPCH (t, t+1)  0.006 0.010  -0.040  0.050  0.180 -0.030  0.030  0.120 -0.020 -0.170 
IPCH(t, t+1)  0.004 0.017   0.120  0.060  0.030 -0.030 -0.090  0.000 -0.070 -0.080 
CONEXCH(t, 
t+1)  0.008 0.052  -0.280 -0.380 -0.270  0.900 -0.240 -0.380 -0.260  0.870 
               
RPICH(t, t+1)  0.016 0.015    0.570  0.540  0.420  0.640  0.380  0.400  0.340  0.510 
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As Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, the period 1963 – 2003 embraced significant regime 
changes. The 1970s were characterised by high inflation, industrial unrest, declining 
real corporate earnings and dividends and exceptional market volatility, particularly 
over the 1972-1975 period. The impact of the latter on the results of this analysis is 
discussed in Section 3.4.7. Exchange controls and dividend controls were also a 
feature until the Conservative party regained power in that year. 
 
The post-1979 period, in the main, has been characterised by lower inflation and 
interest rates, positive corporate earnings and dividend growth, a policy of 
privatisation and a floating exchange rate (at least for most of the period). 
 
3.4.3  Leading/lagging relationships 
The UK stock market tends to lead real activity and for many years was used as a 
component of the Central Statistical Office‟s longer leading cyclical indicator. 
However, following a review of the indicators in 1993 (reported in Moore, 1993), the 
equity market index was replaced as a longer leading component by the inverted 
yield curve. The stock market index, with a median lead time of eight months, has 
subsequently been used as a component of the shorter leading indicator. 
 
The next stage in the analysis, therefore, was to analyse the stock market for its 
leading properties by regressing returns on changes in real activity indicators. The 
relationship between market returns and anticipated inflation was also analysed. The 
results are shown in Table 3.16. 
 
In most cases the strongest relationship was found to be between market returns and 
real activity a full four quarters into the future. The results also confirmed the 
findings of Fama and others that industrial production “explains” the variation in real 
equity market returns more than any of the other variables. 
 
It is interesting at this point to note that the stock market appears to lead changes in 
inflation and that the relationship is negative. However, there is insufficient evidence 
in this analysis to reach any firm conclusions regarding the effects of inflation on the 
equity market. What is known, of course, is that the high inflation of the 1970s had a 
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detrimental effect on the real profitability of the corporate sector which, in turn, was 
in part responsible for the severe 1972-1974 bear market. 
 
3.4.4  Explaining quarterly variability 
Table 3.17 shows the explanatory power of all the variables. The “best fit” is chosen 
in the case of the lagging variables. The real quarterly returns over the period t to t+1 
are regressed on variable values at time t in the case of the first group of predictors, 
the expected return predictors. 
 
Table 3.16  The market as a leading indicator (quarterly data) 
        
Quarterly returns -v- RCECH (t, t+1)  Quarterly returns -v- RCDCH (t, t+1) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.007 -0.22  Coincident 0.027  2.09 
         
         
Mkt leading by:-    Mkt leading by:-   
1Q 0.001  0.38  1Q 0.013 -0.61 
2Q 0.002  0.62  2Q 0.019  1.71 
3Q 0.011  1.35  3Q 0.071  2.19 
4Q 0.052  2.93  4Q 0.081  2.05 
5Q 0.032  2.29  5Q 0.001  0.39 
         
Quarterly returns -v- GDPCH (t, t+1)  Quarterly returns -v- IPCH (t, t+1) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.001  0.28  Coincident 0.001 -0.39 
Mkt leading by:-    Mkt leading by:-   
1Q 0.011  1.31  1Q 0.009  1.23 
2Q 0.001  0.30  2Q 0.010  1.25 
3Q 0.042  2.65  3Q 0.032  2.29 
4Q 0.057  3.08  4Q 0.079  3.68 
5Q 0.000 -0.22  5Q 0.005  0.91 
         
Quarterly returns -v- CONEXCH (t, t+1) Quarterly returns -v- RPICH (t, t+1) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.022 -1.90  Coincident 0.002 -0.62 
Mkt leading by:-    Mkt leading by:-   
1Q 0.002 -0.12  1Q 0.004  0.78 
2Q 0.006  0.95  2Q 0.032 -2.31 
3Q 0.022  1.90  3Q 0.033 -2.33 
4Q 0.015 -1.50  4Q 0.022 -1.87 




Not unexpectedly, dividend yield is found to be very significant and the best of the 
expected return predictors. The relationship between returns and the default spread 
and volatility is negative, surprisingly, but is statistically insignificant. The sign 
associated with the term spread is positive, as expected, but its statistical significance 
is low. 
Table 3.17  Expected return predictors (quarterly data) 
            
  Variable  R2 t-stat   
  DIVY(t)  0.067 3.42   
  DEF(t)  0.001 -0.44   
  TERM(t)  0.009 1.19   
  VOL(t)  0.001 -0.46   
        
  DEFSH(t, t+1) 0.001 -0.45   
  TERMSH(t, t+1) 0.017 -1.69   
  VOLSH(t, t+1) 0.06 -3.2   
  CONSH (t, t+1) 0.372 -9.79   
  TBILLSH(t, t+1) 0.084 -3.85   
        
  RCECH(t+4, t+5) 0.052 2.93   
  RCDCH(t+4, t+5) 0.081 2.05   
  GDPCH (t+4, t+5) 0.057 3.08   
  IPCH(t+4, t+5) 0.079 3.68   
  CONEXCH(t+3, t+4) 0.022 1.9   
  RPICH(t+3, t+4) 0.033 -2.33   
        
  Note: The "best fitting" series is used where the predictor variable is lagged 
            
 
The relationship between returns and the shock variables are all in the direction to be 
expected. An unanticipated rise in the long interest rate (CONSH), for example, is 
associated with a negative reaction in the equity market. Shocks to volatility and 
short and long term interest rates are all statistically significant, the latter especially 
so. Shock movements in long interest rates “explain” over 37% of variation in 
quarterly returns. 
 
3.4.5  Testing the combined power 
A Minitab 14 stepwise regression procedure was used to find the most powerful 
combination of the explanatory variables. Again, the lagging characteristics of the 
real activity variables were taken into account. In other words, the explanatory 
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variables were lagged where previous analysis, as shown in Table 3.17, indicated that 
the equity market appear to discount ahead. The resultant model of best fit was: 
 
Real quarterly return = -6.106 –9.07CONSH –0.399VOLSH+1.76DIVY-3.7DEFSH 
      (-10.39)     (-4.01)      (3.59) (-1.88) 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.478 
 
The stepwise regression technique is periodically criticised for encouraging data 
mining by researchers. Nevertheless, the results achieved here appear sensible. The 
signs attaching to the variables are as expected and the variation in returns 
„explained‟ is approximately double that achieved in the earlier study by Lovatt and 
Parikh (2000). One possible explanation is that Lovatt and Parikh confined 
themselves to the variables defined by Fama and did not, for example, look 
specifically at the impact of shocks to long interest rates. As the above equation and 
Figure 3.4 show, that variable is highly significant. 
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3.4.6  Analysis of annual variation in return (non-overlapping) 
Annual, non-overlapping, real returns were also regressed against the same set of 
explanatory variables. The periods were calendar years. Thus, for example, the real 
return in 2003 was associated with the dividend yield at the end of 2002. 
 
Table 3.18 shows the means, standard deviations and autocorrelations for the 1963-
2003 period. Note the negative first order autocorrelation for the annual returns 
themselves. 
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Table 3.19 shows the extent by which the stock market anticipates changes in real 
activity. As one would expect, given the equivalent results for quarterly data, the 
market tends to lead most variables by a full year (4 quarters). The important 
exception to this generalised observation is industrial production, where the best fit is 
found with coincident data. Again, industrial production is found to be the most 
powerful of the real activity variables. 
Table 3.18  Values for annual, non-overlapping data 
                       …..Autocorrelations for annual lag…….. 
   Mean St Dev   1 2 3 4 
MRR(t, t+4) 0.090 0.252  -0.25 -0.12 -0.11  0.14 
DIVY(t)  0.046 0.015   0.42  0.28  0.15  0.19 
DEF(t)  1.014 0.487   0.66  0.38  0.16  0.04 
TERM(t)  0.816 2.037   0.51  0.20  0.19 -0.05 
VOL(t)  0.128 0.069   0.14  0.01  0.08 -0.09 
           
DEFSH(t, t+4) 0.000 0.363   0.04  0.02 -0.11 -0.14 
TERMSH(t, t+4) -0.078 1.776  -0.08 -0.23  0.23 -0.15 
VOLSH(t, t+4) 0.039 0.075  -0.37 -0.10  0.12 -0.11 
CONSH (t, t+4) 2.715 1.710   0.26  0.30  0.01  0.19 
TBILLSH(t, t+4) 2.500 2.418   0.00 -0.03  0.16 -0.20 
           
RCECH(t, t+4) 0.028 0.126   0.17 -0.07 -0.09  0.27 
RCDCH(t, t+4) 0.016 0.065   0.41  0.18 -0.02 -0.10 
GDPCH (t, t+4) 0.025 0.020   0.30 -0.15 -0.22 -0.12 
IPCH(t, t+4) 0.014 0.037   0.02 -0.23 -0.20 -0.07 
CONEXCH(t, t+4) 0.025 0.024   0.23 -0.15 -0.24 -0.10 
RPICH(t, t+4) 0.067 0.053    0.78  0.56  0.40  0.43 
 
Table 3.20 shows the explanatory powers of all the variables. Lags are taken into 
account in the case of relevant real activity variables. Looked at on this annual basis, 
market dividend yield takes over as the single most powerful predictor. Volatility is 
again disappointing as a measure of future return, the sign of the relationship being 
the opposite of that expected. The sign associated with the term spread relationship is 
as expected but the variable trails a long way behind the dividend yield in terms of 
predictive powers. 
 
Stepwise regression on the full set of explanatory variables (taking into account 
lead/lags) resulted in the following model of annual return variability: 
 
Annual real return = -37.17 + 10.7DIVY –5.3CONSH+4.4GDPCH-2.0TERMSH 
    (7.19)       (-3.39)        (3.12)   (-1.49) 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.689 
 90 
Table 3.19  The market as a leading indicator (annual non-overlapping)  
Annual returns -v- RCECH (t, t+4)   Annual returns -v- RCDCH (t, t+4) 
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.013 -0.71  Coincident 0.005 0.48 
         
Mkt leading by:-    Mkt leading by:-   
4Q 0.176 6.44  4Q 0.102 2.07 
8Q 0.009 0.6  8Q 0.078 1.77 
12Q -0.034 -1.12  12Q -0.004 -0.37 
16Q -0.011 -0.62  16Q 0.049 1.34 
         
Annual returns -v- GDPCH (t, t+4)  Annual returns -v- IPCH (t, t+4) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0 -0.01  Coincident 0.344 4.52 
Mkt leading by:-    Mkt leading by:-   
4Q 0.216 3.24  4Q 0 -0.07 
8Q 0.006 0.47  8Q 0.023 -0.94 
12Q 0.012 -0.65  12Q 0.008 -0.09 
16Q 0 -0.05  16Q 0.059 -1.49 
         
Annual returns -v- CONEXCH (t, t+4) Annual returns -v- RPICH (t, t+4) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.012 -0.68  Coincident 0.005 0.45 
Mkt leading by:-    Mkt leading by:-   
4Q 0.089 1.93  4Q -0.053 -1.46 
8Q 0.036 1.18  8Q -0.03 -1.07 
12Q 0.011 0.64  12Q -0.007 -0.52 
16Q 0.007 0.51   16Q 0.011 0.62 
 
 



















Table  3.20  Expected return predictors (annual non-overlapping) 
            
  Variable  R2 t-stat   
        
  DIVY(t)  0.355 4.64   
  DEF(t)  0 0.04   
  TERM(t)  0.07 1.72   
  VOL(t)  -0.03 -1.1   
        
  DEFSH(t, t+4) 0.041 -1.3   
  TERMSH(t, t+4) 0.015 -0.77   
  VOLSH(t, t+4) 0.059 -1.56   
  CONSH (t, t+4) 0.215 -3.27   
  TBILLSH(t, t+4) 0.058 -1.55   
        
  RCECH(t+4, t+8) 0.176 2.84   
  RCDCH(t+4, t+8) 0.102 2.07   
  GDPCH (t+4, t+8) 0.216 3.24   
  IPCH(t, t+4) 0.344 4.52   
  CONEXCH(t+4, t+8) 0.089 1.93   
  RPICH(t+4, t+8) 0.053 -1.46   
        
        
  Note: The "best fitting" series is used where the predictor variable is lagged 
            
 
3.4.7  Analysis of annual variation in returns (overlapping) 
The previous section looked at the annual variation in returns from calendar year to 
calendar year. For the sake of completeness, year-on-year returns were also analysed 
on a quarterly basis (i.e. overlapping). By definition, therefore, the autocorrelations 
of the series, including that of the return series itself, are much higher, as Table 3.21  
shows. 
 
Table 3.22 shows the lagging characteristics of the real activity indicators and retail 
prices. In all cases, year on year returns appear to anticipate year on year changes 
over the next year (i.e. the market is leading by 4 quarters.). Again, the industrial 
production variable appears to have the most exploratory power. 
 
Table 3.23 shows the explanatory powers of all the variables. Looked at on this 
overlapping basis, industrial production takes over from dividend yield as the most 
powerful single predictor. The sign of the volatility coefficient is once again 
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negative, opposite to what might be expected, whilst the significant negative 
correlation between returns and the volatility shock variable suggests that volatility  
rises during bear phases. 
 
Table 3.21  Values for annual, overlapping data 
        …..Autocorrelations for annual lag…….. 
   Mean St Dev 1 2 3 4 
MRR(t, t+4) 0.080 0.218 0.71 0.41 0.14 -0.15 
DIVY(t)  0.041 0.013 0.88 0.74 0.63 0.52 
DEF(t)  0.980 0.450 0.70 0.65 0.61 0.53 
TERM(t)  0.990 2.020 0.88 0.78 0.68 0.58 
VOL(t)  0.136 0.069 0.35 0.32 0.26 0.27 
          
DEFSH(t, t+4) 0.000 0.319 0.09 0.16 0.13 -0.05 
TERMSH(t, t+4) 0.001 0.947 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.05 
VOLSH(t, t+4) -0.004 0.064 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.12 
CONSH (t, t+4) 0.003 0.710 0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 
TBILLSH(t, t+4) -0.001 1.092 0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.11 
          
RCECH(t, t+4) 0.029 0.123 0.68 0.43 0.18 0.02 
RCDCH(t, t+4) 0.016 0.066 0.71 0.55 0.38 0.34 
GDPCH (t, t+4) 0.025 0.021 0.58 0.43 0.19 0.13 
IPCH(t, t+4) 0.016 0.040 0.53 0.26 -0.01 -0.10 
CONEXCH(t, t+4) 0.025 0.027 0.55 0.35 0.10 0.10 
RPICH(t, t+4) 0.068 0.054 0.89 0.81 0.73 0.68 
       
 
 
The correlation attaching to the long interest rate shock (CONSH) is much lower 
than that obtained with non-overlapping data, suggesting that the latter was heavily 
influenced by the extreme market performances over the 1973-75 period. Indeed, 
repeating the stepwise regression for non-overlapping data, but with the 1973-1975 
data removed from the analysis altogether, throws up the following best fit:- 
 
Annual real return = -11.45 + 1.70IPCH + 6.0DIVY – 3.5VOLSH 
      (2.46)            (2.56)       (-1.83) 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.304 
 
Note that the long bond variable no longer appears as a significant variable and the 
adjusted R
2
 shows a substantial fall from the original finding of 0.689. A multiple 
regression which included all the predictor variables and also dummy variables for 
the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 – as conducted by Pesaran and Timmermann (2000) – 
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was also undertaken and showed that the dummy variable representing 1974 was the 
most significant variable.  
Table 3.22  The market as a leading indicator (annual overlapping) 
        
12 month returns -v- RCECH (t, t+1)  12 months returns -v- RCDCH (t, t+1) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.000 -0.14  Coincident 0.050 2.90 
Mkt leading by:-   Mkt leading by:-   
1Q 0.007 1.04  1Q 0.094 4.05 
2Q 0.033 2.33  2Q 0.140 5.05 
3Q 0.075 3.56  3Q 0.165 5.55 
4Q 0.117 4.53  4Q 0.152 5.27 
5Q 0.104 4.23  5Q 0.131 4.81 
         
12 months returns -v- GDPCH (t, t+1)  12 months returns -v- IPCH (t, t+1) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.007 1.08  Coincident 0.000 0.29 
Mkt leading by:-   Mkt leading by:-   
1Q 0.056 3.06  1Q 0.038 2.51 
2Q 0.116 4.53  2Q 0.132 4.88 
3Q 0.181 5.87  3Q 0.240 7.01 
4Q 0.228 6.77  4Q 0.301 8.16 
5Q 0.148 5.18  5Q 0.220 6.80 
         
12 months returns -v- CONEXCH (t, t+1) 12 month returns -v- RPICH (t, t+1) 
         
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat 
Coincident 0.017 1.64  Coincident 0.004 0.84 
Mkt leading by:-   Mkt leading by:-   
1Q 0.053 2.98  1Q 0.022 -1.90 
2Q 0.076 3.59  2Q 0.056 -3.05 
3Q 0.086 3.83  3Q 0.081 -3.71 
4Q 0.095 4.04  4Q 0.086 -3.82 
5Q 0.045 2.71   5Q 0.077 -3.59 
 
Stepwise regression on the full set of explanatory variables (taking into account 
leads/lags) resulted in the following model of year-on year variability measured at 
quarterly intervals. 
 
Year-on-year return = -36.033 +3.28GDPCH +8.90DIVY –0.71RPICH 
        (5.22)     (9.63) (-2.75) 
   +0.61RCDCH –0.54VOLSH –4.10TERMSH –2.70TBILLSH 






Table 3.23  Expected return predictors (annual overlapping) 
            
  Variable  R2 t-stat   
        
  DIVY(t)  0.233 6.94   
  DEF(t)  0 -0.2   
  TERM(t)  0.013 1.43   
  VOL(t)  0.002 -0.62   
        
  DEFSH(t, t+4) 0.004 -0.84   
  TERMSH(t, t+4) 0.006 -0.98   
  VOLSH(t, t+4) 0.096 -4.11   
  CONSH (t, t+4) 0.049 -2.87   
  TBILLSH(t, t+4) 0.005 -0.9   
        
  RCECH(t+5, t+8) 0.117 4.53   
  RCDCH(t+4, t+7) 0.165 5.55   
  GDPCH (t+5, t+8) 0.228 6.77   
  IPCH(t+5, t+8) 0.301 8.16   
  CONEXCH(t+5, t+8) 0.095 4.04   
  RPICH(t+5, t+8) 0.077 -3.59   
        
  Note: The "best fitting" series is used where the predictor variable is lagged 
            
 
 

















This chapter has summarised the main attempts to relate equity market variation to 
the variation in macro-economic variables. Results for both the US and UK equity 
markets were analysed. In the main, it can be concluded that, as expected, there is a 
linkage between equity market performance and expectations regarding the future 
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economic environment. However, methodological shortcomings and measurement 
errors have to be recognised. 
 
The chapter also discussed the results obtained by applying an extended and unique 
version of the Fama (1990) methodology to the UK market. The range of predictor 
variables included in the analysis was wider than in previous studies. The inclusion 
of long interest rates, in particular, showed a very strong relationship when non-
overlapping data was used, albeit that the sharp swings in the 1973-75 period 
heightened the statistical significance of the results.  Nevertheless, the results 
confirm that the equity market is driven, in the main, by economic factors. Moreover, 
most of the relationships identified were of the type and direction anticipated. 
 
It is conceded, however, that the analysis benefits from hindsight. Actual outcomes 
are used as input activity variables, for example, rather than forecasts. Indeed, it is 
highly likely that less of the variability of the equity market would have been 
explained had forecast data been used. However, it is of particular interest to note the 
power of the equity market as a leading indicator of activity over the period analysed.  
 
Identification of a meaningful linkage between the macroeconomy and the stock 
market provides reassurance and a useful stepping stone. But what is not yet 
answered is the question posed by Cochrane (2005): just how much stock market 
movement can be tied to the macroeconomy through “harder-to-measure time-
varying risk premia rather than “easier-to-understand cashflows” (p)? It is this 
question that will be addressed in full in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4  ANALYSING MARKET VOLATILITY 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
The trade-off between expected return and risk lies at the heart of much of accepted 
financial theory. Moreover, many specific theoretical models, and their applications, 
use a measure such as standard deviation or variance as a surrogate for risk. 
Applications of the CAPM, Black-Scholes model and portfolio optimisation models, 
for example, all utilise measures of variability, and often some form of historic 
variability is used. 
 
Increasingly, however, the relevance and usefulness of such measures have been 
challenged. Improved econometric forecasting techniques have enhanced the 
viability of certain financial models – for example, developments in the field of 
ARCH/GARCH modelling. Nevertheless, many fundamental concepts remain 
challenged and challengeable. 
 
The nature of stock market volatility, and the relationship between market volatility 
and expected asset returns, has been the subject of extensive academic review and 
scrutiny over the past three decades. Answers have been, and continue to be, sought 
to questions such as: 
 
(a) Is there evidence of a positive relationship between expected 
returns and observed volatility? 
 
(b) Is there any evidence that measures of volatility can be used to 
predict future returns? 
 
(c) Does market volatility change over time? How and why? 
 
(d) What is the most successful way of predicting future volatility? 
 
(e) Does the price paid/required for risk-bearing change over time? 
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(f) What is the relationship between stock market volatility and the 
volatility of macroeconomic variables? 
 
4.2  SPECIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first part of this chapter will examine the most relevant academic literature 
covering this specific area. The second part will use some of the techniques, 
approaches and findings in the literature to investigate the risk/return profile of the 
UK equity market and, in particular, the nature of volatility in the UK equity market. 
 
4.2.1  Merton’s exploratory investigation 
Merton (1980) was one of the first academics to query the paucity of research 
relating to expected equity returns and, in particular, research relating to the possible 
variation in expected returns over time. 
 
By way of an “exploratory investigation” and in order to motivate further research in 
the area, Merton presented models of expected return and applied them to market 
data for the period 1926-1978. 
 
The starting point in Merton‟s analysis was recognition that the state-of-the-art 
models in use at that time – which simply added an average, historical risk premium 
to the prevailing risk-free rate – were failing to take into account changing risk 
preferences and requirements over time. Merton argued that, assuming the variance 
in market returns is a sufficient measure of its risk, a reasonably general specification 
of the equilibrium expected excess return could be written as 
 




where (  - r) is the expected excess return over the risk-free rate, Y is a reward-to- 
risk ratio and 
2
 is the variance in market returns. Merton tested variations of the 
above model  - including one in which the reward-to-risk ratio was assumed to 
remain constant for an appreciable period of time - and one in which the right hand 
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side of the above expression was assumed constant (i.e. the state-of-the-art model). 
The principal conclusions from Merton‟s exploratory investigations were: 
 
 in estimating models of the expected market return, a non-negativity 
restriction should be explicitly included since the expected risk 
premium must always be positive 
 
 estimators which use realized returns should be adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, that is the tendency towards volatility clustering. 
 
A criticism of Merton‟s approach, however, was that it utilised contemporaneous, 
rather than ex-ante, measures of volatility. Merton chose months as the measurement 
periods for excess returns and standard deviations. One approach to estimating the 
standard deviation of the market in any month would have been to estimate it from 
daily return observations within the month. However, Merton adopted an approach, 
which estimated the standard deviation of the market at any point from the six 
monthly returns prior to that point and the subsequent six monthly returns. 
 
4.2.2  Use of ex-ante data 
French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) also examined the relationship between the 
expected market risk premium and risk, as measured by stock market volatility. 
However, in recognition of the problems perceived in Merton‟s approach, they 
confined themselves to the use of ex-ante data. Two approaches were made in 
investigating the relation between expected stock returns and volatility: use of 
univariate autoregressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA) models and use of 
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticy (GARCH) models. 
 
Monthly standard deviations in returns on the Standard & Poor‟s Composite Index 
were derived for the period 1928-1984. The monthly standard deviations were 
derived from daily observations within the month. The calculated standard deviations 
were noted to trace a non-stationary moving average process, being highly auto-
correlated and decaying only slowly beyond lag three. Conditional forecasts for 
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standard deviations were constructed therefore using a third-order moving average 
model based on changes in monthly standard deviations (i.e. using first differences in 
logarithms). This showed autocorrelation close to zero beyond lag three.  
 
The predicted standard deviations were found to track the actual standard deviations 
closely although the series was smoother. The time series models were found to be 
stable over time and the residuals appeared to be random. The fitted values were 
taken to represent the predictable volatility in returns; the difference between actual 
volatility and the predicted element was taken to represent unpredicted volatility. 
 
Excess returns – defined as the difference between monthly NYSE equity returns and 
one month Treasury bill returns - were then regressed on each of the predicted and 
unpredicted elements. The results showed: 
 
 there was limited evidence of a relation between expected risk 
premiums and predictable volatility 
 there was a reliably negative relation between excess returns and 
unpredicted volatility 
 
French et al also examined the relationship between excess returns and predictable 
volatility using both ARCH and GARCH models. The original Engel (1982) ARCH 
model took the form: 
 










where the forecast variance, ζt
2
, is a function of news about volatility from the 
previous period, as measured by the squared residual, εt
2
-1, from the mean return 
equation. Fama et al modified the expression for the variance of ε above by using the 
average of the previous twenty-two squared errors instead of the previous squared 
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error alone. This modification reflected the observation that squared excess returns 
decayed slowly, suggesting that ζt
2
 is related to many lags of the squared errors. 
 












Deriving predicted volatility from the latter model, French et al then analysed the 
relation between excess returns and volatility through an in-mean model of the type: 
 




t - t-1 
 
where the moving-average term is included to capture the effect of non-synchronous 
trading. The analysis was performed on daily data. 
 
The results of the GARCH analysis indicated: 
 
 In contrast to the ARIMA results, there was a reliably positive 
relationship between expected risk premiums and predicted 
volatility for one month ahead 
 
 There was a reliably negative relationship between realised risk 
premiums and unexpected volatility. 
 
In conclusion, French et al noted that, while some evidence was found of a positive 
relation between expected risk premiums and predictable levels of volatility, the 
variability of realised returns had fluctuated widely over the period examined. The 
authors concluded that it was difficult to discriminate among alternative 
specifications of the reward-for-risk relationship and that future work was needed 
before any such discrimination could be made. 
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4.2.3  A lack of consensus 
The important work of Merton and French et al in analysing volatility and the returns 
associated with volatility prompted numerous other studies, particularly with regard 
to US evidence. But no strong consensus view emerged about either the relationship 
between expected returns and statistical measures of volatility or the success of 
GARCH modelling techniques in this area. 
 
Akgiray (1989) concluded that daily US stock returns exhibited significant levels of 
second order dependence and that the return-generating process can be regarded as 
an autoregressive process with conditionally heteroskedastic innovations. 
Consequently, he found that GARCH (1,1) models fitted the data very satisfactorily. 
Moreover, he found evidence that out-of-sample forecasts generated by GARCH 
models proved to be superior to historical estimates. Importantly, however, Akgiray 
found a very different picture when applying a similar analysis to weekly and 
monthly returns. Notably, he concluded that the latter are not as leptokurtic as daily 
returns and also that there is little evidence of autocorrelation in either series. 
 
Baillie and DeGennero (1990), on the other hand, found that a GARCH in-mean 
model provided a good description of both daily and monthly returns data. However, 
they also reached the conclusion that that there is very little evidence for a 
statistically significant relationship between returns and volatility, prompting them, 
in turn, to argue that there is a need for research into other measures of risk. 
 
4.2.4  Time-varying persistence in expected returns 
The aforementioned studies concentrated mainly on evidence relating to the 
relationship between expected returns and volatility. Priestley (2001) added another 
dimension to the debate by assuming that the variation in expected returns is caused 
by changes in the price of risk (i.e. the coefficient attaching to volatility) in addition 
to changes in the level of volatility.  
 
Persistence in expected returns was characterised by a simple AR(1) model:- 
 
Etht+1 = Et-1ht + ut-1 
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where ht is a period return, ut-1 represents news about returns and a value of  close 
to 1 represents a high degree of persistence. Since a share price represents the 
discounted value of all expected cash flows, a small change in return news (i.e. ut-1) 
may cause a significant change in price.  Persistence was previously shown by 
Campbell (1991) to approximate to 1/(1 - Ө). Thus an estimate of Ø = 0.9 would 
imply a capital loss of 10% if the expected return in the current period rises by 1%. 
 
Excess returns on the S & P Composite Index were derived for the period 1871 – 
1997. Conditional variance was modelled by assuming a GARCH (1,1) process. A 
small set of instrumental variables, including the dividend yield in excess of short-
term interest rates and changes in short-term interest rates, was used to model the 
price of risk. The product of the price of risk and the conditional variance provided 
an estimate of expected returns over the period examined (1871-1997) and thereby 
estimates of the persistence in returns over time. 
 
Priestly found that, for the whole period examined, the estimate of Ø was 0.856, 
implying an asset price change of almost 7% for a 1% change in expected returns. 
(Campbell had previously estimated 4% - 5%). Priestley‟s main objective, however, 
was to investigate if, and how, persistence changes over time. His resultant 
investigation revealed a substantial variation in persistence over time, implying that 
news affects asset prices differently at different times. An attempt was also made to 
find the cause of this variation by regressing changes in persistence on changes in the 
price of risk, changes in conditional variance and lagged values of persistence itself, 
thus: 
 
Δpersistence =  2.112  + 1.388Δprice of risk 
   (0.88)         (0.41)      
 
   + 95.781Δconditional variance 
           (153.64) 
 
   - 0.263lagged persistence  
            (1.29) 
 
The above results confirmed that changes in the price of risk had a positive and 
significant effect whilst changes in volatility were not shown to be significant. Thus 
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it could be concluded that stock prices will be affected more by news when the price 
of risk is high. Priestley‟s intuitive explanation for this change in effect was the 
relation to the riskiness of the economy, in particular the existence of credit cycles. 
 
 
4.2.5  Relationship with macroeconomic volatility 
Whatever the success, or otherwise, of attempts to relate expected and achieved 
returns to changes in volatility, it has become increasingly accepted that stock returns 
display heteroskedastic patterns; that is, the volatility associated with returns changes 
over time. Moreover, it has become accepted that ARCH and GARCH models in 
their various forms provide the best means of modelling conditional variance over 
time. 
 
An obvious question is whether there are significant relationships between 
conditional stock market volatility and macroeconomic volatility. Early work in this 
area was undertaken by Officer (1973) who analysed the variability of  New York 
Stock Exchange indices over the period 1897-1969. This analysis was in part 
triggered by the observations of other authors that the variability of the US market 
had declined over the period 1926 to 1960. Suggestions advanced for this decline had 
included the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
introduction of margin requirements, and the substantial increase in the number and 
range of stocks that had occurred over that period. 
 
Officer‟s study confirmed a decline in stock volatility over the period in question but 
argued that it could be better described as “a return to normal levels of variability 
after a period of abnormal behaviour in the 1930s.” 
 
Having examined the effects of the establishment of the SEC and the broadening of 
the security base, Officer hypothesised that it was not these factors that were 
significant in reducing the variability of the market but, rather, changes in economy 
wide factors and business fluctuations. He therefore concentrated on the relationship 
between market variability and industrial production variability and found that the 
behaviour of industrial production during the 1930s was distinctly different from that 
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displayed before or after. The conclusion, therefore, was that market-factor 
variability can be related to business fluctuations. 
 
4.2.6  The Schwert analysis 
Schwert (1989) built on the work of Officer and others to take a more comprehensive 
look at the question as to why stock market volatility changed over time, noting that 
the monthly variability in US stock returns over the period from 1857-1987 varied 
from 2% to 20% per month. 
 
The monthly variability in stock returns from 1885 onwards was derived from daily 
return data; variability prior to 1885 was estimated from rolling 12-month monthly 
data. Stock variability was analysed in relation to changes in the variability of a 
number of financial and economic indicators including: inflation, the monetary base, 
bond returns, short-term interest rates and industrial production. 
 
Schwert‟s main conclusions were: 
 
(a) As Officer and others had found, stock market volatility during the 1930s 
was indeed exceptionally high. Moreover, Schwert concluded that the 
excess volatility displayed over this period could not be adequately and 
rationally explained by changes in maroeconomic variables and that it 
remained “a volatility puzzle”. 
 
(b) Many economic variables display more volatility during recessions 
 
(c) There is weak evidence that macroeconomic volatility can help to predict 
stock (and bond) volatility. There is stronger evidence to suggest that 
financial asset volatility helps to predict future macroeconomic volatility. 
 
(d) A small portion of changes in stock volatility can be attributed to a 
positive relationship between stock volatility and financial leverage. 
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(e) There appears to be a positive relationship between trading activity and 
stock volatility. 
 
4.2.7  The Asness analysis 
Asness (2000) more recently also noted shifts in financial market volatility over time 
and linked these shifts to changes in equity dividend yields. He also noted that 
researchers such as Fama and French (1988a) had concluded that equity dividend 
yields are good predictors of long-horizon returns. In other words, high equity yields 
indicate that investors have become more risk averse and indicate that higher 
expected returns are being demanded. Low yields indicate the opposite. 
 
Asness hypothesised that the level of equity yields at any point in time, relative to 
bond yields, is a function of the relative volatilities of the two asset classes. More 
specifically, he formulated the following testable model: 
 D/P = γ0 + γ1Y + γ2ζ(Stocks) + γ3ζ(Bonds) + εD/P 
Where: 
 D/P      = Stock (equity) dividend yield 
 Y          = Bond yield 
 ζ(Stocks)  = volatility of stock returns 
 ζ(Bonds)   = volatility of bond returns 
 εD/P       = error term 
Asness hypothesised further that γ1 would be positive, γ2 would be positive and γ3 
would be negative. 
 
Rolling 20-year annualized monthly returns volatilities for US equities and bonds 
were generated for the period 1946 to 1998 using trailing data (i.e. the data began in 
1926). A period of 20 years was chosen since this was perceived to be representative 
of a generation but Asness found that his results were still robust when shorter time 
frames were examined. 
 
The estimate found for the above equation was: 
 D/P = 0.00% + 0.35Y + 0.23ζ(Stocks) – 0.31ζ(Bonds)  
          (-0.05)    (28.77)   (39.51)      (-25.69) 
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Asness interpreted this result as showing that equity and bond yields are strongly 
positively related and the difference between them is a function of the weighted 
difference in volatilities. 
 
Further analyses were performed in order to overcome the criticism that the initial 
work was merely an in-sample analysis and could be interpreted as data mining. 
Notably, Asness examined whether the variation in equity yields could be explained 
by a time trend. The volatility model, described above, was shown to be far superior. 
Rolling out-of-sample regressions using the volatility model were also undertaken 
and the results compared to those of from other rolling models. Again, the volatility 
model was shown to produce the statistically superior results. Finally, Asness 
examined the effects of using the volatilities from non-overlapping 20 year periods 
and concluded that the results provided compelling evidence that the required equity 
risk premium appears to rise (fall) following periods of high (low) equity volatility 
relative to bond volatility. 
 
A tenet of modern finance is that there is a linkage between volatility and expected 
return. However, this linkage is difficult to identify if realised returns are used as 
surrogates for ex-ante returns. By using yields as a proxy for returns, Asness 
provides a useful contribution to evidence of the theoretical linkage between 
expected returns and perceived risk. 
 
4.2.8  The Shiller contribution 
Chapter 2 contained a brief discussion of Shiller‟s arguments relating to the excess 
volatility of markets in the context of market efficiency. No specific review of 
market volatility would be complete without expanding on the work of Shiller and 
others in this area and examining the main arguments and implications. 
 
Shiller‟s original (1981) work on equity market volatility showed that the rational ex-
post counterpart, p
*
, of a stock price index displayed far less volatility than the actual 
index, p. The smoother behaviour of p
*




 to a weighted-average of dividends. While dividend growth 




Now, the efficient markets model does not say that p equals p
*
. The efficient markets 
model asserts that pt = Et(pt
*
); that is, pt is the optimal forecast of pt
*
. The forecast 
error can be defined as ut = pt
*
 - pt, or we can write pt
* 
= ut + pt. The forecast error 
will be uncorrelated with the forecast. The variance relationship will therefore be 
var(pt
*
) = var(ut) + var(pt), or, var(pt)  var(pt
*
). It is claimed that this latter 
relationship is clearly violated when a stock price index and its ex-post rational 
counterpart are compared. 
 
One possible reason for this apparent violation is that the ex-post counterpart is 
calculated by using a constant discount rate. Shiller also demonstrated the impact of 
allowing the discount rate to vary by setting it equal to the ex-post real commercial 
rate plus a constant risk premium. While this introduced greater volatility into the ex-
post series it did not completely explain the apparent violation of the variance 
relationship. Shiller‟s conclusion was that only serious investigation of psychological 
and popular models featuring irrationalities or fads will help to explain the 
divergence between actual and justifiable performance. 
 
Later, more sophisticated attempts to introduce variation into the discount rate also 
failed to fully explain the variability of the equity market, Campbell and Shiller 
(1988a), for example, used vector auto-regressive methods to examine the linkage 
between dividend yields, real growth expectations and discount rates. Four measures 
of discount rates were examined: a real constant rate and rates that varied according 
to changes in real interest rates, real consumption data and stock return variance. 
While the results showed that dividend yields responded to changes in real growth 
expectations, as expected, the results gained from allowing the discount rate to vary 
were disappointing. Short-term interest rates, consumption growth and the volatility 
in stock returns were all found to be unhelpful in explaining stock price movements. 
 
 108 
Cochrane (1991), in a review essay, summarised the implications of these results. 
Volatility tests, such as those presented by Shiller, were initially interpreted as 
“scientific” tests of market efficiency, a phenomenon overlooked by conventional 
finance‟s focus on expected returns. Now, Cochrane argued, volatility tests are 
understood to be tests of discount rate models. Moreover, the results thrown up by 
such tests merely serve to highlight the fact that current discount models are deficient 
and a challenge exists to construct better models of fundamentals. The debate as to 
whether psychological and sociological factors also need to be built into our models, 
he argued, is “not likely to end soon.” 
 
4.3  THE UK EVIDENCE 
Poon and Taylor (1992), like French et al (1987) and others, addressed two empirical 
relationships between stock returns and volatility. Firstly, the hypothesis that there is 
a negative relationship between unexpected returns and unexpected volatility. 
Secondly, the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between expected 
returns and expected volatility. Theirs was the first study to test the hypotheses on 
UK data. 
 
Daily, weekly, fortnightly and monthly returns on the FT All-Share index were 
analysed over the period January 1965 to December 1989. All return series displayed 
fat tails compared with the normal distribution. 
 
Estimates of monthly volatility were derived using daily data. These estimates were 
then split into predictable and unpredictable components using an autoregressive 
moving average model. Again like French et al, Poon and Taylor also applied 
GARCH models to derive conditional volatilities. Both returns and excess returns 
were regressed against volatilities predicted by each method. Positive relationships 
were found but none was found to be significant (although all t-statistics exceeded 
1.0). An analysis of the relationship between returns and unexpected volatility found 
a significant, negative relationship when volatility was measured by standard 




Fraser and Power (1997) set out to consider the dynamics of price changes for a 
sample of equity markets, including the UK. More specifically, they examined the 
relationship between the weekly conditional volatility of stock returns and the flow 
of information into the market place. The period January 1988 to October 1994 was 
analysed. 
 
The authors applied an expanded form of the GARCH conditional variance model 








-I + λDt-1 
 
and the variance is conditional on the variances from previous periods, the square of 
previous residuals, ε
2
, and a dummy variable, Dt-1. The latter takes a value of unity 
when the ex-post return for the last period is negative and a value of zero otherwise. 
This variable was designed to capture the so-called „leverage effect‟ whereby 
volatility is thought to increase in the wake of returns that are below expectations. 
 
An extension to the analysis also considered the effect on conditional volatility of 
unanticipated information or news. Proxies for such unanticipated information were 
derived by applying autoregressive models to volume series. 
 
The results from the GARCH model described above and which incorporated a 
dummy variable to reflect past market conditions indicated that the UK equity 
market is particularly sensitive to past experience. The t-value associated with the 
dummy variable was 2.9 and therefore statistically significant. Results for the UK 
were not significant when a proxy for unanticipated information was included in the 
GARCH process. 
 
McMillan et al (2000) analysed a variety of statistical and econometric models of UK 
stock market index volatility. Daily, weekly and monthly frequencies were analysed. 
Both in-sample characteristics and the success of out-of sample forecasts were 
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analysed. A total of ten volatility forecasting models were considered including the 
historical mean, moving average, random walk, exponential smoothing, 
exponentially weighted moving average, simple regression, GARCH, TGARCH, 
EGARCH and component-GARCH models. 
 
The results indicated that the random walk model (which assumes that the optimal 
forecast of next period volatility is the last observation) provided vastly superior 
monthly volatility forecasts to the forecasts provided by the other modes. The 
random walk, moving average and recursive smoothing models provided moderately 
superior weekly volatility forecasts; the GARCH, moving average and exponentially 
smoothing models provided superior daily forecasts. The authors‟ results also 
confirmed the conclusions of previous researchers that careful interpretation is 
required – in particular with regard to the relative success of GARCH models – if 
October 1987 Crash data is included in the analysis. 
 
Morelli (2002) attempted to determine the relationship between conditional stock 
market volatility and conditional macroeconomic volatility based upon monthly UK 
data. The period from January 1967 to December 1995 was observed. The analysis 
was based on the standard assumption that security prices are the discounted present 
values of expected future cash flows. The conditional variance will therefore depend 
on the conditional variances of expected cash flows and discount rates and the 
conditional covariances between them. 
 
Monthly stock market returns were derived from FT All Share Index data. The 
macroeconomic variables selected included industrial production, real retail sales, 
money supply, an exchange rate variable, and inflation. The analysis covered the 
period 1967-1995. 
 
GARCH/ARCH models were used to establish conditional volatility series for both 
the market returns and the macroeconomic series. The ability to predict stock market 
volatility from stock market volatility was analysed as well as the reverse: the ability 
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of conditional stock market volatility to predict conditional macroeconomic 
volatility. 
 
The results proved disappointing. A regression analysis of conditional stock market 
volatility on all macroeconomic volatilities, for example, showed an explanatory 
power of just 4.4%. None of the macroeconomic volatilities showed significance at 
either the 5% or 10% level. The author concluded that: “the volatility in the 
macrovariables selected does not explain the volatility in the stock market.” 
 
 
4.4  AN ANALYSIS OF UK EQUITY MARKET VOLATILITY, 1963-2003 
Academic studies of stock market volatility in the UK are limited in number and 
scope in comparison with the US. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to 
investigate key aspects of UK stock market volatility over a relatively long period. 
Aspects to be considered are: 
 
 The basic characteristics of UK stock market returns and volatility 
 Market volatility as a predictor of excess returns 
 The contemporaneous relationship between volatility and returns 
 Modelling of future volatility 
 The relationship with macro-economic volatility 
 
The discussion in this chapter will focus on the historical standard deviation in 
returns as the principal measure of stock market volatility although it is 
acknowledged that this measure has its limitations as a predictor of future risk. The 
underlying assumption in using standard deviation is that asset returns form a normal 
distribution with parameters that are stable over time. However, studies by Fama 
(1963), Mandelbrot (1963) and many others have shown that distributions of share 
returns often display fat tails (i.e. are leptokurtotic) and are skewed. 
 
Other features of financial market returns that are well documented and cited by 
Poon (2005) include: 
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 there is often a “long memory effect” observed in return volatility. i.e 
the decay rate in volatility is slow. 
 there is often evidence of volatility clustering, as will be discussed in 
Section 4.4.3. 
 volatility tends to increase following negative returns, a phenomenon 
described as “the leverage effect”. 
 the returns and volatilities of different assets and markets tend to 
move together. 
 
Models used to forecast volatility, taking into account the above features to a lesser 
or greater degree, tend to fall into four main categories: 
 
 models based on historical volatility which can range from being 
simple averages to being very sophisticated multivariate models 
 models in the ARCH family (note that a GARCH model is applied in 
Section 4.4.7) 
 other stochastic volatility models such as the Monte Carlo Markov 
Chain approach. 
 volatilities implied in option pricing. 
 
In a major review of volatility forecasting models, Poon and Granger (2003) 
conclude that the evidence is that financial market volatility is clearly forecastable. 
The debate remains on just how far ahead one could accurately forecast and to what 
extent volatility changes can be predicted. The option pricing models were found to 
contain most information about future volatility with little to differentiate the 
performances of the other three classes. 
 
4.4.1  The basic characteristics 
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the volatility in UK equity market returns since 




Movements in the FTSE All-Share Index were taken to represent movements in the 
total market. Total returns were calculated by adding in a proportion of dividend 
yield at the start of any period and then by chain-linking successive periods. Thus, 
the total return for any month was given by:- 
 
 TRm = DY0/12 + ((I1 – I0)/I0 -1) 
 
 where:  I0 and I1 are index levels at the start and end of the month 
   DY0 = Dividend yield at the start of the month. 
 
 
and the total return in any quarter, for example, was calculated from: 
 
 TRq = (1 + TRmt)(1 + TRmt+1)(1 + TRmt+2) – 1 
 
 where: TRmt is the total return in the first quarter of the month 
 
 
The two features that dominate any cursory examination of monthly and quarterly 
returns are, firstly, the sharp sell-off followed by a steep rise at the bottom of the 
1973-74 bear market and, secondly, the October 1987 Crash. Whilst the former effect 
is also highlighted in annual returns, the 1987 effect disappears. Indeed, 1987 as a 
whole was a positive year for UK equities, despite the sharp October fall. 
 
Table 4.1  UK Stock market return characteristics  
                    
            
  n Mean SE Mean StDev Min Med Max Skewness Kurtosis 
            
Monthly 492  1.17 0.26  5.80 -26.35  1.35  54.00 1.15 14.87 
            
Quarterly 164  3.63 0.86 10.95 -27.23  4.72  79.93 1.63 13.07 
            
Annual   41 16.29 4.72 30.19 -51.66 16.35 151.24 1.91   9.54 
            
                    
 
 114 
Figure 4.1  Monthly returns 

























Figure 4.2  Quarterly returns 























Figure 4.3  Annual returns 






















4.4.2  Volatility in returns 
The analysis above illustrates the volatility of the UK equity market over the whole 
period of 41 years examined. The standard deviation of the market calculated on 
monthly, quarterly and annual bases is 5.80%, 10.95% and 30.19% respectively. 
 
The key subject of this analysis, however, is how, and why, the volatility of the 
equity market changes over time. Additionally, given that statistical measures of 
volatility are commonly used to represent the perceived “riskiness” of assets, 
including equities, can changes in volatility be used to predict future excess returns? 
 
Previous approaches to measuring trends in volatility over time have focused on: 
 
 Measuring the variability in a moving window of monthly returns 
(e.g. Merton, 1980), or 
 
 Estimating the variability in monthly returns from daily returns within 
any month (e.g. French et al, 1987). 
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Both measures are calculated for comparison (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5 below) but 
subsequent analyses utilise monthly variability estimated from daily returns (i.e. 
utilising the latter approach). It can be argued that the latter approach is superior, 
firstly because calculations depend solely on contemporaneous observations and 
secondly, because no over-lapping observations are used. 
 
For ease of comparison, all standard deviation estimates shown are annualised 
figures. Thus the standard deviation in daily returns in any month is expressed as a 
monthly figure by applying a factor of: [number of trading days in month]. Monthly 
returns are then annualised by applying a factor of 12. This approach ignores any 
autocorrelation between adjacent returns but it will be shown in section 4.4.3 that 
there is minimal autocorrelation in monthly excess returns. 
 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show that the final stages of the 1972-74 bear market and the 
1987 Crash were periods of exceptional market volatility. Figure 4.5, in particular, 
highlights just what an isolated and unusual incident the 1987 Crash proved to be. An 
examination of the trends in Figure 4.5 also suggests a negative relationship between 
volatility and market returns. The rise in volatility during the more recent 2000-2002 
bear phase of the market, followed by a decline in volatility during the start of the 
recovery phase in 2003, illustrates this phenomenon well. 
 
Figure 4.4  UK market volatility (rolling average) 























Figure 4.5  UK market volatility (derived from daily data) 


















4.4.3  Volatility clustering 
Clustering in return volatility is a well-documented feature of many financial 
markets. Volatile periods can persist for some time before a market returns to 
normality. Indeed, the ARCH model, initially designed by Engel (1982) was 
designed to capture volatility persistence. As would be expected, therefore, the 
autocorrelation in observed volatility for the UK market decays only slowly. Indeed, 
as Table 4.2 shows, the autocorrelation of monthly volatility is still significant at lag 
12. 
 
An established premise of traditional financial theory is that there is a reward for 
bearing risk. In other words, above-average returns should accompany abnormal 
risk-taking. However, here we start to see the evidence that this is not always the 
observed outcome in the UK equity market. 
 
Table 4.2  Autocorrelation of observed volatility 
                              
                 
  Lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
                 
  Correlation 0.632 0.478 0.410 0.326 0.332 0.311 0.255 0.236 0.209 0.228 0.198 0.184   
                 
  t-stat 13.85 7.83 5.98 4.44 4.36 3.92 3.12 2.83 2.46 2.66 2.27 2.09   
                 
  LBQ 193.06 304.12 385.51 437.27 491.33 538.50 570.33 597.68 619.16 644.91 664.25 680.96   
                              




Table 4.3  Excess returns - Autocorrelation 
    ………..…...Monthly………..………. ………....….Quarterly……..……   ……….......Annual……..…...…   
  Lag Correlation t-stat LBQ  Correlation t-stat LBQ  Correlation 
t-
stat LBQ   
                
  1  0.12  2.67  7.17   0.056  0.72 0.53  -0.282 -1.81 3.51   
  2 -0.10 -2.20 12.18  -0.034 -0.44 0.73  -0.126 -0.75 4.23   
  3  0.07  1.61 14.9   0.027  0.34 0.85  -0.097 -0.57 4.67   
  4  0.03  0.68 15.39  -0.136 -1.74 4.03   0.051  0.88 5.76   
  5 -0.11 -2.43 21.73  -0.141 -1.78 7.48  -0.027 -0.15 5.79   
  6 -0.02 -0.34 21.86  -0.027 -0.35 7.62  -0.187 -1.66 7.54   
                            
 
Table 4.3 shows the autocorrelation in excess returns for the three return intervals 
analysed. Excess returns are calculated as total returns over and above the returns 
from 3 month T-bills over the same period. 
 
The only observation of real significance in Table 4.3 is the autocorrelation at lag 1 
in the case of monthly excess returns. Here we see a positive correlation in 
subsequent returns; however, this trend reverses by lag 2. The results indicate 
therefore that high (low) volatility might persist for some time but that such 
conditions are seldom accompanied by prolonged periods of low (high) excess 
returns. 
 
4.4.4  Volatility as a predictor 
Can measures of market volatility be used reliably to predict future excess returns? 
Table 4.4 indicates that the answer is no. 
 
A range of predictors was calculated for each of the return intervals analysed and 
their reliability as predictors was measured using least squares regression. Monthly 
variability, for example, “explained” only 0.5% of the excess returns achieved in 
subsequent months. None of the predictors achieved results of significance at the 5% 
level. 
 
4.4.5  Contemporaneous relationships 
More statistically significant relationships are obtained, however, if we examine 
contemporaneous relationships, as shown in Table 4.5. The monthly statistics, for 
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example, indicate that declining volatility is associated with rising excess returns and 
vice versa. 
Table 4.4  Volatility as a predictor of excess returns 
                  
  Predictor Monthly excess returns  Predictor Annual excess returns 
   t-stat R2   t-stat R2   
  PMVol 1.482 0.005  EPYVol -0.693 0.013   
           
  PQAVol 1.610 0.005  PYAVol 1.156 0.035   
           
  P3MWAVol 1.536 0.005  P3MWAVol 0.531 0.008   
           
  P6MWAVol 1.652 0.006  P6MWAVol 1.207 0.038   
           
   Quarterly excess returns  P12MWAVol 1.476 0.056   
   t-stat R2       
  EPQVol -0.020 0.000  P24MWAVol 1.282 0.043   
           
  PQAVol 1.361 0.012  TrendVol 1.570 0.062   
           
  P3MWAVol 0.974 0.006  PYMChVol 0.837 0.019   
           
  P6MWAVol 1.350 0.012       
           
           
  Legend         
  PMVol = Previous month volatility  EPYVol = End previous year volatility   
  PQAVol = Previous quarter average volatility  PYAVol  = Previous year average volatility   
  P3MWAVol  = Previous 3 month weighted-average volatility  P12MWAVol = Previous 12 month weighted-average volatility 
  P6MWAVol = Previous 6 month weighted-average volatility P24MWAVol = Previous 24 month weighted average volatility 
  EPQVol = End previous quarter volatility  TrendVol = Latest trend in volatility    
  PQAVol = Previous quarter average volatility  PYMChVol = Previous year trend (monthly change) 
           
           
           
                  
 
The outstanding result, however, is the strong, negative relationship between the 
trend in monthly volatility (average percentage point change) during any year and the 
excess return for that year (t-stat = -5.8, R
2
 = 0.475). In this case, the annual trends in 
monthly volatility are calculated using a simple ordinary least square regression 
model. Excess returns are, in turn, regressed on the estimated volatility trends.  
 
The strong negative relationship between annual excess returns and volatility trends 
is highlighted further in Figure 4.4. The sharp decline in volatility which 
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accompanied the market recovery in 1975 has a significant impact on the overall 
statistical relationship (the R
2
 falls to 0.305 if the 1975 observation is omitted).  
 
A strong inverse relationship has also been observed in recent years: declining 
volatility during strong market conditions in 1999 and rising volatility throughout the 
2000 – 2002 bear phase. The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is a 
behavioural one: as uncertainties are removed, confidence is restored and a clear 
upward trend is established. The reverse takes place during a bear phase. 
 
Table 4.5  Excess returns and volatility – Contemporaneous relationships 
                  
  Monthly data    Annual data     
           
  Excess return -v-   Excess return -v-    
   T-stat R2   T-stat R2   
  VolM -1.273 0.003  VolA 0.955 0.024   
           
  ChVolM -3.237 0.021  ChVolA%pt -0.217 0.001   
           
  Quarterly data    ChVolA% -1.051 0.029   
           
  Excess return -v-   ChDY%pt -1.020 0.027   
   T-stat R2       
  VolQ -0.106 0.000  ChDY% -1.658 0.069   
           
  ChVolQ -1.602 0.016  TVDYMCh -5.785 0.475   
           
  Legend         
  VolM = Average volatility during month       
  ChVolM = Change in average volatility from previous month      
  VolQ = Average volatility during quarter       
  ChVolQ = Change in average volatility from previous quarter      
  VolA = Average volatility during year        
  ChVolA%pt = Change (%pt) in average volatility from previous year      
  ChVolA% = Change (%) in average volatility from previous year      
  ChDY%pt = Change (%pt) in volatility during year       
  ChDY% = Change (%) in volatility during year       
  TVDYMCh = Trend in volatility during year (monthly change)      
           




4.4.6  Subsequent volatility 
Thus far, the results suggest that volatility is a poor predictor of future excess returns 
but that there is evidence of a negative contemporaneous relationship between 
volatility and excess performance.  
 
To complete the picture, there is a case for examining whether there is any evidence 
of a significant relationship between excess returns and subsequent volatility. In 
other words, does volatility rise (fall) – not just contemporaneously – but subsequent 
to negative (positive) excess returns. 
 
The results in Table 4.6 provide the answer. Monthly volatilities were regressed, in 
turn on one, two and three month excess returns. The sign of the regression in each 
case is negative, as expected; but the results were not significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 4.6  Subsequent volatility 
                
  
Monthly volatility -
v-        
          
  One month return Two month return 
Three month 
return   






   
  -1.311 0.004 -1.539 0.005 -1.547 0.005   
          
  Monthly volatility-v- Sentiment indicator:     
   t-stat R
2
      
   -4.94 0.048      
Note: sentiment indicator measures number of successive months of positive (+) or negative (-) excess returns 
 
A more interesting result was obtained, however, by constructing a simple 
“sentiment indicator”. Numerous indicators have been adopted or developed by 
practitioners and academics to judge whether securities have becoming “overbought” 
or “oversold” as a result of behavioural influences. Examples are the level of public 
offerings, mutual fund flows and investment trust discount levels. Even weather 
patterns and the results of sporting fixtures have been held responsible for pricing 
patterns. Baker and Wurgler (2007) provides a comprehensive discussion of such 
indicators.  
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The simple indicator adopted for this study is the number of consecutive positive or 
negative monthly excess returns experienced up to the current month. Thus, for 
example, the indicator would be +5 if there had been five consecutive months of 
positive excess returns or –3 if there had been three consecutive months of negative 
excess returns. The underlying concept, of course, is that uncertainty – and therefore 
volatility – is likely to increase as a bear phase becomes more prolonged. 
Conversely, investors can be expected to become more confident – and therefore 
more committed to their investments – when a bull phase is sustained. 
 
The results in Table 4.6 show a strong negative relationship between volatility and 
the sentiment indicator. Figure 4.6 illustrates this relationship over the bear and bull 
phases of recent years. 
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4.4.7  A GARCH analysis 
A volatility clustering effect is experienced in most financial markets. Periods of 
“normal” volatility are interspersed with periods of high, sometimes sustained, 
volatility. Or, put more technically, markets exhibit autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH).  
  
The ARCH process assumes that the current conditional variance in returns is a 
weighted-average of past squared unexpected returns. Thus: 
t
2
 = a + a1 t
2
-1 + a2 t
2
-2 + a3 t
2




A generalisation of this model, the GARCH model, requiring far fewer parameters in 
normal circumstances, was introduced by Bollerslev in 1986. 
  
Figure  4.7  UK market volatility – fitted GARCH values 
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However, it is usually sufficient to use a GARCH (1,1) model which uses just one 
lag of past squared errors and one lagged variance forecast: 
t
2
 =  + a t
2




 where:   1 and a, b  0 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the results of a GARCH (1,l) analysis of excess returns over the 
1963 – 2003 period (EViews 5 econometric software was used). The dotted line 
shows the fitted standard deviation in returns; the unbroken line shows the actual 
monthly standard deviation derived, as previously, from daily data within months. 
The equation of the fitted line is given by: 
 
Value  Standard error 
Constant ( )  1.129897 0.213416 
Coefficient (a)  0.112061 0.025117 
Coefficient (b)  0.861185 0.034768 
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Note that all values are statistically significant and that the sum of the a and b 
coefficients is close to unity, implying that shocks to conditional volatility are highly 
persistent. 
4.4.8  Forecasting volatility 
A GARCH model appears to provide a sound description of historic trends in market 
volatility. But, can GARCH models be used to predict future volatility or future 
excess returns? 
 The results of an exercise to answer these questions are shown below. A 
GARCH (1,1) model was estimated for the 1963 – 1979 period with the following 
coefficients: 
 
Value  Standard error 
Constant ( )  1.128316 0.631655 
Coefficient (a)  0.137835 0.043682 
Coefficient (b)  0.853240 0.049647 
 
Subsequent values for conditional volatility were then found by rolling forward the 
model month by month so that an additional month‟s data was used in the estimation. 
Thus conditional volatility at the end of 1982, for example, was estimated from 
1963-1982 data. The estimated out-of-sample forecasts are illustrated by the dotted 
line in Figure 4.8 below. The estimated values of conditional volatility were then 
viewed as the “anticipated” elements of subsequent volatility and the residual 
portions were treated as the “unanticipated” elements. 
 
Although not quite the mid-point of the data set, end-1979 was chosen as the starting 
point for out-of-sample forecasts simply because that year represents a distinct “end 
of an era” in the minds of many investors (i.e. change of Government, end of 
exchange and dividend controls etc.). 
   
Table 4.7 shows the observed relationship over the 1980-2003 period between these 
elements of volatility and subsequent market excess returns. As previously shown, 
there is a very strong, negative correlation between excess returns and 
contemporaneous volatility. Moreover, the linkage would appear to be between 
excess returns and the volatility unanticipated by the GARCH model. There would 
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appear to be a slight positive correlation between anticipated volatility and excess 
returns, although this relationship is not statistically significant over shorter periods 
(e.g. one month).  Note that the linkage between excess returns and unanticipated 
volatility accords with previous research such as that undertaken by French et al 
(1987) for the US market. They interpreted the negative relation between the two to 
be evidence of a positive relation between expected risk premiums and ex ante 
volatility. 
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Table 4.7  Anticipated and unanticipated volatility 
                        
  Excess return ….Anticipated vol…. …......Actual vol…... ...Unanticipated vol…. 
  period  t-stat R2  t-stat R2  t-stat R2   
              
  
One 
month  0.943 0.003  -6.236 0.12  -6.426 0.126   
              
  Two months 1.461 0.007  -6.727 0.037  -6.915 0.144   
              
  Three months 1.402 0.007  -7.641 0.171  -7.296 0.158   
              
  
Six 
months  2.108 0.016  -9.136 0.229  -3.209 0.035   
              
  Twelve months  1.383 0.007  -11.193 0.313  -1.846 0.012   
              
              
  Note: Anticipated volatility is value predicted by GARCH (1,1) model      
            Unanticipated volatility is difference between actual and predicted value      
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4.4.9 Relationship with macro-economic volatility 
Table 4.8  Market and macroeconomic volatility 
Panel A - Changes in quarterly volatility           
 -versus - change in Consols yield (CY)  -versus - change in Industrial Production (IP) 
           
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat    
Coincident 0.0136 -1.4751  Coincident 0.0003  0.2177    
           
CY(-1) 0.0013  0.4520  IP(-1) 0.0209 -1.8288    
CY(-2) 0.0026  0.6409  IP(-2) 0.0013  0.4567    
CY(-3) 0.0040 -0.7854  IP(-3) 0.0001 -0.0881    
CY(-4) 0.0036  0.7476  IP(-4) 0.0034 -0.7298    
           
CY(+1) 0.0468  2.7759  IP(+1) 0.0008 -0.3553    
CY(+2) 0.0009  0.3653  IP(+2) 0.0049  0.8780    
CY(+3) 0.0002 -0.1806  IP(+3) 0.0228  1.9029    
CY(+4) 0.0112  1.3236  IP(+4) 0.0098 -1.2340    
           
 -versus - change in Consumer Spending (CS)  -versus - change in Real Corporate Earnings (RCE) 
           
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat    
Coincident 0.0055  0.9362  Coincident 0.0021  0.5738    
           
CS(-1) 0.0110 -1.3200  RCE(-1) 0.0004 -0.2392    
CS(-2) 0.0025 -0.6259  RCE(-2) 0.0010 -0.3919    
CS(-3) 0.0020  0.5539  IRCE-3) 0.0120 -1.3710    
CS(-4) 0.0043  0.8128  RCE(-4) 0.0014 -0.4563    
           
CS(+1) 0.0032  0.7154  RCE(+1) 0.0000 -0.0519    
CS(+2) 0.0008 -0.3565  RCE(+2) 0.0003  0.2142    
CS(+3) 0.0034 -0.7286  RCE(+3) 0.0000  0.0669    
CS(+4) 0.0005  0.2894  RCE(+4) 0.0010  0.3971    
           
Panel B - Changes in quarterly volatility (Excluding 1987 effect)     
 -versus - change in Consols yield (CY)  -versus - change in Industrial Production (IP) 
           
  R2 t-stat   R2 t-stat    
Coincident 0.0178 -1.6803  Coincident 0.0001 0.1195    
           
CY(-1) 0.0065  1.0033  IP(-1) 0.0317 -2.2561    
CY(-2) 0.0014  0.4613  IP(-2) 0.0056  0.9275    
CY(-3) 0.0042 -0.8048  IP(-3) 0.0058 -0.9424    
CY(-4) 0.0039  0.7740  IP(-4) 0.0030 -0.6743    
           
CY(+1) 0.0338  2.3298  IP(+1) 0.0001 -0.1455    
CY(+2) 0.0048  0.8637  IP(+2) 0.0080  1.0117    
CY(+3) 0.0013  0.4466  IP(+3) 0.0292  2.1455    
CY(+4) 0.0076  1.0762  IP(+4) 0.0105 -1.2724    
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Previous academic work has suggested that there is only a weak link between stock 
market volatility and macro-economic volatility. Indeed, and as discussed previously, 
a recent analysis by Morelli (2002) concluded that: “the volatility in the 
macrovariables selected does not explain the volatility in the stock market.” 
 
The results of a similar analysis for the period 1963-2003 are shown here. Quarterly 
changes in stock market volatility were regressed against changes in long interest 
rates (consol yields), industrial production, consumer spending and real corporate 
earnings (notional FTSE All-Share index earnings). Coincident, leading and lagging 
relationships were examined in each case. 
 
Only two results in Panel A of Table 4.8 are of significance. There appears to be a 
negative correlation between market volatility and anticipated changes in industrial 
production, as one might expect. This also confirms Morelli‟s findings. Additionally, 
stock market volatility appears to rise (fall) in the quarter following a rise (fall) in 
long interest rates (Morelli did not include volatility in the long interest rate as a 
predictor). The results in Panel B, derived after omitting the influence of the 1987 
Crash, confirm the significance of these two relationships. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed previous important studies of the nature of equity market 
volatility and the relationship between excess returns and volatility. An updated 
analysis on the UK equity market has also been presented which examines the excess 
return/volatility relationship from a number of different viewpoints. The analysis 
confirms that this relationship is complex. The key findings are: 
 
 The variability of the UK equity market since 1963 calculated on monthly , 
quarterly and annual bases is 5.8%, 10.95% and 30.19% respectively. 
Exceptional volatility was witnessed at the bottom of the 1973-74 bear 
market and at the time of the 1987 Crash. 
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 Autocorrelation analysis shows that observed volatility decays only slowly. 
Indeed, the analysis of monthly volatility shows a statistically significant 
autocorrelation at lag 12. In contrast, excess returns display little or no 
positive correlation beyond lag 1. 
 
 Measures based on observed volatility are generally poor predictors of excess 
return. 
 
 There is a strong, negative relationship between excess returns and 
contemporaneous volatility. Moreover, there is some evidence that such 
trends in volatility can persist in response to achieved returns. 
 
 A GARCH (1,1) model of conditional volatility provides a good fit to 
observed volatility over the 1963-2003 period. An out-of-sample analysis 
indicates that the main linkage between excess returns and volatility is largely 
confined to the “unanticipated” element of volatility. 
 
 There appears to be a frustratingly weak link between market volatility and 
macroeconomic volatility, as previous research has concluded. 
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CHAPTER 5 - A PARTIAL DECOMPOSTION OF EXPECTED 
RETURNS 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The analysis contained in this relatively short chapter builds on the basic 
methodology of Shiller (1981) in examining the apparent “excess” volatility of 
equity markets. In so doing, the chapter also serves as a preface to chapter 6, in 
which a unique and more comprehensive decomposition of UK market returns is 
discussed in full. 
 
The intention here is to demonstrate that: 
 
(a) variation in the opportunity cost of investing in equities (i.e. the 
returns available on risk-free alternative investments) can explain 
a substantial proportion of observed volatility 
 
(b) there is a case for believing that wide swings also occur in the risk 
premium demanded by (or available to) equity investors. This 
could explain a significant proportion of any apparent “excess” 
volatility. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the thrust of Shiller‟s argument is that a strong linkage 
should be observed between the progress in equity prices and dividends, given that 
equity prices should reflect the present value of all future dividends expected by 
equity investors. Shiller observed that the volatility of equities is, in fact, many times 
the volatility of dividends. 
 
Figure 5.1 below is a reproduction of Figure 2.2 in chapter 2. It compares the 
progress of the UK All-Share index since 1962 with that of an index simulated by 
discounting the end 2005 All-Share Index level and all dividends to be received 
subsequent to the date of observation. In other words, it assumes that the end 2005 
index level is a “correct” valuation of dividends to be received from 2006 to infinity. 
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Additionally, it assumes that investors at all times between 1962 and end-2005 had 
perfect foresight of the dividend stream to end-2005. All dividends and the end-2005 
index value are discounted back at a constant discount rate (the average rate of return 
earned, 13.1%). 
 
The result is that the actual equity index displays far greater volatility than the 
simulated index. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 present the results even more dramatically. 
Figure 5.2 shows the deviation of the simulated index from its long-term trend 
(measured as the percentage deviation from the regression line of best fit). The range 
of the deviation is from -6% to +8%. A positive deviation is observed for the 1980s 
following the lifting of dividend controls; a negative deviation is observed for the 
1990s when dividend growth slowed and, in particular, following the abolition of the 
dividend tax in 1997 (note that the analysis uses notional, gross dividends which 
were effectively cut as a result of the 1997 tax measures). Figure 5.3, which monitors 
the progress of the actual index around its long-term trend, shows far greater 
volatility. The index stood at 68% below trend at the bottom of the 1974 bear market 
and stood at 74% above trend prior to the Crash in October 1987. 
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5.2  VARYING THE RISK-FREE RATE 
Nominal values for both dividend growth and discount rates were used in the 
analysis of the equity market described above. This is in contrast to the Shiller 
approach which used real values for the relevant series. The overall effect is likely to 
be similar because inflation has an impact on both the numerator (nominal dividends) 
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and the denominator (one component of which will be the risk-free nominal rate). It 
is recognised, of course, that the effects of inflation are complex and the effects on 
the numerator and denominator will not always perfectly offset each other. However, 
the purpose of this next stage in the analysis was to show the broad impact on 
volatility if the risk-free component of the discount rate was allowed to vary. A more 
precise and detailed analysis – which takes into account the specific impact of 
inflation on the different variables -  is applied in the more comprehensive 
decomposition described in Chapter 6. 
 
The expected return on equities at any point in time was assumed to be given by: 
 
Alternative, long-term risk-free rate available + equity risk premium 
 
The yield on government 2
1
/2% Consols was used as the long-term, risk-free 
alternative to equity investment. The peak in the Consols yield during the period of 
analysis was 18.0% in December 1974; the low point was 4.1% in December 2005, 
at the close of the period under investigation. 
 
This next stage in the analysis was again to simulate the trend in the UK equity 
market since 1962 assuming, as before, that investors had perfect foresight of the 
dividend stream to the end of 2005 as well as the end-2005 equity market level. 
Instead of discounting at a constant rate, however, the discount rate was varied 
according to the movement in the risk-free component. No attempt was made to vary 
the risk premium element. Instead, a constant element was added to the Consols yield 
at any point. The average nominal return over the entire period was 13.1% pa; the 
average Consols yield was 8.9%. The difference, 4.2%, was therefore used as the 
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Table 5.1  Annual standard deviation in returns 
                
  Actual All-Share Simulated index Simulated index   
  Index  (constant discount) (variable risk-free rate) 
          
  21.14%  0.44%  16.24%    
           
  Note: Simulated index (constant discount) assumes that investors have perfect   
            foresight and discount future dividends at a constant rate    
            Simulated index (variable risk-free rate) assumes that investors have perfect   
            foresight and discount dividends at a rate that incorporates the prevailing risk-free rate.  
                
 
The final two columns of Table 5.2 (a full quarterly analysis is contained in 
Appendix 1) show the variable discount applied in the simulation and the resultant, 
simulated index. Figure 5.4 above illustrates that, unlike the initial simulation – 
conducted using a constant discount rate – the simulated index does display 
significant volatility. Indeed, the annualised standard deviation in returns for this 
second, simulated index was 16.2% compared with an equivalent figure of 21.1% for 




5.3  A VARYING EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
Thus far, we have assumed that changes in the expected return on equities are caused 
in part by changes in risk-free rates of return. And it would appear that such changes 
could add significantly to the volatility of the equity market. But what about changes 
in the second main element of expected equity returns, the equity risk premium? In 
this case, we cannot rely on historical fact in the analysis. All that can be examined is 
the implied equity risk premium prevailing at any point in the past.  
 
The “perfect foresight” analysis of historical trends was therefore extended to find 
the degree to which swings in the equity risk premium might explain the remaining 
portion of historical equity market volatility. In this case, the implied rate of return 
on the equity market was determined (using the Excel internal rate of return function) 
at each point in the past, again assuming that investors had perfect knowledge of 
future dividends and the end-2005 index level. 
 
The assumption being made is that the end-2005 index level represents the 
discounted value of all dividends from 2006 to infinity. What is being applied here, 
therefore, is a two stage discounting model, where a constant discount rate is 
effectively being assumed from 2006, while the internal rate of return being 
estimated is for a variable period up to the end of 2005. At end 1962, for example, 
the internal rate of return estimated is for a period of 43 years. At end 2004, the rate 
of return estimated is for a single annual period. Consequently, it could be argued 
that the results become less and less meaningful as the period of observation shortens 
since the returns become less and less reliable as indicators of what very long-term 
expectations might have been.  
 
Notwithstanding this qualification, the analysis does provide some interesting and 
believable results. The final column of Table 5.3, for example, shows trends in the 
implied equity risk premium. The latter were found by subtracting the Consols yield 
available at any point from the available internal rate of return on equities.  
 
As discussed above, the results for more recent years are arguably distorted. Leaving 
those aside and examining the longer history, the analysis shows that the equity risk  
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Table 5.2  Simulating the equity index 
  All-Share All-share Notional Simulated Variable discount Simulated   
Date Index Yield Dividend Index rate (%) Index   
     (Note A) (Note B) (Note C)   
31/12/1962 95 4.35 4.11 95 9.8 181   
31/12/1963 109 4.08 4.43 98 10.0 185   
31/12/1964 97 5.18 5.03 106 10.5 177   
31/12/1965 104 5.23 5.42 114 10.7 183   
30/12/1966 94 5.79 5.44 123 10.9 190   
29/12/1967 121 4.38 5.31 134 11.3 189   
31/12/1968 174 3.24 5.63 146 12.2 171   
31/12/1969 147 3.85 5.67 159 13.1 159   
31/12/1970 136 4.39 5.98 173 14.1 148   
31/12/1971 193 3.25 6.29 190 12.8 197   
29/12/1972 218 3.15 6.87 208 14.2 175   
31/12/1973 150 4.77 7.14 227 16.9 134   
31/12/1974 67 11.71 7.83 249 22.2 88   
31/12/1975 158 5.47 8.65 273 19.2 130   
31/12/1976 152 6.42 9.76 299 18.9 148   
30/12/1977 215 5.28 11.33 327 14.9 256   
29/12/1978 220 5.79 12.75 356 16.7 228   
31/12/1979 230 6.87 15.79 388 16.2 266   
31/12/1980 292 6.10 17.83 421 16.5 282   
31/12/1981 313 5.89 18.44 457 18.3 258   
31/12/1982 382 5.26 20.10 496 14.6 418   
30/12/1983 471 4.62 21.74 539 14.2 475   
31/12/1984 593 4.42 26.21 583 14.3 509   
31/12/1985 683 4.34 29.64 630 14.2 556   
31/12/1986 835 3.98 33.25 679 14.5 589   
31/12/1987 870 4.33 37.68 730 13.7 686   
30/12/1988 927 4.69 43.46 782 13.4 761   
29/12/1989 1205 4.19 50.48 835 14.0 764   
31/12/1990 1032 5.46 56.36 887 14.9 756   
31/12/1991 1188 4.93 58.55 942 14.2 855   
31/12/1992 1364 4.31 58.78 1004 12.7 1034   
31/12/1993 1682 3.46 58.20 1074 10.7 1304   
30/12/1994 1521 4.02 61.16 1151 12.9 1169   
29/12/1995 1803 3.82 68.88 1233 12.0 1316   
31/12/1996 2014 3.76 75.71 1317 12.0 1418   
31/12/1997 2411 3.23 77.88 1408 10.7 1638   
31/12/1998 2674 2.50 66.85 1523 8.7 1949   
31/12/1999 3242 2.12 68.73 1651 9.2 1998   
29/12/2000 2984 2.23 66.54 1798 8.9 2139   
31/12/2001 2524 2.63 66.38 1963 9.4 2228   
31/12/2002 1894 3.55 67.23 2149 8.9 2395   
31/12/2003 2207 3.10 68.43 2359 9.2 2520   
31/12/2004 2412 3.00 72.37 2593 8.7 2695   
31/12/2005 2847 3.00 85.41 2847 8.3 2847   
Notes         
A Present value of the end 2005 index and all expected dividends to end    
  2005 discounted at a constant rate of 13.08% per annum.    
          
B Prevailing rate of return on 21/2% Consols + 4.2% equity risk premium    
          
C Present value of the end 2005 index and all expected dividends to end    
  2005 discounted at the prevailing rate of return on 21/2% Consols + 4.2%   




Table 5.3  The implied equity risk premium 
  All-Share Notional  Internal rate Consols Implied equity 
Date Index dividend of return (%) yield risk premium (%) 
    (Note A)  (Note B) 
31/12/1962 95 4.11 12.85 5.59 7.3 
31/12/1963 109 4.43 12.53 5.81 6.7 
31/12/1964 97 5.03 13.58 6.31 7.3 
31/12/1965 104 5.42 13.64 6.48 7.2 
30/12/1966 94 5.44 14.73 6.66 8.1 
29/12/1967 121 5.31 13.67 7.06 6.6 
31/12/1968 174 5.63 12.10 7.99 4.1 
31/12/1969 147 5.67 13.53 8.87 4.7 
31/12/1970 136 5.98 14.60 9.87 4.7 
31/12/1971 193 6.29 12.96 8.64 4.3 
29/12/1972 218 6.87 12.77 9.97 2.8 
31/12/1973 150 7.14 16.02 12.70 3.3 
31/12/1974 67 7.83 26.07 18.01 8.1 
31/12/1975 158 8.65 17.29 14.98 2.3 
31/12/1976 152 9.76 18.67 14.70 4.0 
30/12/1977 215 11.33 16.40 10.72 5.7 
29/12/1978 220 12.75 17.07 12.54 4.5 
31/12/1979 230 15.79 17.60 12.01 5.6 
31/12/1980 292 17.83 16.16 12.30 3.9 
31/12/1981 313 18.44 16.38 14.13 2.2 
31/12/1982 382 20.10 15.36 10.39 5.0 
30/12/1983 471 21.74 14.27 9.97 4.3 
31/12/1984 593 26.21 12.94 10.12 2.8 
31/12/1985 683 29.64 12.35 10.05 2.3 
31/12/1986 835 33.25 11.20 10.25 0.9 
31/12/1987 870 37.68 11.41 9.50 1.9 
30/12/1988 927 43.46 11.42 9.16 2.3 
29/12/1989 1205 50.48 9.48 9.83 -0.4 
31/12/1990 1032 56.36 11.48 10.66 0.8 
31/12/1991 1188 58.55 10.57 9.99 0.6 
31/12/1992 1364 58.78 9.65 8.53 1.1 
31/12/1993 1682 58.20 7.88 6.55 1.3 
30/12/1994 1521 61.16 9.57 8.68 0.9 
29/12/1995 1803 68.88 8.02 7.78 0.2 
31/12/1996 2014 75.71 7.02 7.78 -0.8 
31/12/1997 2411 77.88 4.82 6.45 -1.6 
31/12/1998 2674 66.85 3.46 4.51 -1.0 
31/12/1999 3242 68.73 0.14 5.01 -4.9 
29/12/2000 2984 66.54 1.49 4.74 -3.2 
31/12/2001 2524 66.38 5.83 5.16 0.7 
31/12/2002 1894 67.23 18.15 4.71 13.4 
31/12/2003 2207 68.43 16.98 5.02 12.0 
31/12/2004 2412 72.37 21.62 4.52 17.1 
31/12/2005 2847 85.41 - 4.10 - 
Notes       
A The annual internal rate of return that equates the All-Share index level at that 
  data with the end 2005 index level and dividends to be received up until end 2005 
        
B The annual internal rate of return minus the prevailing consols yield 
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premium available reached a peak, 8.1%, in December 1974 and reached a low point, 
-1.5%, in September 1987 (a full quarterly analysis of the results is contained in 
Appendix A). These points heralded, respectively, the major resurgence in the equity 
market during 1975 and the near-30% Crash in the equity market in the fourth 
quarter of 1987. 
 
5.4  A MORE COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS REQUIRED 
The analyses described above suggest that, when perfect foresight is assumed 
regarding future dividend flows, the volatility of the equity market can broadly be 
attributed to two main factors: changes in risk-free rates of return available and 
changes in a risk premium element. 
 
Whether the latter can be explained in terms of irrational behaviour is another matter 
altogether. All that these analyses have shown is that there appear to be significant 
swings in this risk premium element, however caused. 
 
Investors do not have perfect foresight. They can only estimate the course of future 
dividend growth. The consequent uncertainty is, therefore, another element 
contributing to the volatility of equity returns. Indeed, a relatively small change in 
long-term real growth expectations - which would translate into an equivalent 
adjustment to the dividend yield – can have a significant impact on current levels. 
 
A more complex model is required, however, in order to gain a better understanding 
of reality. Perfect foresight models or ex-post measures (e.g. for the equity risk 
premium) are poor – and arguably dangerous – substitutes for ex-ante estimates, 
however difficult and imprecise such estimates might be. 
 
Such an attempt is made in Chapter 6. Expected returns from both equities and the 
risk-free asset returns are decomposed into more precise elements with a view to 
gaining a more realistic and comprehensive understanding of market volatility. The 
aim is also to measure the implied, “pure”, ex-ante risk premium available in the 
past. 
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CHAPTER 6 – TIME VARIATION IN EQUITY RETURNS – A 
FULL DECOMPOSITION 
 
Other studies (e.g. Fama and French, 2002, Vivian, 2007) have indicated that there 
would appear to be a significant divergence between ex-post measures of the equity 
risk premium and estimates of the ex-ante premium historically. The purpose in this 
chapter is to present a full, up-to-date decomposition of both equity and bond returns 
in the UK markets since 1963. A detailed explanation for the divergence between ex-
post and ex-ante measures of the equity risk premium is also presented 
 
6.1  THE COMPONENTS 
The relevant components of the expected returns from equities and long-dated bonds 
are identified in the following discussion. An underlying assumption is that the 
equity and bond markets reflect the actions and expectations of rational, risk averse 
long-term investors. 
 
The expected return on equities can be viewed through the Gordon growth 
relationship as: 
EER = EDY + EIR + ERDG …………….(6.1) 
 
 where:    EER  = Expected equity return 
  EDY  = Expected dividend yield 
  EIR  = Expected long-term inflation rate 
  ERDG  = Expected long-term real dividend growth rate. 
 
The expected equity return is assumed to exceed the return available on a risk-free 
alternative by a risk premium (ERP). The yield on undated gilts is used as the 
relevant risk-free benchmark against which to judge the returns available on equities. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the yield on long gilts (2
1
/2% undated consols are used 
in the analysis) can be viewed as:- 
GY = RRR + EIR + IRP………………..(6.2) 
 
 where: GY  = Long gilt yield 
  RRR  = Real rate of return 
  EIR  = Expected long-term inflation rate 
  IRP   = Inflation risk premium 
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Note that equation (6.2) is an adjusted version of the Fisher effect (in this context, the 
standard Fisher equation would be: GY = RRR + EIR + RRR*EIR). The third, 
insignificant term on the right hand side is removed and a separate term for an 
inflation risk premium is included. 
 
Figure 6.1  Return components 
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The difference between the expected returns from equities and bonds, the expected 
equity risk premium (ERP), can be derived by relating (6.1) to (6.2) :- 
 









Alternatively, we can view the expected dividend yield as:- 
 
EDY = ERP + RRR + IRP – ERDG……………..(6.5) 
 
In essence, we need to decompose expected returns into five components in order to 
start to understand the variation in returns through time, namely: 
 Expected inflation 
 The inflation risk premium 
 Expected long-term real dividend growth. 
 The real rate of interest 
 The expected equity risk premium 
 
 
The following section contains a discussion of each of these components and 
describes previous attempts to measure historical values. 
 
6.1.2  Expected inflation 
Many studies in the area of return variation pay only scant attention to expected 
inflation levels, preferring simply to concentrate on analyses of real returns. Inflation 
is, of course, incorporated into the Gordon growth model both through the numerator 
(the growth in cash flows) and through the denominator (the inflation element in the 
discount rate). The Gordon growth model could therefore be written as: 
 
 P = D1/(r – g)  
  
 where:  r = real risk-free rate of interest 
  g = real dividend growth 
 
However, for the purposes of this study, inflation is retained as a separate component 
of return for two main reasons:- 
 
(a) As will be discussed in the next sub-section, a significant inflation 
risk premium may be embedded within nominal risk-free rates over 
certain periods. If such a premium exists, it is likely to be highly and 
positively correlated with inflation expectations. Moreover, this 
element would need to be incorporated into the Gordon growth model 
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even if the discount rate and dividend growth rate are expressed in 
real terms. 
 
(b) As will be discussed, there is much evidence of a negative 
relationship between inflation and equity returns. One causal linkage 
may be between expected inflation, real productivity and real growth 
expectations. These relationships need to be examined more closely. 
 
The high period of inflation in the 1970s encouraged many researchers to examine 
the inflation-hedging properties of assets. Fama and Schwert (1977), for example, 
analysed US data for the 1953-1971 period. They concluded that:- 
 
 Only private, residential real estate was a complete hedge against both 
expected and unexpected inflation. 
 Government bonds were complete hedges against expected inflation 
and the expected nominal returns varied directly with the expected 
inflation rate. 
 Contrary to conventional wisdom, common stocks returns were 
negatively related to expected inflation. 
 
Fama & Schwert conceded that they were unable to identify the economic origins of 
the negative relationship between equity returns and expected inflation but suggested 
two possible causes: some as yet unidentified phenomenon or some market 
inefficiency in impounding information about future inflation. 
 
Solnik (1983) extended the analysis of the relationship between equity prices and 
inflation to a further eight major equity markets. A Fisherian model of the real 
expected equity return was applied, of the form:- 
 
 rt = α + β1It + β2(It+1 – It) + εt 
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where β1 and β2 are coefficients for inflationary expectations (I) and revisions in 
expectations respectively. Both are expected to be zero under the null hypothesis that 
expected real returns are determined solely by real factors. 
 
Tested on US data, the model confirmed the previous findings of Fama and Schwert, 
that there was a negative relationship between real equity returns and inflation 
expectations. Likewise, the results for all the other markets confirmed a negative 
relationship (β1 and β2 were negative in all cases except for Canada where the β1 was 
positive). 
 
Geske and Roll (1983), along with many others, attempted to provide an explanation 
for the negative relationship between stock returns and both expected and unexpected 
inflation. Their evidence suggested the following chain of events. A random real 
shock affects stock returns which, in turn, signals changes in the real economy. 
Government expenditures do not change immediately in response to such a signal 
and any required changes in Government funding is accommodated through changes 
to the monetary base. The latter, in turn, affects the pricing of other short-term 
securities and, possibly, real interest rates. Thus it is the equity market which signals 
changes in interest rates and expected inflation, rather than the reverse. An analysis 
of data over the previous three decades supported this causal link. 
 
Blanchard (1993), Arnott & Bernstein (2002) and Ilmanen (2003) all attempted to 
simulate past inflation expectations using regression techniques. Ilmanen used 
regression results for early years combined with survey forecasts from 1951 
onwards. Best & Byrne (2000) did not attempt to simulate inflation as a separate 
variable but used survey 10-year forecasts of nominal GDP growth as proxies for 
expected long-term dividend growth. FitzGerald (2001) derived inflation 
expectations from the difference between conventional bond yields and the real rates 





6.1.3  The inflation risk premium 
Although accounting for a relatively small part of total return variability, the inflation 
risk premium is the cause of considerable controversy. There appears to be no 
consensus regarding its size or, even, sign. 
 
Nevertheless, the inflation risk premium has in the past been recognised as positive 
and possibly significant by the UK Government. One reason given for the 
introduction of index-linked gilts in 1981, for example, was that the Government‟s 
cost of funding would be reduced because investors would not require an inflation 
risk premium on index-linked, as opposed to conventional, gilts (Rutterford, 1983). 
 
The launch of index-linked securities in the UK provided a valuable opportunity for 
researchers to examine the composition of the yield gap between conventional and 
index-linked gilts. Arak and Kreicher (1985) undertook work on some of the early 
data, comparing the two types of securities over the period 1981-84 and drawing 
inferences regarding inflation expectations and any implied risk premium. Their 
analysis suggested that “those who are willing to assume (boldly) that the 
uncertainty premium is zero” are likely to overstate inflation expectations. However, 
they concluded that “questions remain about the size of the risk premia.” 
 
Woodward (1990), compared index-linked and conventional gilt data over the period 
1982-89, but side-stepped any measurement of the inflation risk premium, arguing: 
 
 “The inflation risk premium is likely to vary, possibly, but not necessarily, 
with the expected inflation rate…………Calculation of this premium proved to be an 
intractable problem. In the analysis to follow, the premium was assumed to be zero. 
No method was adopted to deal with the inflation risk because none seemed superior 
to ignoring it altogether” (Woodward, 1990: 377), 
 
Woodward did concede, however, that future research into the measurement of the 
inflation risk premium on bonds would be valuable in refining the estimates of 




Chu et al (1995) derived estimates of the inflation risk premium using a regression 
model in which the premium was assumed to be a function of: 
 
 Rbt  = Nominal interest rate on 3-month T-bill 
 Π  = Expected inflation rate (ARCH model estimate) 
 Qgt   = Real yield on long index-linked 
 
2
  =  Expected variance in inflation. 
 
The average premium for the 1985-91 period examined was found to average 2.41% 
and was significant at the 1% level. The authors claimed this as evidence that high 
nominal interest rates over the period examined were a result of significant inflation 
premia rather than a result of high riskless interest rates and that: 
 
 “The size and significance of the inflation risk premium indicate that 
investors are willing to accept a lower real return on the index-linked gilt when they 
recognize that both nominal bonds and equity assets are poor hedges against 
uncertain inflation” (Chu, 1995: 889). 
 
More recent evidence has been provided by Breedon and Chadha (2003), who 
investigated the large excess returns of some 200 basis points provided by nominal 
bonds over their index-linked equivalent. The question addressed was whether this 
excess return reflected lower than expected inflation or whether it reflected a fair 
compensation for bearing inflation risk. 
 
Analysing UK gilt data for the period 1983-98, Breedon and Chadha reached the 
following conclusions: 
 
 There was consistent over-estimation of inflation, of the order of 200 
basis points across maturities and through time. 
 An inflation risk premium of up to 50 basis points seemed plausible. 
 Expected inflation and any inflation risk premium were positively 
correlated. 
 The remaining element of the excess returns earned on nominal bonds 




6.1.4  Simulating the inflation risk premium 
Despite growing evidence of the existence of an inflation risk premium, most 
attempts to measure ex-ante market expectations ignore the inflation risk premium. 
Indeed, the author‟s attempt to estimate the historical trends in the inflation risk 
premium over a reasonably long period – by assuming it to be represented by a 
portion of the “inflation gap” – is the only known attempt (see FitzGerald, 2001).  
 
6.1.5  Expected long-term dividend growth 
Two main approaches have been used to incorporate growth measures in the Gordon 
growth model: 
 
 The use of “realistic expectations” which are modelled from economic 
data available at the time in question 
 The use of current, short-term experience. 
 
The latter approach was adopted by Fama & French (2002) and Vivian (2007). Fama 
& French argued that: 
“In sum, the behaviour of dividends for 1951 to 2000 suggests that future growth is 
largely unpredictable, so the historical mean growth rate is a near optimal forecast 
of future growth” (Fama and French, 2002: 651). 
 
In examining the period 1810 to 2001, Arnott & Bernstein (2002) utilised the basic 
Gordon relationship but substituted GDP growth together with a dilution factor 
instead of expected dividend growth. The dilution factor reflected the fact that, 
historically, aggregate dividend growth had lagged GDP growth, mainly due to the 
dilutive effect of increases in shares outstanding and the introduction of new 
enterprises. The model used was therefore: 
 
 ERSR(t) = EDY(t) + ERGDP(t) + EDGR(t) 
 
 where: ERSR(t)    = expected real stock return from time t 
  EDY(t)     = expected dividend yield at time t 
  ERGDP(t)  = expected real per capita GDP growth starting at time t 
  EDGR(t)    = expected annual dilution of real GDP as it flows through to real  
        dividends. 
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The annual dilution factor used was the average of the dilution experienced over the 
whole long history and the dilution experienced over the prior 40 years. The average 
effect was found to be a dilution of 60 basis points. 
 
The expected real per capita GDP growth was estimated in similar fashion by 
combining the very long-term average with the prior 40 years‟ experience. This 
produced an average forecast of 1.8% pa. 
 
Ilmanen (2003) built on the work of Arnott & Bernstein and provided a useful 
discussion of the wide range of inputs possible to the dividend discounting process. 
In particular, the long-term growth rate was identified as the main cause for debate. 
Historical analyses use various data sources: earnings data, dividend data or adjusted 
GDP data, as discussed above. The problem with dividend data is that growth is 
arguably understated since the 1970s because of a shift towards share repurchases. 
As Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003) highlight, there is also now considerable 
evidence that, historically, real dividend growth has lagged real GDP growth in most 
developed economies. An additional problem is whether to input real or nominal 
expected growth rates. Basing future growth trends on the historical, nominal can 
lead to significant overstatement if inflation is assumed to stay at a much lower level 
than in the past. 
 
The inputs chosen by Ilmanen were:- 
 
 The earnings yield multiplied by a constant 0.59 payout ratio as a 
proxy for sustainable dividend yield. It was argued that quoted 
dividend yields tend to understate true yields because of share buy-
backs. 
 The long-term average for real earnings growth was used as a proxy 
for future expected growth. An average of 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 years‟ 
growth rates was used, thereby giving additional weight to more 
recent years. These averages proved to be very unstable – varying 
from -4% to +6% - and unreasonable as ex-ante estimates for certain 
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periods. The averages were “anchored” therefore at 2%, thereby 
providing a plausible range between 0 and 4% most of the time. 
 
FitzGerald (2001) simulated past expectations by using trailing 10 year average real 
dividend growth rates. Like Ilmanen, the distribution range was restricted (from -2% 
to +3%) in order to make the final results more plausible. 
 
Best & Byrne (2001) assembled ex-ante estimates for the equity risk premium in the 
US and UK markets using survey data. As discussed in section 6.1.2, long-term 
dividend growth was derived from consensus forecasts for medium-term earnings 
forecasts and forecasts for longer-term GDP growth. The authors recognised that this 
approach required a number of important conditions to hold, notably for the stock 
market to be representative of the economy as a whole and for the overseas earnings 
of companies to grow at a similar rate to domestic earnings.  
 
6.1.6  The real rate of interest (real yield) 
The traditional Fisher relationship states that the nominal interest rate at any point is 
composed of an expected real return and an expected inflation rate. Arguably, this 
basic relationship can be expanded to incorporate an inflation risk premium. 
 
The variation in real rates of return can be attributed to the capital expenditure 
generating process. Increasing real activity will put pressure on existing capital stock, 
raising the real return on the stock, thereby inducing greater capital expenditure. 
Equilibrium is established within a mature economy such that resources are allocated 
efficiently between consumption and investment.  
 
As Fama & Gibbons (1982) pointed out, however, this capital expenditure argument 
does not explain why real returns appear to be negatively related to expected 
inflation. The explanation, they argued, lies in the fact that the negative relation 
between inflation and real activity that comes out of the monetary sector combines 
with the positive relation between expected real returns and real activity that comes 
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out of the capital expenditure process. The result is the apparent negative relation 
between expected inflation and expected real returns. 
 
A measure of the real rate of interest has been readily available in the UK market 
since 1981 in the form of the yields available on British Government index-linked 
securities. 
 
Both the coupon and principal payments on index-linked securities are linked to the 
level of the UK retail price index (RPI). The securities are indexed with a lag. Both 
coupon and principal payments are linked to the level of the RPI published seven 
months prior to the payment date (three months since 2005). Since the RPI figure 
published in any month relates to data collected in the previous month, the effective, 
total lag is eight months (four months). 
 
Index-linked yields have provided valuable input to the expected return modelling 
process for the period since 1981. However, it is recognised (Scholtes, 2002; Hurd & 
Relleen, 2006) that illiquidity in the index-linked market, particularly in the early 
years, may have been responsible for some distortions in the market. Indeed, it is 
argued that the decline in real rates in recent years results from the expanded 
liquidity of the index-linked markets and the removal of a liquidity discount (i.e. 
removal of a return premium). 
 
While index-liked real rates of return provide valuable input since 1981, alternative 
methods are required to complete the longer picture. Three main approaches have 
been used in the past: 
 
 Use of a constant. FitzGerald (2001), for example, used a constant 
3.5% pa, a figure based on the conclusions of Wilkie (1994). 
 Use of a current window or recent moving-average of inflation as a 
surrogate for long-term inflation expectations [see, for example, 
Brooke et al (2000)]. Market real rates of return are then assumed to 
be the prevailing conventional bond yield less the inflation surrogate. 
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 Use of a regression technique of the type adopted by Arnott & 
Bernstein (2002) and Ilmanen (2003) which relates, say, ten years of 
inflation data after any date to three prior years. The regression model 
at any point uses all available data at that point and indicates the long-
term inflation expectation. Again, market real rates of return are 
assumed to be the prevailing conventional bond yield less the inflation 
surrogate. A regression approach was also adopted by Blanchard 
(1993) in which inflation expectations were simulated through a 
model that incorporated lagged real capital gains and yields on 
equities and lagged inflation and nominal bond yields. The difference 
between nominal bond yields and inflation expectations was assumed 
to represent the expected real rate of interest. 
 
6.2  THE EX-ANTE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 
The ex-ante expected return on equities is derived from: 
 
Expected return = current year expected dividend yield + long-term expected 
dividend growth 
 
The equity risk premium on offer is the difference between this expected return and 
the risk-free alternative available. Most studies define the latter as the redemption 
yield on a long-term government bond. Fama & French (2002) use the yield on 6 
month Treasury bills. 
 
The risk premium can be estimated by comparing real expected returns or nominal 
expected returns. FitzGerald‟s preference for the latter approach stemmed from 
recognition of the inflation risk premium element within conventional bond yields. 
 
The methodologies used in the seven main studies of ex-ante risk premium 
measurement produced to date, and which have previously been discussed in sections 
6.1.2 to 6.1.6, are summarised in the Tables 6.1 to 6.7. 
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Table 6.1  Blanchard 1993 approach  
Variable Proxy 
    
Expected real dividend growth Derived from regression model using lagged equity capital gain 
  and yield, lagged long bond yield and lagged inflation 
  (similar variables used in a predictive model for expected yield) 
    
Expected inflation Derived from regression model using lagged equity capital gain 
  and yield, lagged long bond yield and lagged inflation 
    
Inflation risk premium Not estimated 
    
Expected real equity return  Expected yield + expected real dividend growth 
    
Expected real risk-free return Long bond yield - simulated expected inflation 
    
Ex-ante equity risk premium Expected real equity return - expected real risk-free return 
    
Table 6.2  FitzGerald 2001 approach 
Variable Proxy 
    
Expected growth (G) Prior 10 year real dividend growth fitted to a distribution 
  band of -2% to +3% 
    
Expected real risk-free return Real rates of return on long index-linked gilts from 1981. 
  Constant 3.5% assumed prior to 1981. 
    
Expected inflation (I) 80% of "yield gap", where yield gap = 
  
Redemption yield on long-dated conventional gilts - Real risk-free 
rate 
    
Inflation risk premium 20% of "yield gap" 
    
Expected equity return  Current year yield + expected growth  
    
Ex-ante equity risk premium Expected equity return - yield on long-dated conventional gilts 
Table 6.3  Best & Byrne 2001 approach  
Variable Proxy 
    
Expected growth (G) Based on consensus earnings forecasts + nominal GDP forecasts 
    
Expected inflation Embedded in nominal GDP forecasts 
    
Inflation risk premium Not estimated 
    
Expected real equity return  Current year yield + G 
    
Expected risk-free return Yield on 10 year benchmark bond 
    
Ex-ante equity risk premium Expected real equity return - expected risk-free return 




Table 6.4  Fama & French 2002 approach  
  
Variable Proxy 
    
Expected growth (G) One year dividend growth 
    
Expected inflation Not estimated 
    
Inflation risk premium Not estimated 
    
Expected real equity return  Current year yield + G (deflated by CPI) 
    
Expected real risk-free return Annual return on 6-month Treasury paper (deflated by CPI) 
    
Ex-ante equity risk premium Expected real equity return - expected real risk-free return 
    
Table 6.5  Arnott & Bernstein 2002 approach 
    
Variable Proxy 
    
Expected growth (G) Estimates of growth in per capita GDP are based on 40 and 200  
  year averages. Haircuts applied. 
    
Expected inflation (I) Next decade inflation model regressed on past 3 years inflation. 
  Resultant model used to predict long-term inflation at any point. 
    
Inflation risk premium Not estimated 
    
Expected real equity return  Current year yield + G (deflated by expected inflation) 
    
Expected real risk-free return Redemption yields on 10 year Treasuries 
  (deflated by expected inflation) 
    
Ex-ante equity risk premium Expected real equity return - expected real risk-free return 
    
Table 6.6  Ilmanen 2003 approach  
                  
Variable   Proxy       
           
Expected growth (G)  Average of past 50 years' growth. Anchored at 2%.   
           
Expected inflation (I)  Average of regression model output. Moving 30 year window 
    and survey-based inflation forecasts (from 1951).   
           
Inflation risk premium  Not estimated      
           
Expected real equity return Current year yield + G (deflated by expected inflation). 
           
Expected real risk-free return Redemption yields on 20 or 30 year Treasury bonds   
    (deflated by expected inflation).     
           
Ex-ante equity risk premium Expected real equity return - expected real risk-free return. 
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Table 6.7  Vivian 2007 approach 
  
Variable Proxy 
    
Expected growth (G) One year dividend growth 
    
Expected inflation Not estimated 
    
Inflation risk premium Not estimated 
    
Expected real equity return  Current year yield + G (deflated by CPI) 
    
Expected real risk-free return Return on Treasury Bills (deflated by CPI) 
    
Ex-ante equity risk premium Expected real equity return - expected real risk-free return 
    
 
6.3  A FULL DECOMPOSITION OF UK MARKET RETURNS 
The following analysis investigates the period from 1963 to end 2005. Whilst 
analysis of a longer history would have provided a more comprehensive analysis of 
historical market trends, it was felt that the period of over 40 years examined 
embraced a sufficiently wide spectrum of economic and market conditions. 
Attempting to analyse a longer period would also have thrown up numerous data and 
measurement problems owing to the need to utilise inconsistent and inferior equity 
indices (the FTSE All-Share Index – the most comprehensive benchmark for the UK 
equity market was introduced in April 1962). The analytical approach adopted was 
also determined and influenced by the following factors: 
 
 Apart from the author‟s earlier work, no major long-term 
investigation in this area has made extensive use of data from the 
index-linked gilt market. This is understandable in analysing US 
markets, since Treasury index-linked securities have only been 
available in the US since January 1997. However, a 27 year 
history of index-linked data is now available in the UK. While 
some of the shortcomings and distortions in the early history of 
that market must be recognised, it was thought that use of this data 
would provide a unique and valuable approach to building a 
picture of historical expectations. As will be discussed, the 
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experience since 1981 is used to construct a model which can then 
be used over the entire period being analysed. 
 
 Whilst investor expectations are undoubtedly influenced by 
shorter term trends in economic variables, an assumption being 
made in this analysis – as stated in Section 6.1 – is that the 
financial markets reflect the expectations of rational, long-term 
investors. Historical 5 year or 10 year forecasts – which, in any 
case, are of limited availability from data vendors – were therefore 
not considered to be adequate. Equally, use of very long-term 
actual outcomes, as surrogates for long-term expectations, was 
also ruled out in view of the relatively short time span being 
investigated. However, as will be discussed, use was made of 10 
year actual outcomes to improve the model developed for growth 
expectations. 
 
 Previous studies, such as those undertaken by Fama & French 
(2002) and Vivian (2007) have sought to analyse trends in 
averages over long periods, not specific changes from year to year 
(and, indeed, from quarter to quarter). Such studies did not 
therefore require a picture to be built of realistic historical 
expectations from year to year. Indeed, annual real dividend 
growth in the UK over recent decades has ranged from -12% in 
the 1970s to +10% during the 1980s following the lifting of 
dividend controls. Use of single year growth outcomes as 
surrogates for long-term expectations, as in the Vivian study, 
would therefore result in meaningless annual numbers. However, 
one of the objectives of the study presented here is to build a 
complete picture of changes from year to year. More complex 
models for simulating such expectations are therefore required. 
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Each of the components of expected return, described in the previous sections, was 
estimated at quarterly intervals. The methodology adopted was as follows. 
 
6.3.1  Expected long-term inflation and the inflation risk premium 
The objective of this part of the analysis is to determine what long-term inflation 
expectations investors built into their financial asset valuations in the past. Two key 
assumptions were made: 
 
(a) The “inflation gap” - the difference between long conventional bond 
yields and long index-linked yields - is composed of a long-term inflation 
expectation and an inflation risk premium. Moreover, and concurring 
with the conclusions of Breedon and Chadha (2003), it is assumed that 
there is a positive correlation between the inflation risk premium and 
expected inflation. Rules of thumb for the proportional split between 
expected inflation and the inflation risk premium embedded in the 
inflation gap were adopted by City analysts following the introduction of 
index-linked gilts (see, for example, Bain and Hibbert, 1984). Indeed the 
assumption used by the author in his 2001 study, is that the inflation gap 
can be split in the proportions 80%:20%. That is, 80% of the inflation gap 
can be regarded as the inflation expectation and 20% as the inflation risk 
premium. Justification for an assumed split of this order is presented later 
in this section. 
 
(b) Inflation expectations at any time are moulded by past experience, 
shorter-term expectations or a combination of the two. 
 
The first part of the exercise, therefore, is to look at the relationship between the 
inflation gap since 1981 and a range of trailing and leading inflation indicators, as 
shown in Table 6.8. Incorporating actual ex-post experience into the “windows” 
shown does, of course, imply that investors had perfect foresight. Whilst this may be 
an unrealistic assumption for long horizons, it could be argued that it is more realistic 
for shorter horizons (e.g. the 2 year horizon incorporated into the 5 year window. 
 155 
 
If a realistic and robust model for the inflation gap can be found, the same model 
could be used to simulate inflation gap levels prior to 1981.  
 
The table below shows the results of regressing the inflation gap on each of the 
variables in turn for the period 1981-2005. 
 
Table 6.8  Inflation gap analysis,1981-2005 
Variable Definition            Regression results     
   t-stat R2 Ave Min Max   
          
30YAVEINF 30 year trailing average 0.5860 0.004 7.5 5.7 8.2   
20YAVEINF 20 year trailing average 11.438 0.574 7.6 3.6 10.2   
15YAVEINF 15 year trailing average 24.672 0.863 7.3 2.7 11.6   
10YAVEINF 10 year trailing average 19.098 0.790 6.4 2.4 14.2   
5YAVEINF 5 year trailing average 19.351 0.794 5.1 2.1 13.7   
5YWININF 5 year window (3 trailing, 2 forward) average 16.252 0.731 4.3 2.0 11.2   
10YWININF 10 year window (5 trailing, 5 forward) 22.088 0.834 4.3 2.1 9.5   
20YWININF 20 year window (10 trailing, 10 forward) average 18.771 0.784 4.8 2.4 9.9   
10YFORINF 10 year forward average 15.466 0.711 3.3 2.1 6.0   
                
 
A Minitab stepwise regression technique was also applied to uncover the best 
combination of explanatory variables. A model which combined the 5 year window 
and the 20 year trailing average - provided the best explanation for the variation in 
the inflation gap: 
 
 
Inflation gap = 0.6572 + 0.7030*(5yrwindow) + 0.16771*(20yearave) 








Or, suppressing the constant, the following: 
 
Inflation gap = 0.6869*(5yrwindow) +0. 2555*(20yearave) 







An analysis of sub-periods confirmed that combinations of a 5 year window with a 
longer-term trailing average consistently proved to provide the most significant fit to 
trends in the actual inflation gap. Indeed, Figure 6.2 illustrates how well the model 
described above fits the actual data from the whole period 1982 – 2005. 
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Reassuringly, also, the average simulation value over the whole period is almost 
exactly the same as the observed average (4.96% -v 4.99%). Interestingly, and 
coincidentally, observed inflation over the 24 year period averaged exactly 80% of 
the simulated inflation gap (3.96% -v- 4.96%), thus providing support for the past, 
ad-hoc assumptions adopted by practitioners in the 1980s.  
 
This model, therefore, based on a 24 year history of market trends, provides a means 
of simulating long-term inflation expectations and inflation risk premia prior to 1981. 
In other words, the model could be used to derive a notional inflation gap for prior 




What method should be used to derive the two inflation components for the period 
post 1981? They could be derived using the observed inflation gap or a notional gap 
based on the above model. The advantage of the latter approach is that; 
 
 The method of simulating long-term inflation forecasts for the entire 
1963-2005 would be consistent. 
 
 Any market distortions caused, in particular, by periods of illiquidity 
in the index-linked market would be smoothed. Figure 6.2 shows this 
smoothing effect. 
 
This second approach was therefore adopted. However, whilst the simulated inflation 
expectation derived in this way was used for the entire period of analysis, the actual 
observed value of the inflation gap was used to simulate the inflation risk premium 
values for the period 1981-2005. In other words, the inflation risk premium values 
for 1981-2005 were given by: 
Observed conventional bond yield – observed index-linked yield – simulated inflation 
expectation 
 
This ensured that simulated and observed values knitted together. 
 







































































































A by-product of using the above model to simulate the required inflation components 
for the period prior to 1982 is that implied real rates of interest could be derived for 
the period by subtracting the notional inflation gap from the conventional long bond 
rate prevailing at any point.  The full simulation is shown in Appendix 2, Table B. 
The results, as shown in Table B and, more specifically, the inflation expectation 
trends shown in Figure 6.3 appear both plausible and realistic. 
 
6.3.2  Simulating long-term real dividend growth expectations 
Two key assumptions are made in simulating long-term real dividend expectations: 
 
(a) There is a significant negative correlation between equity yields and 
expected long-term, real dividend growth (as predicted by the Gordon 
growth model). Indeed, it is assumed that there is a simple one-for-one 
negative relationship.  A rise of 1% in real growth expectations would 
result in a fall of 1% in equity yields, all other variables remaining 
constant and assuming no change in investors‟ expected returns. 
Conversely, a fall of 1% in real growth expectations can be expected to 
result in a rise of 1% equity yields, all other variables remaining constant. 
 
(b) Long-term real dividend growth expectations at any time are moulded by 
past experience, short and medium-term expectations or a combination of 
the two. 
 
A range of predictor variables is assembled therefore in order to explain the variation 
in equity yields over the 1963-2005 period. The historical yield for the FTSE All-
Share Index is then regressed against each of these predictor variables. The results 
are shown in Table 6.9.  
 
In this case, it is the 15 year trailing average, 15YAVEDG, which displays the 
greatest (negative) co-movement with the equity yield. Whilst the 5 year window 
again shows a statistically significant relationship, it does not appear to have the 
same influence as the equivalent inflation window has on the long bond yield. 
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The most significant variable, 15YAVEDG, ranges in value from -2.6% to 5.1%, 
arguably too wide a range to be regarded as a realistic indicator of long-term 
expectations. A Minitab stepwise regression was therefore undertaken incorporating 
all the variables to see if a combination of variables could provide a stronger and 
more realistic explanation of equity yield variation.  
 
 
The following resulted: 
 
Equity yield = 6.646 – 0.512*15YAVEDG – 0.306*10YFORDG - 0.540*30YAVEDG 
   (-8.88)   (-5.90)  (-3.22) 





 = 0.358 
 
Table 6.9  Real dividend growth analysis 
    Regression results   
   t-stat R2 Ave Min Max 
         
30YAVEDG 30 year trailing average -1.077 0.007 1.6 0.6 2.9 
20YAVEDG 20 year trailing average -6.353 0.191 1.9 -1.2 4.7 
15YAVEDG 15 year trailing average -6.974 0.221 1.8 -2.6 5.1 
10YAVEDG 10 year trailing average -6.036 0.176 1.7 -4.4 6.2 
5YAVEDG 5 year trailing average -3.511 0.067 1.4 -5.9 9.5 
5YWINDG 5 year window (3 trailing, 2 forward) average -2.829 0.045 1.2 -5.9 9.5 
10YWINDG 10 year window (5 trailing, 5 forward) -1.531 0.034 1.3 -4.4 6.2 
20YWINDG 20 year window (10 trailing, 10 forward) average -4.073 0.060 1.6 -1.2 4.0 
10YFORDG 10 year forward average  1.922 0.064 1.6 -4.4 6.2 
         
15YA10YF Weighted average value -8.560 0.296 1.7 -0.5 3.9 
              
 
The results of the stepwise regression showed that the first two variables, 
15YAVEDG and 10YFORDG, explained most (32%) of the co-movement 
identified; the remaining two variables explained only a further 4%. For ease of 
interpretation, therefore, it was decided to confine the final explanatory model to the 
first two variables. Confining the regression to these variables gave the following 
result: 
Equity yield = 5.465 -0.396*15YAVEDG – 0.171*10YFORDG 
   (-8.80)  (-4.62) 
      R2 = 0.317 
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The final step is to construct a new composite series (15YA10YF) by weighting the 
two predictor variables according to their regression weights. This composite 
measure is assumed to represent a realistic measure of long-term growth expectations 
at any point in the past. The relationship between equity market yield and this 
composite indicator is: 
 
 Equity yield = 5.4673-0.559*15YA10YF 
    (-8.560) 
          R2 =0.296 
The full history of this series is shown in Appendix 2, Table B and is illustrated in 
Figure 6.4.  
 
Figure 6.4  Equity yield –v- simulated real growth expectation 
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Some interpretation is necessary as to how the addition of the 10 year forecast    
average, for which the actual average growth experienced is being used as a 
surrogate, appears to improve the explanatory power. A closer analysis of the data 
for the period suggests that real growth displays long cyclical trends and is mean-
reverting. Relatively high growth gradually declines and tends to be followed by 
lengthy periods of relatively poor growth, and vice versa. If, for instance, subsequent 
10 year growth (10FORDG) is regressed on the most significant indicator identified, 
the previous fifteen year average (15AVEDG), the following negative relationship is 
found:   
10FORDG = 3.045 – 0.851*15AVEDG 






The inclusion of both variables in the final predictive model for real growth appears 
to establish a more balanced picture of what very long term expectations might have 
been. It could be argued that perfect ten year forecasts would not have been available 
historically and therefore it is unrealistic to use them in an expectations model. 
However, this analysis indicates that investors do somehow adjust for likely long-
term trend reversal. In the absence of any alternative, objective method of reflecting 
this perceived behaviour of investors, therefore, it was concluded that a series based 
on both trailing and subsequent growth experiences was justified and would provide 
a superior and more realistic simulation of long-term expectations. 
 
6.3.3 Simulating expected returns and ex-ante equity risk premia 
All the building blocks are now in place to derive historical values for expected 
equity returns and ex-ante equity risk premia. It is useful to stress that the first, and 
main, analysis presented here shows the “implied ERP” at any time. In other words, 
the residual element on offer in the equity market after all other factors have been 
taken into account. 
 
Later in the discussion, the results of two supplementary analyses are presented. 
Firstly, a simulation of the risk/return profile of the equity market under the 
assumption that the premium required by investors remains constant over time. 
Secondly, a simulation of the market‟s risk/return characteristics if the assumed 
premium is permitted to vary within a “realistic” band. We begin, however, by 
examining the expected returns and the “implied” premia available historically. 
 
As was discussed at the start of this chapter, the expected equity return at any time is 
given by the Gordon growth model: 
 
EER = EDY + EIR + ERDG 
 
 where:  EER     = Expected nominal equity return 
   EDY    = Expected UK market dividend yield (year 1) 
   EIR      = Expected long-term inflation rate 
   ERDG  = Expected long-term real dividend growth rate. 
 
 162 
Historical values were therefore derived making use of the values simulated for long-
term real dividend growth and inflation expectations. 
 
Expected equity returns averaged 11.4% over the period analysed, the maximum 
level of 22.4% being achieved at end 1974 and the lowest level, 6.8%, occurring 
several times during 2005. Most importantly, the standard deviation in expected 
annual returns is measured at just 3.2%, which is considerably lower than the 
standard deviation in ex-post returns. 
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The ex-ante equity risk premium at any point can be derived by subtracting the risk-
free rate (the prevailing 2
1
/2% consols yield) from the simulated expected equity 
return. The arithmetic-average value for the ex-ante equity risk premium was found 




Table G in Appendix 2 provides a complete analysis of how this difference of 3 
percentage points arises: 
 
 A windfall average return of 1.5% p.a. arising from unexpected 
dividend growth. 
 A positive re-rating effect which averaged 3.4% pa. 
 Less: an unexpected, average bond return of 1.9% pa. (see Appendix 
2a, Table F – bond returns averaged 10.8% p.a. compared with an 
average expectation of 8.9% p.a.). 
 
The following discussion explains in more detail how the first two of these elements 
arise.  
(i)      If the dividend yield remains constant, then it can be assumed that capital 
performance will match dividend growth. However, if there is unexpected growth in 
dividends then: 
unexpected dividend growth effect = unexpected capital  
performance  
+ 
  unexpected dividend yield 
 
                 =  ADG – EDG 
       + 
        ADY0(ADG – EDG) 
   
where: ADG   = actual dividend growth during the year  
EDG   = dividend growth for the year expected at the start of the year 




(ii) if there is an unexpected change in rating (i.e. dividend yield), then there 
will also be an unexpected capital gain: 
 
unexpected re-rating effect = (1 + ADG)(ADY0/ADY1-1) 
 
where: ADY1 = actual historic yield at the end of the year 
 
The following example illustrates the mathematics behind these components. 
Example 
 
The start-of-year data/expectations for a stock market index are: 
 
Index level (I0) = 1200.00 
Dividend yield (ADY0) = 5.00% 
Notional aggregate dividend = (1200.00)(0.050) = 60.0 
Expected aggregate dividend growth for year (EDG) = 10% 
 
Expected total return  = expected capital performance + expected dividend yield 
   = 10% (assuming unchanged equilibrium dividend yield) 
       + 
       5.00(1.1) 
   = 15.5% 
 
If we assume that the equilibrium dividend yield shifts over the course of the year 
from 5.00% to 5.50%, despite 20% growth in aggregate dividends (ADG), then the 
end-of-year picture is: 
Dividend yield (ADY1) = 5.50% 
Notional aggregate dividend = 60.0(1.2) = 72.0 
Index level (I1) = dividend/dividend yield = 72.0/0.055 = 1309.09 
Actual total return = actual capital performance + actual dividend yield 
        = (I1/I0 – 1) + ADY0(1 + ADG) 
        = 9.1% + 5.00(1.2) 
        = 15.1% 
 
The actual return can be decomposed into the following elements: 
 
(i) the expected return (15.5%) 
(ii) the unexpected dividend growth effect 
= (ADG – EDG) + ADY0(ADG – EDG) 
= 10% + 5.00(0.1) = 10.5% 
(iii) the unexpected re-rating effect 
= (1 + ADG)(ADY0/ADY1-1) 
= (1.2)(5.00/5.50 – 1) 
= -10.9% 




6.3.4 Decomposing the re-rating effect 
The annual re-rating effect – that is, the return caused by an unexpected change in 
dividend yield -  can, in turn, be broken down into its components, viz: 
 The effect of a change in real interest rates. A rise in real interest rates 
will push yields up; a fall will push yields down. 
 The effect of a change in long-term real growth expectations. Rising 
expectations will push yields down; falling expectations will push 
yields up. 
 The effect of a change in inflation risk premium requirements. A rise 
in the premium will push yields up; a fall will push yields down. 
 The effect of a change in equity risk premium requirements. A rising 
risk premium requirement will push yields up; a falling requirement 
will push yields down. 
 
The methodology used to attribute the total effect in any year is as follows. As shown 
above, the unexpected re-rating effect is given by:  
 
Total re-rating effect = (1 + ADG)(ADY0/ADY1-1) 
 
where: ADG   = actual dividend growth in any year 
 ADY0 = actual dividend yield at the start of the year 
ADY1 = actual historic yield at the end of the year 
 
In other words, the effect of the change in dividend yield adjusted by a dividend 
growth factor. In any year, therefore, the total re-rating was apportioned to each of 
the four components according to: 
  
 Total re-rating effect x Yield change associated with component 
      Total yield change 
 
The results for 1975 – the year of recovery following the 1972-1974 bear market – 
offer an extreme example of market performance but can be used to illustrate clearly 
the method of apportionment adopted. 
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The dividend yield on the UK equity market fell by 6.24% during 1975, from 
11.71% to 5.47%. The decomposition presented here has attributed this fall as 
follows: 
Real interest rate effect -3.58% 
 Real growth effect   0.47% 
 Inflation risk premium effect  0.16% 
 Equity risk premium effect  -3.28% 
     -6.24% 
This fall in yield, combined with the dividend growth factor (1975 dividend growth 
was 10.4%), produced a total re-rating return of: 
(11.71/5.47 – 1)(1.104) = 125.9% 
 
This return was then apportioned to changes in each of the four components as 
follows: 
  
Real interest rate return =  125.9*(-3.58/-6.24) = 72.2% 
 Real growth return =   125.9*(0.47/-6.24) = -9.4% 
 Inflation risk premium return = 125.9*(0.16/-6.24) = -3.2% 
Equity risk premium return =  125.9*(-3.28/-6.24) = 66.3% 
                 125.9% 
 
Table E in Appendix 2a shows these detailed results for the whole period examined. 
The annual average re-rating effect was found to be 3.45%. This can be apportioned 
to changes in the four components as follows: 
 
 Average real interest rate return   =   2.28% 
 Average real growth effect    = -0.74% 
 Average inflation risk premium return = -0.79% 
 Average equity risk premium return  =  2.70% 
           3.45% 
 
It should be noted that this result is similar to that obtained by Fama and French 
(2002) from their analysis of the US equity market between 1951 and 2000. They 
concluded that unexpected capital gains were enjoyed over that period as a result of a 
decline in expected stock returns, the latter manifesting itself in a significant fall in 
equity yield over the period. Vivian (2007) concludes that UK equity investors also 
enjoyed unexpected capital gains towards the end of the 20
th
 century. His conclusion 
is that this was due to either expectations of higher growth post 2004 or a decline in 
the discount rate. 
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6.3.5  Additional volatility 
This thesis is a study of changes over time in the returns expected by investors in 
equities, including an analysis of the causes of those changes and the impact of such 
changes. Volatility is partly caused by changes in expected return. However, 
additional volatility is also experienced as a result of unexpected factors.  
 
Table 6.10  Return decomposition 
            
    Annual Associated    
    average (%) volatility (%)   
        
  Expected return 11.4 3.2   
        
  Contributions from:     
  Unexpected dividend growth 1.5 6.3   
  Change in real rates of interest 2.3 22.9   
  Change in real growth expectations -0.7 9.3   
  Change in inflation risk premium -0.8 18.7   
  Change in equity risk premium 2.7 31.0   
        
  Actual return 16.3 29.1   
        
  Unanticipated return 4.9    
        
  less Unanticipated bond return 1.9    
        
  Unanticipated equity risk premium 3.0    
        
  Note: Unexpected dividend growth contribution reflects average capital performance   
            and yield that results from actual dividend growth varying from expectations   
            Contributions from changes in other variables reflect the average capital effects   
            of outcomes varying from expectations (see text for full discussion).   
            
 
 
Table 6.10 summarises the annual effect that specific components have on equity 
returns and the volatility associated with each. The volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation in the return components that can be attributed to each factor. 
(The annual average components can be found in Appendix 2a, Tables, C, E, F and 
G). Table 6.11 shows the correlation between the return components. Note that there 
is evidence of negative correlation between some of these unexpected return 
components which has the result of containing the cumulative volatility associated 
with these sources. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 also highlight the substantial difference in the 
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volatility of actual returns compared with that of expected returns (charts of each of 
the components are shown in Appendix 3). 
 
As Table 6.10 indicates, changes in the equity risk premium available in the equity 
market would appear to represent a significant proportion of overall volatility. 
However, negative correlation between the returns generated by movements in the 
ex-ante equity risk premium and returns generated from changes in other 
expectations, suggests that the expected return adjustment process within the equity 
market is highly complex. 
 
Table 6.11  Correlation between unexpected return components 
                
   DG RR RGE IRP ERP   
          
  Dividend growth (DG) 1.000 0.074 0.561 -0.026 -0.303   
          
  Real rates of interest (RR) 0.074 1.000 -0.051 0.057 -0.144   
          
  
Real growth expectations 
(RGE) 0.561 -0.051 1.000 0.180 -0.450   
          
  Inflation risk premium (IRP) -0.026 0.057 0.180 1.000 -0.594   
          
  Equity risk premium (ERP) -0.303 -0.144 -0.450 -0.594 1.000   
                
 
 





































Traditional financial market theory suggests that the equity risk premium will widen 
in deteriorating economic conditions – thus providing greater potential returns – and 
narrow when conditions are improving. Thus, declining expectations regarding future 
economic growth or expectations of rising interest rates would normally be 
associated with falling stock market prices. 
 
The results obtained in this analysis, however – notably the negative correlation 
between the returns caused by changes in risk premium requirements and returns 
caused by other factors - suggest that this phenomenon is not necessarily observed in 
practice. 
 
6.3.5  Fixed equity risk premium simulation 
Another approach to investigating the impact of changes in the ex-ante equity risk 
premium on overall volatility is to examine the results if no changes had occurred in 
the ex-ante equity risk premium. In other words, we assume that investors and 
markets have reacted to changes in other expectations but have maintained a fixed, 
constant ex-ante equity risk premium. In this case, the long-term average risk 
premium of 2.5% was assumed. The actual dividend growth experienced over the 
period was also used in simulating how the market would have behaved. 
Such an exercise was carried out for the 1963-2005 period, making use of the 
simulation results previously obtained. The procedure therefore was: 
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(a) the first year expected dividend yield at any point was derived using the   
relationship discussed at the start of this section, namely: 
 
 EDY = ERP +RRR + IRP – ERDG 
 
 where:   EDY   = Expected first year dividend yield 
    ERP    = Expected (ex-ante) equity risk premium (fixed at 2.5%) 
    RRR   = Real rate of return available 
    IRP     = Required inflation risk premium 
    ERDG = Expected long-term real dividend growth rate. 
 
 The observed, historic dividend yield (HDY0) can then be derived as: 
 
 HDY0 = EDY/(1 + NDG) 
 
 where: NDG = First year expected nominal dividend growth 
 
(b) The total return earned from the equity market over any twelve month 
period was then calculated from: 
 
First year dividend income (yield) + achieved capital performance 
 
These components can be derived from: 
 
First year dividend income = HDY0(1 + actual first year dividend growth) 
 
Capital performance = HDY0/HDY1(1 + ADG)-1 
 
where: HDY1 = The historic divided yield projected for the end of the period 
 ADG = The actual dividend growth experienced over the period. 
 
(c) The procedure of decomposition used in the main analysis was also 
applied in this secondary exercise, thus breaking down the (simulated) 
observed equity return into: 
 
 The expected return 
 Unexpected return due to unexpected dividend growth 
 The unexpected return due to a change in real interest rates 
 The unexpected return due to a change in long-term real growth 
expectations 
 The unexpected return due to a change in inflation risk premium 
requirements 
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In this case, of course, there is no unexpected return attributed to changes in 
the equity risk premium. 
 
As the results in Table 6.12 indicate, the results are fairly dramatic. In particular, the 
simulation suggests that declining real rates of interest – especially over the past 
fifteen years – should have resulted in even greater unexpected returns from equities 
than actually experienced. Additionally, significant changes in real rates of interest 
and inflation risk premium requirements should have resulted in volatility much 
higher than actually observed. 
 
Table 6.12  Return decomposition (Fixed equity risk premium)  
            
    Annual Associated    
    average (%) volatility (%)   
        
  Expected return 11.4   3.2   
        
  Contributions from:     
  Unexpected dividend growth  1.5   6.3   
  Change in real rates of interest  7.5 40.4   
  Change in real growth expectations -0.3 10.3   
  Change in inflation risk premium  3.7 31.2   
        
  Simulated return 23.8 65.7   
        
  Unanticipated return 12.4    
        
  less Unanticipated bond return  1.9    
        
  Unanticipated equity risk premium 10.5     
 
 
6.3.7  Mispricing or mean-reverting assumptions? 
The key to understanding why actual, observed market volatility is lower than that 
indicated in Table 6.12 can be found in Table 6.11, the correlation matrix.  
 
The main analysis estimates the ex-ante equity risk premium as the residual element 
after decomposing the expected return from equities into its other elements, such as 
expected real growth and real rates of interest. However, as the correlation matrix 
shows, our assumed equity risk premium appears to fluctuate in such a way that 
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unexpected returns from that source are negatively correlated with the unanticipated 
returns from the other sources, a fact that is counter-intuitive. For example, it would 
normally be assumed that a rise in investor confidence, and a consequent lowering in 
the risk premium, would accompany a decline in real rates of interest. The analysis 
above suggests the opposite: a rising risk premium tends to accompany a decline in 
real interest rates. 
 
This observed phenomenon is open to a number of interpretations: 
 
 The simulations undertaken to produce historical trends in the 
explanatory variables have produced a false picture of what actually 
occurred. In other words, the models constructed to simulate ex-ante 
expectations are unsatisfactory. 
 
 Equity investors assume that trends in the underlying, explanatory 
variables will always revert to long-term mean levels. In this way, any 
potentially positive benefits arising when these variables deviate from 
their long-term norm will tend to be offset by a deliberate increase in 
equity risk premium requirements, as the analysis shows. Equally, 
equity investors will tend to lower their risk premium requirements 
when negative pressures arise from changes in the other explanatory 
variables. 
 
 There are periods of mis-pricing, in which the equity market is in 
disequilibrium with the bond market. The analysis undertaken here 
assumes, for example, that the equity market will tend to be pushed 
higher by a decline in real interest rates. However, should the equity 
market fail to react to the decline in rates, then the analysis will 
falsely conclude that the potentially positive effects of the decline in 
real interest rates have been offset by a rising equity risk premium.  
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The third interpretation, if close to reality, suggests important and intriguing 
implications. Moreover, can such periods of disequilibrium be identified? 
 
Thus far, this study has examined the outcomes under two scenarios: 
 
(a) The main analysis assumed that the equity market reacted 
rationally to changes in underlying economic circumstances. 
Movements in the market which could not be explained by such 
changes were assumed to be caused by changes in equity risk 
premium demands i.e. the ERP was the residual element of the 
analysis. As discussed above, however, it may be that the equity 
market does not always react rationally to economic change and 
the analysis is therefore distorting any measurement of equity risk 
premium requirements. 
 
(b) The second analysis looked at what the likely outcome would have  
been if equity investors‟ risk premium requirements remained 
constant and it is assumed that market movements could be 
attributed solely to changes in the underlying economic 
circumstances. As discussed above, this analysis suggested that 
the equity market would have been even more volatile than it was 
in practice. The weakness in this approach is that the assumption 
that risk premia remain constant is unrealistic. The risk-averse 
nature of investors implies that risk premium requirements do rise 
as underlying conditions deteriorate and fall in improving 
conditions. 
 
 6.3.8  Realistic risk premium assumption 
An even more complex analysis is required, therefore, to get a fuller, more realistic, 
explanation for equity market behaviour. In a third and final analysis, therefore, it is 
assumed that the equity risk premium requirements of investors do vary within 
“realistic” limits. The limits chosen are 1.5% either side of the observed mean, 2.5% 
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(note that the standard deviation in the observed risk premium is 1.44%). In other 
words, the minimum “realistic” premium sought is 1% and the maximum 4%. 
 
It is assumed further that changes in the required premium will be closely related to 
the scale and direction of changes in the underlying economic conditions. A rise in 
risk premium requirements is therefore assumed to accompany rising real interest 
rates and/or deterioration in the inflation environment and real growth prospects. 
Conversely, a fall in premium requirements is assumed to accompany declining real 
interest rates and/or an improvement is the inflation environment and real growth 
prospects. In other words, equity yields will tend to rise in deteriorating conditions 
and fall in improving economic conditions. 
 
More precisely, a “Realistic Risk Premium Indicator (RRPI)” was monitored for the 
1963-2005 period. The RRPI at any point was defined to be the combined impact on 
the UK equity market dividend yield over the previous 12 month period from 
changes in real interest rates, the required inflation risk premium and real dividend 
growth expectations. The RRPI reached a maximum of 4.6% in June 1974 (note from 
Table B, Appendix 2, a rise in real rates and the inflation risk premium over this 
period together with a fall of growth expectations) and a minimum of -4.3% in 
September 1977 (caused by a combination of falling real rates of interest and rising 
growth expectations). 
 
The RRPI was transformed into a “Realistic Equity Risk Premium (RERP)” range of 
1% to 4% using the transformation function: 
 
RERP = 0.3359 + 2.4448*RRPI 
 
 The results are illustrated in Figure 6.9. Thus the maximum RRPI value of 4.63% 
observed for June 1974 is transformed to a RERP of 4% and the minimum RRPI 
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The computations described in 6.3.6. were repeated for this third scenario. In this 
case, of course, equity yields at any point would additionally have been influenced 
by changes in the assumed equity risk premium requirement. 
 
Table 6.13  Return decomposition (Realistic risk premium simulation) 
            
    Annual Associated    
    average (%) volatility (%)   
        
  Expected return 11.4   3.4   
        
  Contibutions from:     
  Unexpected dividend growth  1.5   6.3   
  Change in real rates of interest  4.7 21.0   
  Change in real growth expectations -0.3 10.0   
  Change in inflation risk premium  1.5 18.2   
  Change in equity risk premium  1.4 17.2   
        
  Actual return 20.2 39.5   
        
  Unanticipated return  8.8    
        
  less 
Unanticipated bond 
return 1.9    
        
  Unanticipated equity risk premium 6.9     
 
As before, the simulated returns were decomposed to examine the impact of each of 
the influences. As Table 6.13 shows, the overall volatility of the market would have 
been higher than actually observed but well below that observed for the fixed risk 
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premium simulation. The key difference in comparison with actual observed equity 
market volatility is that it is assumed that there is a positive correlation between the 
impact of changes in the risk premium requirement and the impact of changes in 
other variables. As discussed previously, the first analysis showed that, over the 
period of observation, there is a negative correlation between the implied equity risk 
premium effects and other effects which had the effect of reducing overall volatility. 
The main reasons why the second simulation – which assumed the fixed risk 
premium – produced such a high market volatility was that there were no benefits 
from such a negative correlation effect, but also because of the geared effect on 
returns that a constant risk premium assumption produces. For example, during 1977 
there appeared to be a very significant decline in real interest rates – long bond yields 
fell by 4 percentage points against a marginal improvement in the inflation 
environment. While the equity market received some benefit from this, equity yields 
fell little more than one percentage point. The initial analysis – which estimates the 
implied equity risk premium at any point – interpreted this phenomenon as implying 
that there had been a significant rise in the equity risk premium available. The second 
analysis however – which assumed a constant 2.5% risk premium assumption – 
simulated the equity dividend yield as falling from 7.27% to 3.13%, an implied 
capital gain of 132%. 
 
6.3.9  Over-reaction or under-reaction? 
It has been demonstrated that changes in economic fundamentals and expectations 
can produce significant changes in current asset values, thereby creating significant 
volatility. The question then arises as to how much of this volatility is “rational” and 
how much is “irrational”. It has also been shown that there appears to be a negative 
correlation between movements in the implied equity risk premium and movements 
in other fundamental influences. As a result, a simulation of market behaviour 
assuming rational changes in risk premium requirements (the third simulation 
discussed above) suggests that greater volatility would result than is actually 
observed. One explanation proposed for the negative correlation between the implied 
risk premium and other factors is not that investors behave counter-intuitively (e.g. 
they lower risk premium requirements at times of deteriorating conditions) but that 
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there are periods of disequilibrium between the equity market and other financial 
markets. 
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In the third scenario described above, the “rational” equity risk premium was 
confined to a band of 1% to 4%, a lower band than that of the implied equity risk 
premium. A comparison is presented in Figure 6.10. Whilst there are occasions when 
the two measures move in the same direction – rising significantly during the 1972-
74 bear market, for example - there are many occasions when the two measures 
move in opposite directions. Indeed, there is a significant negative correlation 
between the two measures. Assuming that investors are risk-averse, this suggests that 
much of the movement in the implied risk premium results from the under-reaction 
by the equity market to changes in the economic environment which, in turn, results 
in market disequilibrium. In other words, pricing can be irrational 
 
6.3.10  Rational or irrational pricing? 
This final analysis examines the predictive ability of the two risk premium measures 
calculated, the “implied” ex-ante risk premium and the “realistic” risk premium.  
 
The results in the tables 6.14 and 6.15 indicate the predictive ability of each of the 
measures. The excess returns ([1+equity return]/[1+bond return]-1) earned from 
equities over subsequent 3, 6 12 and 24 month periods were regressed on each of the 
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measures in turn. Quarterly overlapping observations for the period 1963-2005 were 
input. 
 
The results indicate: 
 
 There is a positive, statistically significant relationship 
between the implied equity risk premium and subsequent 
excess equity returns. The strongest relationships are observed 
for subsequent 6 and 12 month periods. 
 
 The relationship between the realistic equity risk premium and 
excess equity returns is largely insignificant and, surprisingly, 
negative for subsequent periods up to 12 months. 
 
Table 6.14 Excess equity returns (EER)–v- Implied equity risk premium (IERP) 
3 months   3m EER = -1.246 + 1.017*IERP R2 = 0.022 
                                     (t-stat = 1.94)    
          
          
6 months  6m EER =  -2.470 + 2.023*IERP R2 = 0.040 
                                     (t-stat = 2.64)    
          
          
          
12 months 12m EER = -2.654 + 2.997*IERP R2 = 0.042 
                                     (t-stat = 2.66)    
          
          
          
24 months 24m EER = 2.731 + 2.323*IERP R2 = 0.015 
                                     (t-stat = 1.54)    
          
Note: Excess equity returns = ((1 + equity return)/(1 + bond return) -1)    
          Implied equity risk premium is the risk premium derived in the main analysis (See Appendix 2A) 
                
 
This analysis is extended to analyse performances subsequent to peaks and troughs in 





Table 6.15 Excess equity returns –v- Realistic equity risk premium (RERP) 
3 months   3m EER = 4.611 - 1.415*RERP R2 = 0.001 
                                     (t-stat = -0.86)   
         
         
6 months  6m EER =  9.012 - 2.746*RERP R2 = 0.008 
                                     (t-stat = -1.13)    
          
          
          
12 
months  12m EER = 6.863 - 1.009*RERP R2 = 0.001 
                                     (t-stat = -0.28)   
         
         
         
24 
months  24m EER = 0.955 + 2.956*RERP R2 = 0.002 
                                     (t-stat = 0.63)   
           
Note: Excess equity returns = ((1 + equity return)/(1 + bond return) -1)     
          Realistic risk premium (constrained to the range 1% to 4%) is inversely proportional to    
          the change in equity dividend yield experienced over trailing 12 months which arises through    
          the combined impact of changes in real rates, the inflation risk premium and growth expectations.   
                
 
Tables 6.16 and 6.17 indicate: 
 
 Exceptional, positive excess equity returns subsequent to the “implied 
ERP” indicator reaching exceptionally high levels. Equally, very poor 
excess returns are obtained subsequent to exceptionally low levels of 
the indicator. Prime examples of these phenomena are the periods 
following the trough in the 1973-4 bear market in December 1974 and 
the Crash experienced from Black Monday onwards in October 1987. 
 
 The “realistic ERP” indicator appears to be a very poor predictor of 
subsequent excess performance, even at its extreme levels. Indeed, the 
results are counter-intuitive, suggesting that there are leads and/or lags 
in the process that have not been identified or that the model used to 
construct the “realistic ERP” is flawed. 
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Table 6.16  Excess returns following peaks/troughs in “Implied ERP” 
                  
   Implied  ……..Subsequent excess returns……….   
  Date ERP  
3 
months 6months 12 months 24 months   
           
  Q4/66 4.43  -0.1 14.8 34.2 109.1   
  Q2/71 0.09  0.5 4.9 19.5 16.2   
  Q4/74 4.43  38.2 52.2 80.7 57.2   
  Q4/75 0.83  -2.5 -11.4 -13.1 -16.1   
  Q4/77 5.18  2.2 11.9 12.4 6.4   
  Q3/87 -0.18  -32.4 -34.8 -30.9 -15.6   
  Q4/88 3.51  12.3 20.8 32.3 16.2   
  Q4/94 1.33  -2.7 2.4 1.9 9.1   
  Q4/98 4.62  14.7 19.7 31.2 11.1   
  Q2/01 1.78  -18.6 -12.5 -22.5 -38.1   
  Q1/03 3.51  13.6 21.3 24.2 35.3   
           
  Average (following peaks) 13.5 23.5 35.8 39.2   
  Average (following troughs) -11.1 -10.3 -9.0 -8.9   
           
  Note: Excess equity returns = ((1 + equity return)/(1 + bond return) -1)     
            Implied equity risk premium is the risk premium derived in the main analysis 
                
 
6.4  RETURN DECOMPOSITION: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this analysis has been to model the ex-ante equity risk premium evident 
in the UK equity market. The results indicate that, over the period analysed, the ex-
ante risk premium averaged some three percentage points less than the premium 
subsequently experienced. This unexpected premium has been analysed and 
attributed to changes in a number of economic variables. 
 
Unexpected changes in fundamental driving variables have also resulted in high 
volatility of returns. Likewise, contributions to this increased volatility have been 
analysed and attributed. 
 
Perhaps the most significant and intriguing element of the analysis, however, is the 
suggestion of a negative correlation between the “implied” equity risk premium and 
other driving variables. This finding raises the question as to whether the “implied 
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ERP” being measured reflects not only changes in the risk aversion of investors but 
also captures irrational pricing. 
 
Table 6.17  Excess equity returns following peaks/troughs in “Realistic ERP” 
                  
   "Realistic" ……..Subsequent excess returns……….   




months   
           
  Q1/69 2.99  -9.8 -15.5 -17.7 -17.8   
  Q4/71 1.99  13.9 13.9 22.4 -0.5   
  Q2/74 4.00  -27.2 -30.0 6.5 12.1   
  Q4/75 1.45  -2.5 -11.4 -13.1 -16.1   
  Q3/76 2.50  6.3 6.1 10.6 21.6   
  Q3/77 1.00  -7.2 -5.1 10.0 -0.2   
  Q4/78 3.28  3.6 0.7 -5.3 16.5   
  Q3/82 1.63  -0.6 5.2 9.7 25.2   
  Q1/90 3.04  -3.3 -16.8 -9.5 -17.5   
  Q1/91 1.97  -1.5 -1.4 -8.9 -12.4   
  Q4/94 3.28  -2.7 2.4 1.9 9.1   
  Q4/98 1.87  14.7 19.7 31.2 11.1   
           
  Average (following peaks) -5.5 -8.9 -2.3 4.0   
  Average (following troughs) 2.8 3.5 8.6 1.2   
           
  Note: Excess equity returns = ((1 + equity return)/(1 + bond return) -1)     
            Realistic risk premium (constrained to the range 1% to 4%) is inversely proportional to    
            the change in equity dividend yield experienced over trailing 12 months which arises through  
            the combined impact of changes in real rates, the inflation risk premium and growth expectations. 
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
7.1 A VARYING RISK PREMIUM 
Investors accept that there is uncertainty, or risk, associated with equity investment 
returns. On average, over the long-term, equities are expected to provide a premium 
over and above the returns available on risk-free assets. Moreover, long histories of 
returns provide evidence that such a premium is achieved. 
 
Equity returns, however, are cyclical. There can be long periods when equity returns 
greatly exceed risk–free returns; there can be long periods when the premium 
disappears altogether. 
 
This thesis has explored the influences and driving forces in equity markets, with a 
particular emphasis on the UK equity market. Both rational and irrational influences 
have been examined and discussed. It is certainly not the author‟s contention that 
many of the puzzles that have confronted equity market researchers over recent 
decades have now been resolved. It is to be hoped, however, that a further, useful 
platform has been built from which further investigation and analysis can be taken 
forward. 
 
7.2  GENERAL REVIEW 
Chapter 2 of the thesis explored previous work related to the broad issues under 
investigation. In so doing, the spotlight inevitably fell on the concepts of information 
efficiency and valuation rationality, concepts that have been keenly debated by both 
academics and practitioners over the past forty years. 
 
7.2.1  Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Testing of the weak and semi-strong forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) has shown that it is difficult to earn abnormal stock market returns 
consistently by using publicly available information. Indeed, studies show that even 
expert, professional investors, on average, underperform stock market benchmarks. 
Tests of the strong form of the EMH are more difficult to interpret in view of legal 
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and regulatory constraints on practitioners but the evidence suggests that stock 
markets are not efficient in the strong form. 
 
Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis have been mounted over the past three 
decades, however, following the identification of anomalies that appeared to suggest 
that prices do not always follow a random walk. Indeed, claims emerged that prices 
are mean-reverting and that returns could be predicted by using, for example, 
dividend yield as a simple predictor variable or by employing shorter-term 
momentum strategies. 
 
Further questioning of the EMH arrived in the 1970s and early 1980s in the form of 
variance testing and variance bounds analysis. The claim was that security prices 
appear to be far more volatile than is justified by the volatility of underlying earnings 
and dividends, suggesting that investors behave irrationally. Shiller (1981) was at the 
forefront in such attacks and his arguments are presented in Chapter 2 in the form of 
a simulation of the volatility witnessed in the UK equity market. 
 
The concept of “rationality”, therefore, has become a focus of the challenge to the 
EMH. And behavioural finance has drawn on the work of cognitive psychologists, 
such as Taversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981, 1986) in identifying and explaining 
investors‟ beliefs, preferences and expectations. A number of factors are evident, 
behavioural finance suggests, which indicate that investors do not always behave 
rationally. Indeed, it could be argued that, in today‟s competitive environment, the 
“rational” or “least risky” investment strategy to pursue might well be that being 
pursued by the majority of competitors, whether or not one believes that the 
majority‟s course of action is fundamentally justified. 
 
The 1995-2000 period, which witnessed the phenomenon of the dot-com bubble, 
could be identified as one period when such behaviour was evident. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that it was a widely held view amongst professional managers at 
that time that stocks in the dot-com sector were being priced irrationally. Moreover, 
that apparent mis-pricing was exacerbated by the buying demand from private 
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investors. To be underweight significantly in the sector, however, would have, and 
did, present considerable risks. Even long-term funds, such as pension funds, have 
their performance measured – both in absolute terms and in relation to their peer 
group – every three months!  
 
Another plank of the efficient market hypothesis – that arbitragers will ensure that 
deviations from “true” fundamental analysis - has also from time to time been sorely 
tested, none more so than at present as a result of the “credit crunch” within the 
banking system. In such an environment, where there is no guarantee that highly-
leveraged positions will be financed indefinitely – even if they represent supposedly 
perfect arbitrage opportunities – there will be occasions when pricing anomalies are 
sustained for significant periods. 
 
7.2.2  The equity risk premium 
Chapter 2 also introduced a discussion of the equity risk premium, the annual return 
earned on ordinary shares over and above the risk-free rate. The assumed level of the 
premium is important in many financial assessments including the cost of equity 
capital and long-term actuarial assumptions. 
 
For many years, following the initial studies of Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1976) in 
the US and Dimson and Brealey (1978) in the UK, academics and practitioners were 
advised to assume that the equity premium is of the order of  6% - 9% per annum. 
  
Since those initial studies, many researchers have questioned the “equity risk 
premium puzzle” – why the historical premium was so high. More importantly, the 
justification for using ex-post assessments of the premium has also been questioned, 
particularly in view of the forward-looking nature of the applications in which the 
premium is used. All the analyses that have attempted to measure historical ex-ante 
measures of the risk premium have concluded that ex-ante estimates are significantly 
lower than ex-post measures. Thus, it is dangerous to base future expectations of the 
equity risk premium on historical, achieved experiences. 
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7.2.3  Important implications 
Chapter 2 concluded with three important observations: 
(a) It is dangerous to extrapolate from past experiences. Financial markets are  
driven by expectations. 
(b) Expected equity returns, as well as achieved outcomes, can vary 
significantly over time. 
(c) Small changes in expected equity returns can result in significant short-
term variation in equity values. 
These three observations formed key considerations in the empirical studies that 
were undertaken and presented in Chapters 3 to 6 of the thesis. 
 
7.3  THE MACRO APPROACH 
The first of the empirical studies undertaken, as described in Chapter 3, examined the 
relationship between equity markets and underlying macro-economic variables. 
 
If it is assumed that equity prices reflect the present value of all future, expected 
dividends – and this assumption is adopted throughout the thesis – then we should 
expect equity returns to reflect changes in both growth expectations and required 
discount rates.  
 
It is surprising that, given this fundamental relationship, research into the nature of 
the systematic factors driving the market has been relatively limited. Historical 
studies tend to agree, however, that there is a negative correlation between expected 
equity returns and anticipated business conditions. In particular, yields rise and 
default terms widen in anticipation of deteriorating conditions; yields fall and default 
terms narrow ahead of improving conditions. 
 
The greatest methodological problem, recognised by most researchers in this area, is 
that, in the main, any analyses are dependent on ex-post macro-economic data, rather 
than expectational data. However, some studies, notably Lovatt and Parikh (2000), 
did duplicate analyses that had previously been carried out using ex-post data by 
making use of historical forecasts. The relationships between equity returns and 
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changes in the historical forecasts tended to be less significant than those found using 
the ex-post variable data. 
 
7.3.1 A new analysis of UK equity market returns, 1963-2003 
Chapter 3 presented a new analysis of UK equity market returns using the approach 
adopted by Fama (1990) for his analysis of the US equity market. Unlike previous 
studies of UK market returns – notably that of Lovatt and Parikh (2000) – the period 
analysed was not confined to one of relative calm under a single government, but 
embraced diverse cyclical swings in economic and market conditions. The range of 
market and macro-economic indicators was also extended. Some of these additional 
indicators were found to be statistically meaningful; the inclusion of long interest 
rates, in particular, was found to be very significant. 
 
The indicators were broken down into three categories: standard predictors of return 
variation such as dividend yield; shocks to the discounting process, such as 
unexpected changes in interest rates; and shocks to future expected cash flows, such 
as unexpected changes in economic activity. Quarterly, annual non-overlapping and 
annual overlapping variations in equity returns were analysed. 
 
Changes in dividend yield, shocks to long-interest rates and shocks to levels of 
industrial production were found to be the best indicators of variation in equity 
returns. In the case of anticipated levels of economic activity, the equity market 
tended to lead by a full year. Multi-factor combinations of the indicators were found 
to explain approximately 50% to 70% of return variation. 
 
These are re-assuring results which confirm that, in the main, the equity market is 
driven by expectations for the macroeconomic environment. They also fit neatly with 
Gordon‟s equity discount model, which provides the framework for the analyses 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Rises in risk premium requirements and interest rates, 
for example, can by viewed as rises in the discount rate, which would push equity 
prices down and dividend yields up. Subsequent returns will be above-average if and 
when premium requirements return to normal. Equally, a lowering of expectations 
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regarding future economic activity can be viewed as a negative influence on the 
numerator in the discounting process.  
 
This analysis of the linkages between the equity market and macro-economic factors 
benefited from the use of ex-post data. Thus, it was assumed that investors had 
perfect foresight. It is likely that less of the variation in returns would have been 
explained if relevant ex-ante data had been available and used. 
 
7.4 MARKET VOLATILITY 
Chapter 4 explored the nature of equity market volatility and its predictive 
capabilities. Past studies have shown that, although statistical measures of volatility 
are important elements in financial market modelling – in option pricing, for example 
- such measures are not reliable indicators of future expected returns. Furthermore, 
no significant correlation has been found between stock market volatility and macro-
economic variability. 
 
Studies of stock market volatility in the UK are limited in number and scope 
compared with those in the US. This thesis therefore contributes a wide-ranging 
investigation into key aspects of UK stock market volatility over a relatively long 
period. 
 
An analysis of UK equity market volatility over the period 1963-2003 has been 
presented. Clustering in return volatility is a well-documented feature in many 
financial markets and the analysis shows that the UK equity market is no exception. 
It is for this reason that ARCH and GARCH models have become popular tools for 
use in studies of this type. Indeed, a GARCH (1,1) model was found to provide a 
sound description of historic trends in UK equity market volatility over the period in 
question. 
 
Standard finance assumes a positive relationship between expected return and risk, 
where risk is commonly represented by standard deviation or variance. A range of 
predictors, which incorporated historic measures of volatility, was tested, therefore, 
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for ability to predict subsequent excess returns. No predictor achieved results that 
were statistically significant. A significant, negative relationship was found, 
however, between contemporaneous measures of volatility and excess returns. The 
GARCH model established further that the key element of this contemporaneous 
relationship was a strong linkage between excess returns and unanticipated volatility. 
 
The relationship between market volatility and the volatility of macro-economic 
variables was also examined. Only limited relationships of statistical significance 
were found. 
 
Expected returns must be judged against prospective volatility. But what the analysis 
described here demonstrates is that past volatility provides only a limited guide to 
future volatility and future returns. An important conclusion must be that we should 
continue to strive for better predictors of potential risk and rewards. 
 
The following definition is attributed to Elroy Dimson of the London Business 
School (cited in Maginn et al, 2007, p xiv): “Risk means more things can happen 
than will happen”. In other words, it is often very difficult to assess the range and 
nature of possible outcomes. But a failure to do so could have very damaging 
consequences. Recent experiences in financial markets suggest that many of our 
traditional measures of risk, such as standard deviation, and our assumptions 
regarding the distribution of potential equity returns, are only of limited use. 
 
7.5  A PARTIAL DECOMPOSITION OF EXPECTED RETURNS 
Chapter 5 presented an investigation into the argument raised by Shiller (1981), in 
particular, that the volatility of equity markets is “excessive” and not justified by the 
“fundamentals”. 
 
The same conclusions can be reached if a similar approach to Shiller‟s is applied to 
the UK equity market. That is, the equity market should display only limited 
volatility if it is assumed that investors have perfect foresight of future earnings and 
dividends since the long-term trend in earnings and dividends is reasonably smooth. 
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The weakness in Shiller‟s original methodology, however, was the assumption that 
perfect-forecast dividends could be discounted at a constant rate. This was, of course, 
unrealistic. Subsequent attempts to relax the constant discount rate assumption 
produced mixed results. 
 
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 shows that, even if perfect foresight of future 
dividends is assumed, equity markets will still show considerable volatility, mainly 
because of variation in the return available on alternative, risk-free assets. That is, 
such variation introduces considerable volatility through the dividend discounting 
process. Indeed, by using a variable discount rate comprised of the prevailing risk-
free bond yield and a constant equity risk premium it was shown that changes in the 
discount rate could account for approximately three-quarters of the “excessive” 
volatility displayed by the equity market. A constant discount rate assumption 
resulted in volatility of less than 1% p.a. compared to a volatility of over 21% p.a. in 
the actual index. However, introducing a variable discount rate, as described, resulted 
in volatility of over 16% pa. 
 
The remainder of Chapter 5 presented a possible explanation for the volatility not 
explained by discount rate variation, namely variation in the required equity risk 
premium. The important conclusion reached was that, whatever the cause, there 
appear to be significant swings in the risk premium over time. 
 
7.6  A FULL DECOMPOSITION OF RETURNS 
The final empirical analysis presented in this thesis attempts to explain fully the 
variation in equity returns over time and why ex-post returns vary substantially from 
ex-ante returns. A supplementary analysis of bond returns is also provided as a spin-
off from the main investigation. 
 
To the best of the author‟s knowledge, no detailed analysis of the type presented here 
has been previously undertaken. Certainly, analyses of expected equity returns and 
equity risk premia from an ex-ante perspective have been attempted previously, and 
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these analyses are summarised in Chapter 6. Vivian (2007), for example, applied the 
Fama & French (2002) methodology to the UK stock market. But such studies only 
analyse long-term trends, they do not – as is the case here – measure and dissect 
returns from year to year and, indeed, from quarter to quarter. 
 
The analysis presented here utilises the history of real, long-term interest rates now 
available for the UK market in decomposing expected equity returns, an approach 
not taken elsewhere.  Another feature of the analysis is the recognition given to the 
“inflation risk premium” and the attempt to simulate the variation in this return 
element over the period examined. 
 
The key findings of the analysis are as follows: 
 
 Ex-post equity returns in the UK over the period from end-1963 to end-2005 
were estimated to have been 4.9% p.a. higher than ex-ante returns. At 29.1%, 
the annualised standard deviation in ex-post returns was considerably higher 
than the equivalent, estimated measure for ex-ante returns (3.2%). The ex-
post estimate of the equity risk premium, at 5.5%, was found to be 
substantially higher than the ex-ante estimate of 2.5% pa. 
 
 The main analysis, in which the implied equity risk premium is the residual 
element of returns after all other elements have been estimated, produced 
some counter-intuitive results. In particular, the results suggested that the 
required premium has tended to rise in expectation of improved economic 
conditions and has tended to fall when conditions are expected to deteriorate. 
The implication – tested using a fixed risk-premium model – is that the 
volatility of the equity market would be even higher if the negative 
correlation between the risk premium and other return elements did not exist. 
Several interpretations were offered for this phenomenon, including the 
suggestion that there are periods during which equity and bond markets are in 
disequilibrium. A third return model, which incorporates a “realistic risk 
premium”, suggested that such anomalies do periodically exist. 
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7.7  FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis attempts to explain why a high variation in equity returns is experienced 
over time. To different degrees, all the empirical analyses presented suggested that 
there are rational explanations for high variation such as the variability in risk-free 
returns, as reflected in long-term interest rates. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, however, it would appear that there are periods, such 
as 1974 and late 1987, when equity valuations are forced to extremes and when 
investors appear to be either overly-pessimistic or overly-optimistic. Some 
commentators might suggest that such extremes do not prove that these represent 
periods of irrationality. Economic conditions arise, they might argue, when such risk 
premium levels are justified. Behavioural theorists are more likely to provide 
emotive descriptions for such extreme instances. 
 
Today‟s researchers can only simulate from past data available what expectations 
might have been historically. And simulations, as presented herein, require 
assumptions to be made that can always be open to challenge. A useful area for 
future research would be to record the long-term expectations of investors regarding 
a range of market and economic variables at regular intervals. One benefit would be 
a greater understanding of the movements in long-term financial markets. 
 
The full decomposition of equity and bond returns, presented in Chapter 6, is a 
unique analysis of UK financial markets. Some of the key results, such as the 
significant difference between ex-ante and ex-post equity risk premia, were not 
unexpected. However, no previous analysis has attempted to explain the difference in 
such detail. Perhaps the most intriguing conclusion of the study is the fact that there 
appear to be periods of disequilibrium between the bond and equity markets during 
which the “implied risk premium” can deviate significantly from the “realistic risk 
premium”. Ex-post analysis suggests that these periods of disequilibrium provide 
opportunities for investors to earn superior excess returns. Further research could 
usefully be undertaken to establish: 
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(a) whether such disequilibrium is apparent in other mature markets 
(b) whether the “implied risk premium” could be divided more precisely into 
“rational” and “irrational” elements. 
 
Finally, recognition also has to be given to changes in market environments over 
time. The introduction of modern derivative instruments and the acceleration in 
information flows through improved technology, for example, will have influenced 
the formation of prices during the period investigated in this thesis.  Performance 
pressures are also considerably greater than several decades ago. Arguably, this leads 
to greater short-termism and herding. Additionally, hedge funds now have a 
substantial influence. It could be argued that this has a positive influence on the 
efficiency of markets through the continual eradication of pricing anomalies; the 
negative argument is that, by their very nature, certain hedge fund strategies can 
create major instabilities in markets.  
 
Whilst many theories may remain core ingredients of our understanding of market 
pricing for many decades to come, future researchers should always bear in mind that 
any models built on past experience might have only a limited life expectancy in 
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APPENDIX 1a – SIMULATED INDICES 
 
 All-Share All-share Notional Simulated Variable Simulated 
Date Index Yield Dividend Index discount rate (%) Index 
    (Note A) (Note B) (Note C) 
31/12/1962 95 4.35 4.11 95 9.8 181 
29/03/1963 98 4.27 4.19 98 10.0 176 
28/06/1963 99 4.32 4.28 94 9.6 197 
30/09/1963 104 4.14 4.30 96 9.6 199 
31/12/1963 109 4.08 4.43 98 10.0 185 
31/03/1964 105 4.29 4.49 100 10.1 185 
30/06/1964 107 4.49 4.82 102 10.3 180 
30/09/1964 109 4.50 4.92 104 10.3 184 
31/12/1964 97 5.18 5.03 106 10.5 177 
31/03/1965 98 5.36 5.26 108 10.6 177 
30/06/1965 93 5.69 5.32 110 10.9 170 
30/09/1965 100 5.40 5.38 112 10.4 191 
31/12/1965 104 5.23 5.42 114 10.7 183 
31/03/1966 105 5.24 5.50 116 10.9 179 
30/06/1966 111 4.94 5.49 119 11.1 174 
30/09/1966 94 5.84 5.47 121 11.2 173 
30/12/1966 94 5.79 5.44 123 10.9 190 
31/03/1967 98 5.48 5.36 126 10.6 204 
30/06/1967 106 5.00 5.32 129 11.0 191 
29/09/1967 114 4.65 5.30 131 11.1 193 
29/12/1967 121 4.38 5.31 134 11.3 189 
       
29/03/1968 137 3.92 5.38 137 11.4 188 
28/06/1968 155 3.47 5.38 140 12.0 172 
30/09/1968 164 3.31 5.43 143 11.7 185 
31/12/1968 174 3.24 5.63 146 12.2 171 
31/03/1969 164 3.44 5.64 149 12.9 153 
30/06/1969 142 4.02 5.71 152 14.1 128 
30/09/1969 140 4.09 5.71 155 13.1 156 
31/12/1969 147 3.85 5.67 159 13.1 159 
31/03/1970 144 4.07 5.86 162 12.8 171 
30/06/1970 126 4.72 5.93 166 13.4 157 
30/09/1970 139 4.31 5.98 170 13.6 157 
31/12/1970 136 4.39 5.98 173 14.1 148 
31/03/1971 143 4.20 5.99 177 13.3 172 
30/06/1971 168 3.64 6.11 181 13.4 171 
30/09/1971 181 3.40 6.16 186 12.9 191 
31/12/1971 193 3.25 6.29 190 12.8 197 
31/03/1972 218 2.96 6.44 194 13.1 194 
30/06/1972 206 3.22 6.65 198 13.7 180 
29/09/1972 199 3.40 6.77 203 13.9 178 
29/12/1972 218 3.15 6.87 208 14.2 175 
       
30/03/1973 190 3.69 6.99 212 14.6 169 
29/06/1973 192 3.67 7.04 217 14.8 168 
28/09/1973 181 3.93 7.13 222 15.8 150 
31/12/1973 150 4.77 7.14 227 16.9 134 
29/03/1974 118 6.17 7.30 233 18.8 111 
28/06/1974 105 7.31 7.70 238 20.1 101 
30/09/1974 77 10.15 7.81 243 20.3 102 




 All-Share All-share Notional Simulated Variable Simulated 
Date Index Yield Dividend Index discount rate Index 
    (Note A) (Note B) (Note C) 
31/03/1975 118 6.70 7.93 255 18.5 128 
30/06/1975 128 6.51 8.35 261 19.1 124 
30/09/1975 145 5.91 8.55 267 19.1 128 
31/12/1975 158 5.47 8.65 273 19.2 130 
31/03/1976 165 5.35 8.81 279 18.5 142 
30/06/1976 155 5.91 9.18 285 18.3 150 
30/09/1976 135 7.12 9.61 292 19.5 137 
31/12/1976 152 6.42 9.76 299 18.9 148 
31/03/1977 177 5.69 10.04 305 17.1 185 
30/06/1977 191 5.53 10.55 312 17.4 183 
30/09/1977 224 4.89 10.98 319 15.1 244 
30/12/1977 215 5.28 11.33 327 14.9 256 
31/03/1978 205 5.64 11.58 334 15.8 235 
30/06/1978 211 5.65 11.90 341 16.8 215 
29/09/1978 228 5.43 12.40 349 16.7 223 
29/12/1978 220 5.79 12.75 356 16.7 228 
30/03/1979 266 4.94 13.15 364 15.1 282 
29/06/1979 248 5.32 13.19 372 15.8 267 
28/09/1979 255 5.96 15.18 380 15.0 298 
31/12/1979 230 6.87 15.79 388 16.2 266 
       
31/03/1980 240 6.91 16.61 396 17.0 267 
30/06/1980 270 6.40 17.25 404 16.4 273 
30/09/1980 290 6.12 17.76 412 16.0 291 
31/12/1980 292 6.10 17.83 421 16.5 282 
31/03/1981 310 5.78 17.90 429 16.5 288 
30/06/1981 321 5.66 18.14 438 17.5 246 
30/09/1981 278 6.57 18.30 447 18.8 240 
31/12/1981 313 5.89 18.44 457 18.3 258 
31/03/1982 327 5.80 18.94 466 17.0 301 
30/06/1982 323 6.09 19.66 476 17.0 309 
30/09/1982 362 5.50 19.90 486 15.1 407 
31/12/1982 382 5.26 20.10 496 14.6 418 
31/03/1983 412 4.94 20.35 506 14.5 428 
30/06/1983 459 4.56 20.93 517 14.2 453 
30/09/1983 446 4.80 21.39 528 14.4 452 
30/12/1983 471 4.62 21.74 539 14.2 475 
30/03/1984 524 4.38 22.96 550 14.2 486 
29/06/1984 488 4.87 23.75 561 15.0 456 
28/09/1984 536 4.68 25.08 572 14.5 491 
31/12/1984 593 4.42 26.21 583 14.3 509 
       
29/03/1985 616 4.47 27.54 595 14.5 509 
28/06/1985 596 4.80 28.59 606 14.6 514 
30/09/1985 626 4.63 28.99 618 14.2 549 
31/12/1985 683 4.34 29.64 630 14.2 556 
31/03/1986 810 3.69 29.91 642 13.0 651 
30/06/1986 816 3.87 31.57 654 13.1 652 
30/09/1986 769 4.17 32.06 666 14.5 573 
31/12/1986 835 3.98 33.25 679 14.5 589 
31/03/1987 1004 3.41 34.24 691 13.4 666 
30/06/1987 1153 3.08 35.52 704 13.4 684 
30/09/1987 1209 3.03 36.63 717 14.2 641 




 All-Share All-share Notional Simulated Variable Simulated 
Date Index Yield Dividend Index discount rate Index 
    (Note A) (Note B) (Note C) 
31/03/1988 897 4.31 38.65 743 13.2 734 
30/06/1988 963 4.22 40.64 756 13.6 719 
30/09/1988 946 4.47 42.30 769 13.5 741 
30/12/1988 927 4.69 43.46 782 13.4 761 
31/03/1989 1076 4.19 45.09 795 13.2 759 
30/06/1989 1102 4.20 46.27 809 13.7 759 
29/09/1989 1170 4.07 47.60 822 13.8 767 
29/12/1989 1205 4.19 50.48 835 14.0 764 
30/03/1990 1115 4.74 52.85 848 15.6 674 
29/06/1990 1171 4.67 54.70 861 14.9 731 
28/09/1990 962 5.76 55.42 874 15.5 702 
31/12/1990 1032 5.46 56.36 887 14.9 756 
29/03/1991 1193 4.77 56.92 900 14.4 800 
28/06/1991 1161 5.00 58.06 914 14.7 794 
30/09/1991 1266 4.62 58.49 928 13.9 860 
31/12/1991 1188 4.93 58.55 942 14.2 855 
31/03/1992 1172 5.04 59.05 957 14.2 871 
30/06/1992 1217 4.81 58.52 972 13.5 937 
30/09/1992 1206 4.88 58.86 987 13.7 933 
31/12/1992 1364 4.31 58.78 1004 12.7 1034 
       
31/03/1993 1408 4.13 58.15 1020 12.5 1070 
30/06/1993 1432 4.06 58.15 1038 12.2 1119 
30/09/1993 1507 3.87 58.30 1055 11.5 1208 
31/12/1993 1682 3.46 58.20 1074 10.7 1304 
31/03/1994 1562 3.76 58.73 1093 12.2 1175 
30/06/1994 1463 4.09 59.85 1112 13.0 1116 
30/09/1994 1511 4.00 60.44 1131 12.8 1152 
30/12/1994 1521 4.02 61.16 1151 12.9 1169 
31/03/1995 1539 4.15 63.85 1171 12.6 1211 
30/06/1995 1624 4.04 65.59 1192 12.7 1225 
29/09/1995 1734 3.85 66.75 1212 12.6 1257 
29/12/1995 1803 3.82 68.88 1233 12.0 1316 
29/03/1996 1843 3.86 71.16 1253 12.6 1296 
28/06/1996 1856 3.91 72.58 1274 12.4 1331 
30/09/1996 1945 3.82 74.30 1295 12.2 1372 
31/12/1996 2014 3.76 75.71 1317 12.0 1418 
31/03/1997 2100 3.64 76.43 1339 12.2 1421 
30/06/1997 2185 3.55 77.55 1361 11.4 1518 
30/09/1997 2455 3.17 77.82 1384 11.0 1582 
31/12/1997 2411 3.23 77.88 1408 10.7 1638 
       
31/03/1998 2782 2.36 65.65 1436 10.2 1711 
30/06/1998 2743 2.41 66.12 1464 10.0 1758 
30/09/1998 2345 2.84 66.59 1493 9.1 1878 
31/12/1998 2674 2.50 66.85 1523 8.7 1949 
31/03/1999 2895 2.34 67.74 1553 9.0 1940 
30/06/1999 2946 2.26 66.58 1585 9.2 1950 
30/09/1999 2826 2.41 68.11 1618 9.4 1949 
31/12/1999 3242 2.12 68.73 1651 9.2 1998 
31/03/2000 3111 2.11 65.63 1686 9.1 2033 
30/06/2000 3030 2.16 65.44 1722 9.1 2063 
29/09/2000 3029 2.17 65.74 1760 9.3 2077 




 All-Share All-share Notional Simulated Variable Simulated 
Date Index Yield Dividend Index discount rate Index 
    (Note A) (Note B) (Note C) 
30/03/2001 2711 2.53 68.60 1837 9.1 2137 
29/06/2001 2728 2.42 66.02 1878 9.6 2143 
28/09/2001 2340 2.87 67.17 1919 9.3 2196 
31/12/2001 2524 2.63 66.38 1963 9.4 2228 
29/03/2002 2557 2.66 68.03 2007 9.7 2238 
28/06/2002 2263 2.98 67.44 2053 9.4 2295 
30/09/2002 1801 3.73 67.20 2100 8.9 2365 
31/12/2002 1894 3.55 67.23 2149 8.9 2395 
31/03/2003 1736 3.87 67.17 2199 9.0 2426 
30/06/2003 1971 3.43 67.61 2251 9.0 2461 
30/09/2003 2028 3.36 68.13 2304 9.2 2488 
31/12/2003 2207 3.10 68.43 2359 9.2 2520 
30/03/2004 2197 3.10 68.11 2415 8.9 2575 
29/06/2004 2229 3.20 71.32 2473 9.1 2607 
28/09/2004 2272 3.20 72.69 2532 8.9 2652 
31/12/2004 2412 3.00 72.37 2593 8.7 2695 
29/03/2005 2458 3.10 76.19 2654 9.0 2728 
28/06/2005 2560 3.10 79.37 2717 8.6 2773 
30/09/2005 2746 3.00 82.37 2782 8.6 2810 
31/12/2005 2847 3.00 85.41 2847 8.3 2847 
       
Notes       
A Present value of the end 2005 index and all expected dividends to end  
 2005 discounted at a constant rate of 13.08% per annum.  
       
B Prevailing rate of return on 21/2% Consols + 4.2% constant equity risk  
 premium      
       
C Present value of the end 2005 index and all expected dividends to end  
 2005 discounted at the prevailing rate of return on 21/2% Consols + 4.2%  
 constant equity risk premium.    
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APPENDIX 1b – IMPLIED EQUITY RISK PREMIA 
 All-Share Notional  Internal rate Consols Implied equity 
Date Index dividend of return (%) yield risk premium (%) 
   (Note A)  (Note B) 
31/12/1962 95 4.11 12.85 5.59 7.3 
29/03/1963 98 4.19 12.76 5.79 7.0 
28/06/1963 99 4.28 12.81 5.39 7.4 
30/09/1963 104 4.30 12.66 5.43 7.2 
31/12/1963 109 4.43 12.53 5.81 6.7 
31/03/1964 105 4.49 12.83 5.88 7.0 
30/06/1964 107 4.82 12.80 6.07 6.7 
30/09/1964 109 4.92 12.80 6.05 6.8 
31/12/1964 97 5.03 13.58 6.31 7.3 
31/03/1965 98 5.26 13.62 6.39 7.2 
30/06/1965 93 5.32 14.04 6.66 7.4 
30/09/1965 100 5.38 13.77 6.21 7.6 
31/12/1965 104 5.42 13.64 6.48 7.2 
31/03/1966 105 5.50 13.68 6.68 7.0 
30/06/1966 111 5.49 13.45 6.89 6.6 
30/09/1966 94 5.47 14.62 7.01 7.6 
30/12/1966 94 5.44 14.73 6.66 8.1 
31/03/1967 98 5.36 14.61 6.41 8.2 
30/06/1967 106 5.32 14.21 6.80 7.4 
29/09/1967 114 5.30 13.91 6.85 7.1 
29/12/1967 121 5.31 13.67 7.06 6.6 
      
29/03/1968 137 5.38 13.06 7.16 5.9 
28/06/1968 155 5.38 12.50 7.75 4.7 
30/09/1968 164 5.43 12.29 7.46 4.8 
31/12/1968 174 5.63 12.10 7.99 4.1 
31/03/1969 164 5.64 12.53 8.71 3.8 
30/06/1969 142 5.71 13.49 9.91 3.6 
30/09/1969 140 5.71 13.73 8.87 4.9 
31/12/1969 147 5.67 13.53 8.87 4.7 
31/03/1970 144 5.86 13.81 8.56 5.2 
30/06/1970 126 5.93 14.84 9.19 5.6 
30/09/1970 139 5.98 14.33 9.37 5.0 
31/12/1970 136 5.98 14.60 9.87 4.7 
31/03/1971 143 5.99 14.45 9.07 5.4 
30/06/1971 168 6.11 13.55 9.24 4.3 
30/09/1971 181 6.16 13.22 8.71 4.5 
31/12/1971 193 6.29 12.96 8.64 4.3 
31/03/1972 218 6.44 12.39 8.87 3.5 
30/06/1972 206 6.65 12.84 9.50 3.3 
29/09/1972 199 6.77 13.20 9.73 3.5 
29/12/1972 218 6.87 12.77 9.97 2.8 
      
30/03/1973 190 6.99 13.81 10.39 3.4 
29/06/1973 192 7.04 13.88 10.61 3.3 
28/09/1973 181 7.13 14.42 11.59 2.8 
31/12/1973 150 7.14 16.02 12.70 3.3 
29/03/1974 118 7.30 18.24 14.65 3.6 
28/06/1974 105 7.70 19.63 15.87 3.8 
30/09/1974 77 7.81 23.63 16.06 7.6 




 All-Share Notional  Internal rate Consols Implied equity 
Date Index dividend of return (%) yield risk premium (%) 
      
31/03/1975 118 7.93 19.28 14.33 4.9 
30/06/1975 128 8.35 18.75 14.87 3.9 
30/09/1975 145 8.55 17.85 14.86 3.0 
31/12/1975 158 8.65 17.29 14.98 2.3 
31/03/1976 165 8.81 17.16 14.33 2.8 
30/06/1976 155 9.18 17.93 14.08 3.9 
30/09/1976 135 9.61 19.61 15.26 4.3 
31/12/1976 152 9.76 18.67 14.70 4.0 
31/03/1977 177 10.04 17.48 12.86 4.6 
30/06/1977 191 10.55 17.00 13.20 3.8 
30/09/1977 224 10.98 15.80 10.90 4.9 
30/12/1977 215 11.33 16.40 10.72 5.7 
31/03/1978 205 11.58 17.02 11.63 5.4 
30/06/1978 211 11.90 17.02 12.62 4.4 
29/09/1978 228 12.40 16.51 12.54 4.0 
29/12/1978 220 12.75 17.07 12.54 4.5 
30/03/1979 266 13.15 15.58 10.90 4.7 
29/06/1979 248 13.19 16.43 11.56 4.9 
28/09/1979 255 15.18 16.40 10.81 5.6 
31/12/1979 230 15.79 17.60 12.01 5.6 
      
31/03/1980 240 16.61 17.38 12.82 4.6 
30/06/1980 270 17.25 16.50 12.19 4.3 
30/09/1980 290 17.76 16.02 11.80 4.2 
31/12/1980 292 17.83 16.16 12.30 3.9 
31/03/1981 310 17.90 15.83 12.31 3.5 
30/06/1981 321 18.14 15.72 13.29 2.4 
30/09/1981 278 18.30 17.30 14.65 2.6 
31/12/1981 313 18.44 16.38 14.13 2.2 
31/03/1982 327 18.94 16.19 12.78 3.4 
30/06/1982 323 19.66 16.53 12.78 3.8 
30/09/1982 362 19.90 15.66 10.90 4.8 
31/12/1982 382 20.10 15.36 10.39 5.0 
31/03/1983 412 20.35 14.87 10.33 4.5 
30/06/1983 459 20.93 14.10 10.02 4.1 
30/09/1983 446 21.39 14.56 10.23 4.3 
30/12/1983 471 21.74 14.27 9.97 4.3 
30/03/1984 524 22.96 13.49 9.97 3.5 
29/06/1984 488 23.75 14.33 10.75 3.6 
28/09/1984 536 25.08 13.66 10.25 3.4 
31/12/1984 593 26.21 12.94 10.12 2.8 
      
29/03/1985 616 27.54 12.77 10.31 2.5 
28/06/1985 596 28.59 13.24 10.41 2.8 
30/09/1985 626 28.99 12.95 9.97 3.0 
31/12/1985 683 29.64 12.35 10.05 2.3 
31/03/1986 810 29.91 11.03 8.75 2.3 
30/06/1986 816 31.57 11.12 8.91 2.2 
30/09/1986 769 32.06 11.78 10.33 1.4 
31/12/1986 835 33.25 11.20 10.25 0.9 
31/03/1987 1004 34.24 9.77 9.24 0.5 
30/06/1987 1153 35.52 8.74 9.16 -0.4 
30/09/1987 1209 36.63 8.47 9.99 -1.5 




 All-Share Notional  Internal rate Consols Implied equity 
Date Index dividend of return (%) yield risk premium (%) 
      
31/03/1988 897 38.65 11.29 9.00 2.3 
30/06/1988 963 40.64 10.78 9.39 1.4 
30/09/1988 946 42.30 11.08 9.26 1.8 
30/12/1988 927 43.46 11.42 9.16 2.3 
31/03/1989 1076 45.09 10.16 8.97 1.2 
30/06/1989 1102 46.27 10.06 9.54 0.5 
29/09/1989 1170 47.60 9.63 9.61 0.0 
29/12/1989 1205 50.48 9.48 9.83 -0.4 
30/03/1990 1115 52.85 10.32 11.43 -1.1 
29/06/1990 1171 54.70 9.96 10.68 -0.7 
28/09/1990 962 55.42 12.06 11.33 0.7 
31/12/1990 1032 56.36 11.48 10.66 0.8 
29/03/1991 1193 56.92 10.14 10.20 -0.1 
28/06/1991 1161 58.06 10.54 10.47 0.1 
30/09/1991 1266 58.49 9.79 9.73 0.1 
31/12/1991 1188 58.55 10.57 9.99 0.6 
31/03/1992 1172 59.05 10.85 9.96 0.9 
30/06/1992 1217 58.52 10.59 9.30 1.3 
30/09/1992 1206 58.86 10.83 9.54 1.3 
31/12/1992 1364 58.78 9.65 8.53 1.1 
      
31/03/1993 1408 58.15 9.44 8.32 1.1 
30/06/1993 1432 58.15 9.39 7.98 1.4 
30/09/1993 1507 58.30 8.97 7.27 1.7 
31/12/1993 1682 58.20 7.88 6.55 1.3 
31/03/1994 1562 58.73 8.83 7.98 0.8 
30/06/1994 1463 59.85 9.72 8.83 0.9 
30/09/1994 1511 60.44 9.50 8.65 0.8 
30/12/1994 1521 61.16 9.57 8.68 0.9 
31/03/1995 1539 63.85 9.58 8.44 1.1 
30/06/1995 1624 65.59 9.07 8.51 0.6 
29/09/1995 1734 66.75 8.38 8.38 0.0 
29/12/1995 1803 68.88 8.02 7.78 0.2 
29/03/1996 1843 71.16 7.85 8.40 -0.5 
28/06/1996 1856 72.58 7.88 8.25 -0.4 
30/09/1996 1945 74.30 7.38 8.04 -0.7 
31/12/1996 2014 75.71 7.02 7.78 -0.8 
31/03/1997 2100 76.43 6.55 7.98 -1.4 
30/06/1997 2185 77.55 6.08 7.19 -1.1 
30/09/1997 2455 77.82 4.51 6.78 -2.3 
31/12/1997 2411 77.88 4.82 6.45 -1.6 
      
31/03/1998 2782 65.65 2.79 5.99 -3.2 
30/06/1998 2743 66.12 3.01 5.80 -2.8 
30/09/1998 2345 66.59 5.50 4.93 0.6 
31/12/1998 2674 66.85 3.46 4.51 -1.0 
31/03/1999 2895 67.74 2.20 4.81 -2.6 
30/06/1999 2946 66.58 1.89 4.96 -3.1 
30/09/1999 2826 68.11 2.60 5.23 -2.6 
31/12/1999 3242 68.73 0.14 5.01 -4.9 
31/03/2000 3111 65.63 0.82 4.93 -4.1 
30/06/2000 3030 65.44 1.27 4.92 -3.7 
29/09/2000 3029 65.74 1.22 5.08 -3.9 




 All-Share Notional  Internal rate Consols Implied equity 
Date Index dividend of return (%) yield risk premium (%) 
      
30/03/2001 2711 68.6 3.63 4.94 -1.3 
29/06/2001 2728 66.02 3.55 5.39 -1.8 
28/09/2001 2340 67.17 7.62 5.14 2.5 
31/12/2001 2524 66.38 5.83 5.16 0.7 
29/03/2002 2557 68.03 5.66 5.47 0.2 
28/06/2002 2263 67.44 9.82 5.16 4.7 
30/09/2002 1801 67.2 18.8 4.65 14.2 
31/12/2002 1894 67.23 18.15 4.71 13.4 
31/03/2003 1736 67.17 23.65 4.76 18.9 
30/06/2003 1971 67.61 19.45 4.78 14.7 
30/09/2003 2028 68.13 19.88 4.98 14.9 
31/12/2003 2207 68.43 16.98 5.02 12 
30/03/2004 2197 68.11 19.51 4.72 14.8 
29/06/2004 2229 71.32 21.34 4.9 16.4 
28/09/2004 2272 72.69 23.47 4.69 18.8 
31/12/2004 2412 72.37 21.62 4.52 17.1 
29/03/2005 2458 76.19 25.4 4.81 20.6 
28/06/2005 2560 79.37 27.44 4.36 23.1 
30/09/2005 2746 82.37 19.08 4.36 14.7 
31/12/2005 2847 85.41 - 4.1 - 
      
Notes      
A The annual internal rate of return that equates the All-Share index level at that date 
 with the end 2005 index level and dividends to be received up until end 2005 
      







APPENDIX 2a - Analysis of calendar year returns 
 




TABLE A Shows historical yields and 12-month total returns for UK equities 
and undated bonds together with implied ex-post equity risk premia. 
Historical 12-month dividend growth and inflation values are also 
shown. 
 
TABLE B Shows the input data for simulations of historical long-term inflation 
and real dividend growth expectations together with the simulated 
values. 
 
TABLE C Shows simulated ex-ante equity risk premium values as the difference 
between simulated expected equity returns and quoted bond returns. 
 
TABLE D Shows how changes in the real interest rate environment together with 
changes in real dividend growth expectations and inflation risk premia 
“explain” changes in the simulated ex-ante equity risk premium 
values. 
 
TABLE E Analyses why equity returns over any 12-month period have varied 
from expectations. 
 
TABLE F Analyses why bond returns over any 12-month period have varied 
from expectations. 
 
TABLE G Analyses how and why the achieved equity risk premium over any 12-

















(1) Historic dividend yield for FTSE All-Share Index (FTSE 500 Index prior to 1993). 
Gross prior to 1998. 
 
(2) Yield on undated 21/2% UK government consols. 
 
(3) Implied dividend growth for the FTSE All-Share Index constituents. Derived from 
movement in implied dividend (Index x [dividend yield]/100). Adjusted to allow for 
change in yield presentation in 1998. 
 
(4) Total return from a portfolio indexed to the  FTSE All-Share Index over the previous 12 
months. Total return = Capital performance + (dividend yield 12 months ago x [1 + 
dividend growth over previous 12 months]). 
 
(5) Total return on 21/2% UK government consols over previous 12 months. 
Income yield + capital performance. 
 
(6) Column 4 – column 5. 
 





(1) Average annual inflation over 5 year window which includes 3 years historic and 2 years 
still to be reported (i.e. assumes perfect foresight.) 
 
(2) Average inflation over previous 20 years. 
 
(3) Derived as a function of the two variables shown in (1) and (2). [see main text] 
End 2005: Inflation gap = 0.6869*2.7 + 0.2555*3.6 = 2.8 
 
(4) 80% of value derived in (3). 
 
(5)       20% of value derived in (3) up until 1981. 
       Value used from 1981 onwards is: 
 
       Actual observed inflation gap – simulated long-term inflation  
 
      (6)          Simulated real rates of interest. Actual real rates on benchmark long-dated  
     index-linked gilts used for 1981 – 2005. Prior to 1981, derived from: 
 
     Consols yield – simulated inflation gap. 
 
     End 1963: Simulated real rate = 5.8 – 3.4 = 2.4 
 
(7)        Average real annual dividend growth over previous 15 years. 
 
 
(8)       Average real annual dividend growth over subsequent 10 years.     
 
(9)     Derived as a function of the two variables shown in (7) and (8). 






(1) Column 1, Table A. 
 
(2)   Expected inflation (column 4, Table B) + Expected real growth (column 9,     
  Table B). 
  End 2005: 2.2 + 1.8 = 4.0% 
 
(3)     Dividend yield expected in first year : 
  = Historic yield x (1 + expected nominal dividend growth) -1 
   End 2005: (2.95 x 1.04) – 1 = 3.07% 
 
(4)     Expected first year yield (column 3) + expected nominal dividend growth    
  (column 2) 
   End 2005: 3.1 + 4.0 = 7.1% 
 
(5)     Yield on 21/2% consols. 
 




(1) Column 3. Table C 
 
(2) Column 6, Table B. 
 
(3) Column 4, Table B. 
 
(4) Column 3, Table B. 
 
(5) Column 1 + column 2 - column 3 – column 4. 




(1) Actual return – expected return (at end of previous year) 
End 2005: 21.6 – 7.1 = 14.5 
 
(2) Unexpected capital performance + unexpected yield (see text) 
End 2005: (14.3 – 3.9) + 0.0305*(14.3 – 3.9) = 10.7 
 
(3) (1 + actual dividend growth )*(start yield/end yield – 1)   
End 2005: (1.143)*(3.05/2.95 -1) = 3.8 
 
(4) Performance attributable to change in real rate (see text for discussion) 
End 2005: -0.1554/-0.1000*3.7915 = 5.9 
 
 (5)    Performance attributable to change in real growth expectation 
End 2005: -0.1921/-0.1000*3.7915 = 7.3 
 
 (6)    Performance attributable to change in inflation risk premium 
End 2005: -0.1754/-0.1000*3.7915 = 6.7 
    
(7)    Performance attributable to change in equity risk premium 
End 2005: 0.4229/-0.1000*3.7915 = -16.0 





(1) Column 5, Table A. 
 
(2) Expected return (yield) 12 months previously as in column 2, Table A. 
 
(3) Column 1 – column 2. 
 
(4)- 
(6) Percentage changes due to changes in yield components. 
 Returns should be chain-linked. 




(1) From column 6, Table C. 
 
(2) Column 1, Table E. 
 
(3) Column 2, Table E. 
 
(4) Column 3, Table E. 
 
(5) Column 3. Table F. 
 
(6) Column 4, Table A – column 5, Table A. 
 
(7) Column 6 – column 1. 
 215 
APPENDIX 2A 
Table A - Historical market/economic data   
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
 Historic Undated 12 Month 12 Month 12 Month Ex-post 12 Month 
 Equity Bond Dividend Equity Bond Equity risk Inflation 
 Yield Yield Growth Return Return Premium (RPI) 
        
1963 4.08 5.81 7.2 18.9 1.8 17.1 1.9 
1964 5.18 6.31 18.1 -2.1 -2.1 0.0 4.8 
1965 5.23 6.48 7.8 12.3 3.7 8.6 4.5 
1966 5.79 6.66 0.4 -4.1 3.8 -7.8 3.7 
1967 4.38 7.06 -2.4 34.6 1.0 33.6 2.5 
1968 3.24 7.99 6.0 48.0 -4.6 52.6 5.9 
1969 3.85 8.87 0.8 -11.9 -1.9 -10.0 4.7 
        
1970 4.39 9.87 5.5 -3.5 -1.3 -2.1 7.9 
1971 3.25 8.64 5.1 46.5 24.2 22.3 9.0 
1972 3.15 9.97 9.3 16.4 -4.8 21.1 7.7 
1973 4.77 12.70 3.9 -28.1 -11.5 -16.6 10.6 
1974 11.71 18.01 9.6 -50.1 -16.8 -33.3 19.1 
1975 5.47 14.98 10.4 149.3 38.3 111.0 24.9 
1976 6.42 14.70 12.8 2.3 16.8 -14.5 15.1 
1977 5.28 10.72 16.1 48.6 51.8 -3.2 12.1 
1978 5.79 12.54 12.6 8.6 -3.7 12.3 8.4 
1979 6.87 12.01 23.8 11.5 16.9 -5.4 17.2 
        
1980 6.10 12.30 12.9 34.9 9.6 25.3 15.1 
1981 5.89 14.13 3.5 13.5 -0.6 14.1 12.0 
1982 5.26 10.39 9.0 28.5 50.2 -21.7 5.4 
1983 4.62 9.97 8.1 28.8 14.5 14.2 5.3 
1984 4.42 10.12 13.8 31.6 8.5 23.1 4.6 
1985 4.34 10.05 13.1 20.2 10.9 9.3 5.7 
1986 3.98 10.25 12.2 27.2 8.0 19.2 3.7 
1987 4.33 9.50 13.3 8.7 18.2 -9.5 3.7 
1988 4.69 9.16 15.3 11.5 13.2 -1.7 6.8 
1989 4.19 9.83 16.2 35.5 2.4 33.1 7.7 
        
1990 5.46 10.66 11.7 -9.6 2.0 -11.6 9.3 
1991 4.93 9.99 3.9 20.7 17.5 3.3 4.5 
1992 4.31 8.53 0.4 19.8 27.1 -7.3 2.6 
1993 3.46 6.55 -1.0 27.6 38.8 -11.2 1.9 
1994 4.02 8.68 5.1 -5.9 -18.0 12.1 2.9 
1995 3.82 7.78 12.6 23.0 20.2 2.9 3.2 
1996 3.76 7.78 9.9 15.9 7.8 8.1 2.5 
1997 3.23 6.45 2.9 23.6 28.4 -4.8 3.6 
1998 2.50 4.51 4.7 14.3 49.5 -35.2 2.7 
1999 2.12 5.01 2.8 23.8 -5.5 29.3 1.8 
        
2000 2.23 4.74 -3.2 -5.9 10.8 -16.7 2.9 
2001 2.63 5.16 -0.2 -13.2 -3.4 -9.8 0.7 
2002 3.55 4.71 1.3 -22.3 14.7 -37.0 2.9 
2003 3.10 5.02 1.8 20.2 -1.5 21.7 2.8 
2004 3.05 4.54 7.5 12.5 15.5 -3.0 3.5 




Table B - Long-term Simulations    
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
 5 Year 20 Year Sim Sim Sim Sim 15 year 10yr F/C Sim 
 Inflation Trailing Inf L-T Inflation real rates Trailing Real L-T 
 Window Inflation Gap Inf. Exp. RP (Prior to '81) RG Growth Exp. 
          
1963 2.3 3.9 3.4 2.7 0.7 2.4 4.2 -1.1 2.6 
1964 3.1 3.9 3.3 2.7 0.7 3.0 4.8 -2.7 2.6 
1965 3.4 3.9 3.4 2.7 0.7 3.1 4.5 -4.2 1.9 
1966 4.3 3.8 3.9 3.1 0.8 2.8 4.4 -4.1 1.9 
1967 4.2 3.7 3.9 3.1 0.8 3.2 4.5 -3.3 2.2 
1968 4.9 3.8 4.3 3.5 0.9 3.6 3.8 -2.9 1.8 
1969 6.0 3.9 5.1 4.1 1.0 3.8 2.6 -2.0 1.2 
          
1970 7.0 3.8 5.8 4.6 1.2 4.1 2.1 -2.0 0.9 
1971 7.9 3.8 6.4 5.2 1.3 2.2 1.9 -2.4 0.6 
1972 10.8 4.1 8.4 6.8 1.7 1.5 2.0 -2.2 0.7 
1973 14.1 4.5 10.8 8.7 2.2 1.9 1.3 -1.4 0.5 
1974 15.3 5.2 11.8 9.5 2.4 6.2 -0.2 0.9 0.1 
1975 16.3 6.1 12.7 10.2 2.5 2.3 -1.7 2.8 -0.4 
1976 15.8 6.7 12.5 10.0 2.5 2.2 -1.8 3.8 -0.1 
1977 15.4 7.1 12.4 9.9 2.5 -1.7 -1.6 4.4 0.2 
1978 13.5 7.5 11.2 9.0 2.2 1.3 -1.8 4.8 0.2 
1979 12.9 8.3 11.0 8.8 2.2 1.0 -1.9 5.0 0.2 
          
1980 11.6 8.9 10.2 8.2 2.0 2.1 -2.3 5.5 0.1 
1981 10.9 9.3 9.9 7.9 3.0 3.2 -2.6 6.2 0.1 
1982 8.4 9.5 8.2 6.6 0.9 3.0 -2.0 5.7 0.3 
1983 6.6 9.6 7.0 5.6 0.9 3.5 -1.9 5.1 0.2 
1984 4.9 9.6 5.9 4.7 2.3 3.1 -0.7 3.8 0.7 
1985 4.6 9.7 5.6 4.5 1.9 3.6 -0.1 4.0 1.1 
1986 4.9 9.7 5.8 4.7 1.9 3.7 0.7 3.9 1.7 
1987 5.5 9.8 6.3 5.0 0.6 3.9 1.2 2.9 1.7 
1988 6.2 9.8 6.8 5.4 0.0 3.8 2.1 2.3 2.2 
1989 6.4 10.0 6.9 5.5 0.7 3.6 3.2 1.7 2.7 
          
1990 6.1 10.0 6.8 5.4 1.2 4.1 4.2 0.8 3.2 
1991 5.2 9.8 6.1 4.8 0.7 4.4 4.3 0.8 3.3 
1992 4.2 9.5 5.3 4.3 0.3 3.9 3.9 0.8 3.0 
1993 3.0 9.1 4.4 3.5 -0.9 3.9 3.5 1.0 2.7 
1994 2.6 8.3 3.9 3.1 1.7 3.9 3.2 1.2 2.6 
1995 2.8 7.3 3.8 3.0 1.2 3.6 4.0 1.7 3.3 
1996 3.0 6.7 3.8 3.0 1.2 3.6 5.0 1.2 3.9 
1997 2.8 6.2 3.5 2.8 0.6 3.0 4.7 1.6 3.8 
1998 2.7 5.9 3.4 2.7 -0.2 2.0 4.7 1.7 3.8 
1999 2.3 5.2 2.9 2.4 0.9 1.8 3.8 1.8 3.2 
          
2000 2.2 4.6 2.7 2.2 0.8 1.8 2.9 2.7 2.8 
2001 2.2 4.1 2.6 2.1 0.9 2.2 2.3 3.1 2.5 
2002 2.6 3.9 2.8 2.2 0.3 2.2 1.5 3.5 2.1 
2003 2.4 3.8 2.6 2.1 1.0 1.9 1.0 3.9 1.8 
2004 2.8 3.8 2.9 2.3 0.8 1.5 0.7 3.8 1.6 




Table C - Simulated equity risk premium    
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)    (6)   
 Historic Long-term 1st Year Expected  Expected  Ex-ante 
 Equity Exp div growth Expected 12 month - Bond   = Equity risk 
 Yield (nominal) Yield equity return  Return  Premium 
         
1963 4.08 5.3 4.30 9.6  5.8  3.8 
1964 5.18 5.2 5.45 10.7  6.3  4.4 
1965 5.23 4.6 5.47 10.0  6.5  3.6 
1966 5.79 5.0 6.08 11.1  6.7  4.4 
1967 4.38 5.3 4.61 9.9  7.1  2.8 
1968 3.24 5.3 3.41 8.7  8.0  0.7 
1969 3.85 5.3 4.05 9.3  8.9  0.5 
         
1970 4.39 5.5 4.63 10.2  9.9  0.3 
1971 3.25 5.7 3.44 9.2  8.6  0.5 
1972 3.15 7.5 3.39 10.9  10.0  0.9 
1973 4.77 9.2 5.21 14.4  12.7  1.7 
1974 11.71 9.6 12.83 22.4  18.0  4.4 
1975 5.47 9.8 6.01 15.8  15.0  0.8 
1976 6.42 9.9 7.06 17.0  14.7  2.3 
1977 5.28 10.1 5.81 15.9  10.7  5.2 
1978 5.79 9.2 6.32 15.5  12.5  3.0 
1979 6.87 9.0 7.49 16.5  12.0  4.5 
         
1980 6.10 8.2 6.60 14.8  12.3  2.5 
1981 5.89 8.0 6.36 14.3  14.1  0.2 
1982 5.26 6.8 5.62 12.5  10.4  2.1 
1983 4.62 5.8 4.89 10.7  10.0  0.7 
1984 4.42 5.4 4.66 10.0  10.1  -0.1 
1985 4.34 5.7 4.59 10.2  10.0  0.2 
1986 3.98 6.3 4.23 10.6  10.3  0.3 
1987 4.33 6.7 4.62 11.4  9.5  1.9 
1988 4.69 7.6 5.05 12.7  9.2  3.5 
1989 4.19 8.3 4.54 12.8  9.8  3.0 
         
1990 5.46 8.6 5.93 14.6  10.7  3.9 
1991 4.93 8.1 5.33 13.4  10.0  3.4 
1992 4.31 7.3 4.62 11.9  8.5  3.4 
1993 3.46 6.3 3.68 9.9  6.5  3.4 
1994 4.02 5.8 4.25 10.0  8.7  1.3 
1995 3.82 6.3 4.06 10.4  7.8  2.6 
1996 3.76 6.9 4.02 10.9  7.8  3.1 
1997 3.23 6.6 3.44 10.0  6.5  3.6 
1998 2.50 6.5 2.66 9.1  4.5  4.6 
1999 2.12 5.5 2.24 7.8  5.0  2.8 
         
2000 2.23 5.0 2.34 7.3  4.7  2.6 
2001 2.63 4.6 2.75 7.3  5.2  2.1 
2002 3.55 4.4 3.70 8.1  4.7  3.3 
2003 3.10 3.9 3.22 7.2  5.0  2.1 
2004 3.05 3.9 3.17 7.1  4.5  2.6 
2005 2.95 4.0 3.07 7.1  4.1  3.0 
         




Table D - Analysis of the ex-ante equity risk premium 
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
 First year  Simulated  Simulated  Simulated  Ex-ante 
 Expected  + Long-term real  - Real rates  -  Inflation  = Equity risk 
 div yield  Dividend growth  (actual from '81)  Risk Premium  Premium 
          
1963 4.30  2.6  2.4  0.7  3.8 
1964 5.45  2.6  3.0  0.7  4.4 
1965 5.47  1.9  3.1  0.7  3.6 
1966 6.08  1.9  2.8  0.8  4.4 
1967 4.61  2.2  3.2  0.8  2.8 
1968 3.41  1.8  3.6  0.9  0.7 
1969 4.05  1.2  3.8  1.0  0.5 
          
1970 4.63  0.9  4.1  1.2  0.3 
1971 3.44  0.6  2.2  1.3  0.5 
1972 3.39  0.7  1.5  1.7  0.9 
1973 5.21  0.5  1.9  2.2  1.7 
1974 12.83  0.1  6.2  2.4  4.4 
1975 6.01  -0.4  2.3  2.5  0.8 
1976 7.06  -0.1  2.2  2.5  2.3 
1977 5.81  0.2  -1.7  2.5  5.2 
1978 6.32  0.2  1.3  2.2  3.0 
1979 7.49  0.2  1.0  2.2  4.5 
          
1980 6.60  0.1  2.1  2.0  2.5 
1981 6.36  0.1  3.2  3.0  0.2 
1982 5.62  0.3  3.0  0.9  2.1 
1983 4.89  0.2  3.5  0.9  0.7 
1984 4.66  0.7  3.1  2.3  -0.1 
1985 4.59  1.1  3.6  1.9  0.2 
1986 4.23  1.7  3.7  1.9  0.3 
1987 4.62  1.7  3.9  0.6  1.9 
1988 5.05  2.2  3.8  0.0  3.5 
1989 4.54  2.7  3.6  0.7  3.0 
          
1990 5.93  3.2  4.1  1.2  3.9 
1991 5.33  3.3  4.4  0.7  3.4 
1992 4.62  3.0  3.9  0.3  3.4 
1993 3.68  2.7  3.9  -0.9  3.4 
1994 4.25  2.6  3.9  1.7  1.3 
1995 4.06  3.3  3.6  1.2  2.6 
1996 4.02  3.9  3.6  1.2  3.1 
1997 3.44  3.8  3.0  0.6  3.6 
1998 2.66  3.8  2.0  -0.2  4.6 
1999 2.24  3.2  1.8  0.9  2.8 
          
2000 2.34  2.8  1.8  0.8  2.6 
2001 2.75  2.5  2.2  0.9  2.1 
2002 3.70  2.1  2.2  0.3  3.3 
2003 3.22  1.8  1.9  1.0  2.1 
2004 3.17  1.6  1.5  0.8  2.6 





Table E - Analysis of equity returns    
 (1)     (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
 Unexpected    Unexpected return due to: …….......Contributions to 12m re-rating…… 
 Equity Unexpected Unexpected Change in Change in Change in Change in 
 Return div growth re-rating Real rates Real growth IRP ERP 
1963 9.1 2.0 7.1 -6.3 0.9 0.2 12.2 
1964 -11.7 13.4 -25.1 -12.1 -0.1 0.2 -13.2 
1965 1.6 2.7 -1.0 -2.6 -13.3 -0.3 15.1 
1966 -14.1 -4.4 -9.7 6.1 0.0 -1.7 -14.1 
1967 23.5 -7.9 31.4 -9.5 6.1 0.3 34.5 
1968 38.1 0.8 37.3 -13.6 -11.9 -3.1 65.9 
1969 -20.6 -4.6 -16.0 -3.0 -14.8 -3.8 5.6 
1970 -12.8 0.2 -13.0 -6.9 -6.9 -3.1 3.9 
1971 36.4 -0.5 36.9 57.8 -9.7 -3.9 -7.3 
1972 7.2 3.7 3.5 22.6 4.7 -12.2 -11.6 
1973 -39.0 -3.7 -35.3 -6.4 -5.1 -9.0 -14.8 
1974 -64.5 0.5 -65.0 -36.7 -3.1 -1.7 -23.6 
1975 126.8 0.9 125.9 72.2 -9.4 -3.2 66.3 
1976 -13.5 3.2 -16.7 1.7 4.3 0.6 -23.3 
1977 31.6 6.6 25.1 76.7 5.5 0.6 -57.7 
1978 -7.3 2.6 -9.9 -53.0 0.8 3.8 38.5 
1979 -4.0 15.5 -19.5 5.3 -0.8 0.6 -24.5 
1980 18.5 4.2 14.3 -19.0 -1.7 2.5 32.5 
1981 -1.4 -5.1 3.7 -17.8 0.3 -16.4 37.6 
1982 14.2 1.1 13.1 3.4 3.9 41.9 -36.2 
1983 16.3 1.3 15.0 -12.8 -1.3 -0.4 29.4 
1984 20.9 15.4 5.5 9.7 11.6 -37.2 21.3 
1985 10.2 8.1 2.1 -11.9 11.8 9.8 -7.7 
1986 17.0 6.8 10.1 -1.2 13.5 0.9 -3.0 
1987 -1.9 7.3 -9.2 -4.8 1.0 32.5 -37.8 
1988 0.1 9.0 -8.9 4.2 10.6 13.6 -37.3 
1989 22.8 8.9 13.9 4.7 14.0 -18.1 13.3 
        
1990 -22.5 3.5 -26.0 -8.8 8.3 -8.8 -16.6 
1991 6.2 -5.0 11.2 -7.2 1.4 8.5 8.4 
1992 6.3 -8.1 14.4 9.9 -5.0 8.3 1.3 
1993 15.7 -8.6 24.3 -1.0 -6.4 33.2 -1.4 
1994 -15.8 -1.2 -14.6 1.3 -2.4 -63.7 50.2 
1995 13.0 7.1 5.9 8.6 18.0 14.4 -35.1 
1996 5.5 3.7 1.8 -0.6 15.8 0.2 -13.7 
1997 12.7 -4.2 16.9 17.6 -2.6 15.4 -13.5 
1998 4.3 -2.0 6.2 8.0 -0.1 6.8 -8.5 
1999 14.7 -3.7 18.4 11.1 -25.8 -50.9 84.0 
2000 -13.7 -8.9 -4.8 -2.9 -14.0 5.5 6.5 
2001 -20.5 -5.3 -15.2 -15.9 -10.9 -3.7 15.3 
2002 -29.6 -3.4 -26.2 0.7 -9.9 15.9 -32.9 
2003 12.1 -2.7 14.8 8.9 -9.2 -22.3 37.4 
2004 5.4 3.6 1.8 15.6 -7.3 7.1 -13.6 
2005 14.5 10.7 3.8 5.9 7.3 6.7 -16.0 
        




Table F - Analysis of bond returns    
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   (5)   (6)   
 Bond  Expected  Unexpected  …...Unexpected bond return due to… 
 total 
 
- bond return 
 
= bond      Change in Change in Change in  
 return  (12 m ago)  return  RRR Inflation IRP 
          
1963 1.8  5.6  -3.8  -4.3 0.4 0.1 
1964 -2.1  5.8  -7.9  -8.7 0.7 0.2 
1965 3.7  6.3  -2.6  -1.7 -0.7 -0.2 
1966 3.8  6.5  -2.7  5.8 -6.5 -1.6 
1967 1.0  6.7  -5.7  -6.4 0.6 0.2 
1968 -4.6  7.1  -11.6  -5.8 -5.0 -1.2 
          
1969 -1.9  8.0  -9.9  -1.5 -7.0 -1.7 
1970 -1.3  8.9  -10.2  -3.4 -5.7 -1.4 
1971 24.2  9.9  14.3  23.6 -6.1 -1.5 
1972 -4.8  8.6  -13.4  8.3 -16.7 -4.0 
1973 -11.5  10.0  -21.4  -3.3 -15.6 -3.7 
1974 -16.8  12.7  -29.5  -25.3 -4.6 -1.1 
1975 38.3  18.0  20.3  27.8 -4.8 -1.2 
1976 16.8  15.0  1.9  0.7 0.9 0.2 
1977 51.8  14.7  37.1  35.3 1.1 0.3 
1978 -3.7  10.7  -14.5  -21.8 7.4 1.9 
          
1979 16.9  12.5  4.4  2.7 1.3 0.3 
1980 9.6  12.0  -2.4  -8.4 5.2 1.3 
1981 -0.6  12.3  -12.9  -8.1 2.1 -7.1 
1982 50.2  14.1  36.0  1.5 10.7 21.1 
1983 14.5  10.4  4.2  -5.0 9.8 -0.1 
1984 8.5  10.0  -1.5  4.1 10.4 -14.2 
1985 10.9  10.1  0.8  -4.6 1.7 3.9 
1986 8.0  10.0  -2.0  -0.7 -1.5 0.2 
1987 18.2  10.3  7.9  -2.0 -3.3 13.9 
1988 13.2  9.5  3.7  1.6 -4.1 6.5 
          
1989 2.4  9.2  -6.8  1.8 -1.3 -7.2 
1990 2.0  9.8  -7.9  -4.7 1.1 -4.4 
1991 17.5  10.7  6.8  -3.2 5.6 4.4 
1992 27.1  10.0  17.1  5.2 6.5 4.5 
1993 38.8  8.5  30.3  0.0 9.6 18.8 
1994 -18.0  6.5  -24.5  1.1 6.3 -29.8 
1995 20.2  8.7  11.5  3.5 1.2 6.5 
1996 7.8  7.8  0.0  -0.5 0.5 0.0 
1997 28.4  7.8  20.6  8.4 3.0 8.0 
1998 49.5  6.5  43.0  18.3 1.7 18.9 
          
1999 -5.5  4.5  -10.0  6.1 8.9 -22.1 
2000 10.8  5.0  5.8  -1.2 4.0 2.9 
2001 -3.4  4.7  -8.2  -8.3 2.1 -1.9 
2002 14.7  5.2  9.6  0.6 -3.1 12.4 
2003 -1.5  4.7  -6.2  6.6 2.5 -14.1 
2004 15.5  5.0  10.5  10.1 -4.0 4.6 
2005 14.8  4.5  10.3  3.7 1.9 4.4 
          




Table G - Ex-post -v- ex-ante risk premia   
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
 Ex-ante Unexpected 
                          
....…Due to….  Unexpected Ex-post Unexpected 
 ERP Equity return Unexpected Unexpected  Bond return ERP Risk premium 
 (12M ago) (Last 12M) Dividend growth Re-rating (Last 12M) (Last 12M) (Last 12M) 
        
1963 4.2 9.1 2.0 7.1 -3.8 17.1 12.9 
1964 3.8 -11.7 13.4 -25.1 -7.9 0.0 -3.8 
1965 4.4 1.6 2.7 -1.0 -2.6 8.6 4.3 
1966 3.6 -14.1 -4.4 -9.7 -2.7 -7.8 -11.4 
1967 4.4 23.5 -7.9 31.4 -5.7 33.6 29.2 
1968 2.8 38.1 0.8 37.3 -11.6 52.6 49.8 
1969 0.7 -20.6 -4.6 -16.0 -9.9 -10.0 -10.7 
        
1970 0.5 -12.8 0.2 -13.0 -10.2 -2.1 -2.6 
1971 0.3 36.4 -0.5 36.9 14.3 22.3 22.0 
1972 0.5 7.2 3.7 3.5 -13.4 21.1 20.6 
1973 0.9 -39.0 -3.7 -35.3 -21.4 -16.6 -17.5 
1974 1.7 -64.5 0.5 -65.0 -29.5 -33.3 -35.0 
1975 4.4 126.8 0.9 125.9 20.3 111.0 106.6 
1976 0.8 -13.5 3.2 -16.7 1.9 -14.5 -15.4 
1977 2.3 31.6 6.6 25.1 37.1 -3.2 -5.5 
1978 5.2 -7.3 2.6 -9.9 -14.5 12.3 7.2 
1979 3.0 -4.0 15.5 -19.5 4.4 -5.4 -8.4 
        
1980 4.5 18.5 4.2 14.3 -2.4 25.3 20.9 
1981 2.5 -1.4 -5.1 3.7 -12.9 14.1 11.6 
1982 0.2 14.2 1.1 13.1 36.0 -21.7 -21.9 
1983 2.1 16.3 1.3 15.0 4.2 14.2 12.2 
1984 0.7 20.9 15.4 5.5 -1.5 23.1 22.4 
1985 -0.1 10.2 8.1 2.1 0.8 9.3 9.4 
1986 0.2 17.0 6.8 10.1 -2.0 19.2 19.0 
1987 0.3 -1.9 7.3 -9.2 7.9 -9.5 -9.9 
1988 1.9 0.1 9.0 -8.9 3.7 -1.7 -3.6 
1989 3.5 22.8 8.9 13.9 -6.8 33.1 29.6 
        
1990 3.0 -22.5 3.5 -26.0 -7.9 -11.6 -14.6 
1991 3.9 6.2 -5.0 11.2 6.8 3.3 -0.6 
1992 3.4 6.3 -8.1 14.4 17.1 -7.3 -10.8 
1993 3.4 15.7 -8.6 24.3 30.3 -11.2 -14.5 
1994 3.4 -15.8 -1.2 -14.6 -24.5 12.1 8.7 
1995 1.3 13.0 7.1 5.9 11.5 2.9 1.5 
1996 2.6 5.5 3.7 1.8 0.0 8.1 5.5 
1997 3.1 12.7 -4.2 16.9 20.6 -4.8 -7.9 
1998 3.6 4.3 -2.0 6.2 43.0 -35.2 -38.8 
1999 4.6 14.7 -3.7 18.4 -10.0 29.3 24.7 
        
2000 2.8 -13.7 -8.9 -4.8 5.8 -16.7 -19.5 
2001 2.6 -20.5 -5.3 -15.2 -8.2 -9.8 -12.4 
2002 2.1 -29.6 -3.4 -26.2 9.6 -37.0 -39.2 
2003 3.3 12.1 -2.7 14.8 -6.2 21.7 18.3 
2004 2.1 5.4 3.6 1.8 10.5 -3.0 -5.1 
2005 2.6 14.5 10.7 3.8 10.3 6.8 4.2 
        





Table A - Historical market/economic data    
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
  Historic Undated 12 Month 12 Month 12 Month Ex-post 12 Month 
  Equity Bond Dividend Equity Bond Equity risk Inflation 
  Yield Yield Growth Return Return Premium (RPI) 
         
1963 Q4 4.08 5.81 7.2 18.9 1.8 17.1 1.9 
1964 Q1 4.29 5.88 15.4 19.7 4.3 15.5 1.4 
 Q2 4.49 6.07 12.5 13.1 -5.8 19.0 3.4 
 Q3 4.50 6.05 19.8 15.2 -4.8 20.0 4.4 
 Q4 5.18 6.31 18.1 -2.1 -2.1 0.0 4.8 
1965 Q1 5.36 6.39 17.1 -1.3 -2.1 0.8 4.5 
 Q2 5.69 6.66 10.4 -8.0 -2.8 -5.2 4.9 
 Q3 5.40 6.21 9.3 -4.0 3.5 -7.4 4.8 
 Q4 5.23 6.48 7.8 12.3 3.7 8.6 4.5 
1966 Q1 5.24 6.68 4.4 12.4 2.0 10.3 4.3 
 Q2 4.94 6.89 3.3 24.9 3.3 21.6 3.9 
 Q3 5.84 7.01 1.8 -0.3 -5.2 4.9 3.6 
 Q4 5.79 6.66 0.4 -4.1 3.8 -7.8 3.7 
1967 Q1 5.48 6.41 -2.5 -1.7 10.9 -12.6 3.5 
 Q2 5.00 6.80 -3.2 0.4 8.2 -7.8 2.4 
 Q3 4.65 6.85 -3.1 27.3 9.3 18.0 1.5 
 Q4 4.38 7.06 -2.4 34.6 1.0 33.6 2.5 
1968 Q1 3.92 7.16 0.4 45.8 -4.1 49.9 3.4 
 Q2 3.47 7.75 1.2 50.8 -5.5 56.3 4.6 
 Q3 3.31 7.46 2.5 48.7 -1.3 50.1 5.9 
 Q4 3.24 7.99 6.0 48.0 -4.6 52.6 5.9 
1969 Q1 3.44 8.71 4.9 23.7 -10.7 34.4 6.3 
 Q2 4.02 9.19 6.1 -4.7 -8.0 3.3 5.3 
 Q3 4.09 8.87 5.0 -11.6 -8.4 -3.1 5.1 
 Q4 3.85 8.87 0.8 -11.9 -1.9 -10.0 4.7 
         
1970 Q1 4.07 8.56 3.9 -8.6 10.5 -19.1 5.1 
 Q2 4.72 9.19 3.9 -7.3 9.2 -16.5 5.9 
 Q3 4.31 9.37 4.8 3.7 3.6 0.2 7.0 
 Q4 4.39 9.87 5.5 -3.5 -1.3 -2.1 7.9 
1971 Q1 4.20 9.07 2.2 3.2 3.0 0.2 8.8 
 Q2 3.64 9.24 3.1 38.5 8.7 29.8 10.3 
 Q3 3.40 8.71 3.1 35.1 16.9 18.3 9.9 
 Q4 3.25 8.64 5.1 46.5 24.2 22.3 9.0 
1972 Q1 2.96 8.87 7.5 57.1 11.3 45.7 7.6 
 Q2 3.22 9.50 8.7 26.9 6.5 20.4 6.1 
 Q3 3.40 9.73 9.8 13.5 -1.7 15.3 7.0 
 Q4 3.15 9.97 9.3 16.4 -4.8 21.1 7.7 
1973 Q1 3.69 10.39 8.6 -9.7 -5.8 -3.9 8.2 
 Q2 3.67 10.61 6.0 -3.6 -1.0 -2.6 9.3 
 Q3 3.93 11.59 5.4 -5.2 -6.3 1.1 9.3 
 Q4 4.77 12.70 3.9 -28.1 -11.5 -16.6 10.6 
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  Historic Undated 12 Month 12 Month 12 Month Ex-post 12 Month 
  Equity Bond Dividend Equity Bond Equity risk Inflation 
  Yield Yield Growth Return Return Premium (RPI) 
         
1974 Q1 6.17 14.65 4.4 -33.7 -18.7 -15.0 13.5 
 Q2 7.31 15.87 9.3 -41.1 -22.5 -18.6 16.5 
 Q3 10.15 16.06 9.5 -53.3 -16.2 -37.1 17.1 
 Q4 11.71 18.01 9.6 -50.1 -16.8 -33.3 19.1 
1975 Q1 6.70 14.33 8.6 6.7 16.8 -10.1 21.2 
 Q2 6.51 14.87 8.4 29.6 22.6 7.0 26.1 
 Q3 5.91 14.86 9.5 99.2 24.1 75.1 26.6 
 Q4 5.47 14.98 10.4 149.3 38.3 111.0 24.9 
1976 Q1 5.35 14.33 11.1 46.6 14.3 32.2 21.2 
 Q2 5.91 14.08 10.0 28.4 20.4 7.9 13.8 
 Q3 7.12 15.26 12.4 0.0 12.3 -12.3 14.3 
 Q4 6.42 14.70 12.8 2.3 16.8 -14.5 15.1 
1977 Q1 5.69 12.86 14.0 13.3 25.8 -12.5 16.7 
 Q2 5.53 13.20 14.8 29.5 20.8 8.7 17.7 
 Q3 4.89 10.90 14.2 74.4 55.3 19.1 15.6 
 Q4 5.28 10.72 16.1 48.6 51.8 -3.2 12.1 
1978 Q1 5.64 11.63 15.3 22.9 23.5 -0.6 9.1 
 Q2 5.65 12.62 12.9 16.7 17.8 -1.1 7.4 
 Q3 5.43 12.54 13.0 7.3 -2.2 9.4 7.8 
 Q4 5.79 12.54 12.6 8.6 -3.7 12.3 8.4 
1979 Q1 4.94 10.90 13.6 36.1 18.3 17.8 9.8 
 Q2 5.32 11.56 10.8 23.9 21.8 2.2 11.4 
 Q3 5.96 10.81 22.4 18.2 28.5 -10.3 16.5 
 Q4 6.87 12.01 23.8 11.5 16.9 -5.4 17.2 
         
1980 Q1 6.91 12.82 26.3 -3.5 -4.1 0.6 19.8 
 Q2 6.40 12.19 30.8 15.7 6.4 9.3 21.0 
 Q3 6.12 11.80 17.0 20.9 2.4 18.5 15.9 
 Q4 6.10 12.30 12.9 34.9 9.6 25.3 15.1 
1981 Q1 5.78 12.31 7.8 36.3 17.0 19.3 12.6 
 Q2 5.66 13.29 5.2 25.7 4.0 21.7 11.3 
 Q3 6.57 14.65 3.0 2.2 -7.7 9.9 11.4 
 Q4 5.89 14.13 3.5 13.5 -0.6 14.1 12.0 
1982 Q1 5.80 12.78 5.8 11.6 8.6 2.9 10.4 
 Q2 6.09 12.78 8.3 6.8 17.3 -10.4 9.2 
 Q3 5.50 10.90 8.8 37.1 49.1 -12.0 7.3 
 Q4 5.26 10.39 9.0 28.5 50.2 -21.7 5.4 
1983 Q1 4.94 10.33 7.4 32.4 36.4 -4.0 4.6 
 Q2 4.56 10.02 6.5 48.7 40.2 8.4 3.7 
 Q3 4.80 10.23 7.5 29.0 17.4 11.6 5.1 
 Q4 4.62 9.97 8.1 28.8 14.5 14.2 5.3 
1984 Q1 4.38 9.97 12.8 32.8 14.0 18.9 5.2 
 Q2 4.87 10.75 13.5 11.5 3.3 8.2 5.1 
 Q3 4.68 10.25 17.3 25.9 10.0 15.9 4.7 
 Q4 4.42 10.12 20.6 31.6 8.5 23.1 4.6 
1985 Q1 4.47 10.31 20.0 22.8 6.7 16.1 6.1 
 Q2 4.80 10.41 20.3 28.0 14.0 14.0 7.0 
 Q3 4.63 9.97 15.6 22.3 13.1 9.2 5.9 




  Historic Undated 12 Month 12 Month 12 Month Ex-post 12 Month 
  Equity Bond Dividend Equity Bond Equity risk Inflation 
  Yield Yield Growth Return Return Premium (RPI) 
         
1986 Q1 3.69 8.75 8.6 36.4 28.1 8.3 4.2 
 Q2 3.87 8.91 10.4 42.3 27.3 14.9 2.5 
 Q3 4.17 10.33 10.6 27.9 6.5 21.4 3.0 
 Q4 3.98 10.25 12.2 27.2 8.0 19.2 3.7 
1987 Q1 3.41 9.24 14.5 28.1 3.5 24.6 4.0 
 Q2 3.08 9.16 12.5 45.7 6.1 39.6 4.2 
 Q3 3.03 9.99 14.3 62.0 13.8 48.2 4.2 
 Q4 4.33 9.50 13.3 8.7 18.2 -9.5 3.7 
1988 Q1 4.31 9.00 12.9 -6.8 11.9 -18.7 3.5 
 Q2 4.22 9.39 14.4 -13.0 6.8 -19.7 4.6 
 Q3 4.47 9.26 15.5 -18.2 17.8 -36.1 5.9 
 Q4 4.69 9.16 15.3 11.5 13.2 -1.7 6.8 
1989 Q1 4.19 8.97 16.7 25.0 9.3 15.7 7.9 
 Q2 4.20 9.54 13.9 19.2 7.7 11.5 8.3 
 Q3 4.07 9.61 12.5 28.6 5.6 23.1 7.6 
 Q4 4.19 9.83 16.2 35.5 2.4 33.1 7.7 
         
1990 Q1 4.74 11.43 17.2 8.5 -12.6 21.1 8.1 
 Q2 4.67 10.68 18.2 11.3 -1.1 12.4 9.8 
 Q3 5.76 11.33 16.4 -13.0 -5.5 -7.5 10.9 
 Q4 5.46 10.66 11.7 -9.6 2.0 -11.6 9.3 
1991 Q1 4.77 10.20 7.7 12.1 23.4 -11.3 8.2 
 Q2 5.00 10.47 6.1 4.1 12.7 -8.6 5.8 
 Q3 4.62 9.73 5.5 37.7 27.8 9.9 4.1 
 Q4 4.93 9.99 3.9 20.7 17.5 3.3 4.5 
1992 Q1 5.04 9.96 3.7 3.1 12.6 -9.5 4.0 
 Q2 4.81 9.30 0.8 9.8 23.0 -13.2 3.9 
 Q3 4.88 9.54 0.6 -0.1 11.7 -11.8 3.6 
 Q4 4.31 8.53 0.4 19.8 27.1 -7.3 2.6 
1993 Q1 4.13 8.32 -1.5 25.1 29.8 -4.6 1.9 
 Q2 4.06 7.98 -0.6 22.5 25.8 -3.3 1.2 
 Q3 3.87 7.27 -0.9 29.7 40.8 -11.1 1.8 
 Q4 3.46 6.55 -1.0 27.6 38.8 -11.2 1.9 
1994 Q1 3.76 7.98 1.0 15.1 12.5 2.6 2.3 
 Q2 4.09 8.83 2.9 6.3 -1.6 7.9 2.6 
 Q3 4.00 8.65 3.7 4.3 -8.6 12.9 2.2 
 Q4 4.02 8.68 5.1 -5.9 -18.0 12.1 2.9 
1995 Q1 4.15 8.44 8.7 2.6 2.6 0.0 3.5 
 Q2 4.04 8.51 9.6 15.4 12.6 2.8 3.5 
 Q3 3.85 8.38 10.4 19.2 11.8 7.4 3.9 
 Q4 3.82 7.78 12.6 23.0 20.2 2.9 3.2 
 225 
 
  Historic Undated 12 Month 12 Month 12 Month Ex-post 12 Month 
  Equity Bond Dividend Equity Bond Equity risk Inflation 
  Yield Yield Growth Return Return Premium (RPI) 
         
1996 Q1 3.86 8.40 11.4 24.4 8.9 15.6 2.7 
 Q2 3.91 8.25 10.7 18.8 11.7 7.1 2.1 
 Q3 3.82 8.04 11.3 16.5 12.7 3.8 2.1 
 Q4 3.76 7.78 9.9 15.9 7.8 8.1 2.5 
1997 Q1 3.64 7.98 7.4 18.0 13.8 4.3 2.6 
 Q2 3.55 7.19 6.8 21.9 22.9 -1.0 2.9 
 Q3 3.17 6.78 4.7 30.2 26.5 3.7 3.6 
 Q4 3.23 6.45 2.9 23.6 28.4 -4.8 3.6 
1998 Q1 2.36 5.99 4.7 36.3 41.0 -4.7 3.5 
 Q2 2.41 5.80 4.0 29.3 31.3 -2.0 3.7 
 Q3 2.84 4.93 4.4 -1.2 44.5 -45.6 3.2 
 Q4 2.50 4.51 4.7 14.3 49.5 -35.2 2.7 
1999 Q1 2.34 4.81 3.2 6.5 30.6 -24.1 2.1 
 Q2 2.26 4.96 0.7 9.8 22.6 -12.7 1.3 
 Q3 2.41 5.23 2.3 23.4 -0.9 24.3 1.1 
 Q4 2.12 5.01 2.8 23.8 -5.5 29.3 1.8 
         
2000 Q1 2.11 4.93 -3.1 9.7 2.3 7.4 2.6 
 Q2 2.16 4.92 -1.7 5.1 5.9 -0.8 3.3 
 Q3 2.17 5.09 -3.5 9.5 8.1 1.4 3.3 
 Q4 2.23 4.74 -3.2 -5.9 10.8 -16.7 2.9 
2001 Q1 2.53 4.94 4.5 -10.6 4.8 -15.4 2.3 
 Q2 2.42 5.39 0.9 -7.8 -3.9 -3.9 1.9 
 Q3 2.87 5.14 2.2 -20.5 4.0 -24.5 1.7 
 Q4 2.63 5.16 -0.2 -13.2 -3.4 -9.8 0.7 
2002 Q1 2.66 5.47 -0.8 -3.2 -4.7 1.5 1.3 
 Q2 2.98 5.16 2.2 -14.6 9.9 -24.5 1.0 
 Q3 3.73 4.65 0.0 -20.2 15.7 -35.9 1.7 
 Q4 3.55 4.71 1.3 -22.3 14.7 -37.0 2.9 
2003 Q1 3.87 4.76 -1.3 -29.5 20.2 -49.7 3.1 
 Q2 3.43 4.78 0.3 -9.9 13.1 -23.0 2.9 
 Q3 3.36 4.98 1.4 16.3 -2.0 18.3 2.8 
 Q4 3.10 5.02 1.8 20.2 -1.5 21.7 2.8 
2004 Q1 3.13 4.75 2.4 30.5 5.1 25.5 2.6 
 Q2 3.16 4.91 4.2 16.6 2.1 14.5 3.0 
 Q3 3.16 4.74 5.4 15.6 10.1 5.5 3.1 
 Q4 3.05 4.54 7.5 12.5 15.5 -3.0 3.5 
2005 Q1 3.09 4.70 10.4 15.3 5.8 9.5 3.2 
 Q2 3.10 4.34 12.7 18.4 18.0 0.4 2.9 
 Q3 2.99 4.38 14.4 24.5 13.0 11.5 2.7 




Table B - Long-term Simulations     
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
  5 Year 20 Year Sim Sim Sim Sim 15 year 10yr F/C Sim 
  Inflation Trailing Inf L-T Inflation real rates Trailing Real L-T 
  Window Inflation Gap Inf. Exp. RP (Prior to '81) RG Growth Exp. 
           
1963 Q4 2.3 3.9 3.4 2.7 0.7 2.4 4.2 -1.1 2.6 
1964 Q1 2.3 3.9 3.1 2.5 0.6 2.8 4.2 -1.4 2.5 
 Q2 2.6 3.9 3.4 2.7 0.7 2.6 4.5 -1.8 2.6 
 Q3 2.7 4.0 3.5 2.8 0.7 2.5 4.7 -2.1 2.7 
 Q4 3.1 3.9 3.3 2.7 0.7 3.0 4.8 -2.7 2.6 
1965 Q1 3.2 3.8 3.3 2.7 0.7 3.1 5.1 -3.6 2.5 
 Q2 3.4 3.9 3.5 2.8 0.7 3.2 4.8 -3.9 2.2 
 Q3 3.1 4.0 3.4 2.8 0.7 2.8 4.7 -4.0 2.1 
 Q4 3.4 3.9 3.4 2.7 0.7 3.1 4.5 -4.2 1.9 
1966 Q1 3.4 3.8 3.3 2.6 0.7 3.4 4.4 -4.4 1.7 
 Q2 3.8 3.9 3.6 2.9 0.7 3.3 4.3 -4.2 1.8 
 Q3 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.0 0.8 3.3 4.4 -4.0 1.9 
 Q4 4.3 3.8 3.9 3.1 0.8 2.8 4.4 -4.1 1.9 
1967 Q1 4.4 3.7 3.9 3.2 0.8 2.5 4.5 -4.1 1.9 
 Q2 4.2 3.7 3.9 3.1 0.8 2.9 4.4 -3.8 1.9 
 Q3 4.2 3.7 3.8 3.0 0.8 3.0 4.6 -3.6 2.1 
 Q4 4.2 3.7 3.9 3.1 0.8 3.2 4.5 -3.3 2.2 
1968 Q1 4.5 3.7 4.0 3.2 0.8 3.1 4.6 -3.3 2.3 
 Q2 4.4 3.8 4.0 3.2 0.8 3.7 4.2 -3.0 2.0 
 Q3 4.6 3.8 4.1 3.3 0.8 3.3 4.0 -2.9 1.9 
 Q4 4.9 3.8 4.3 3.5 0.9 3.6 3.8 -2.9 1.8 
1969 Q1 5.4 3.9 4.7 3.8 0.9 4.0 3.5 -2.8 1.6 
 Q2 5.7 3.9 4.9 3.9 1.0 4.3 3.2 -3.2 1.3 
 Q3 5.8 4.0 5.0 4.0 1.0 3.8 3.0 -2.4 1.4 
 Q4 6.0 3.9 5.1 4.1 1.0 3.8 2.6 -2.0 1.2 
           
1970 Q1 6.2 3.6 5.2 4.2 1.0 3.4 2.4 -2.2 1.1 
 Q2 6.4 3.7 5.4 4.3 1.1 3.8 2.4 -2.2 1.0 
 Q3 7.0 3.8 5.8 4.6 1.2 3.6 2.3 -2.1 1.0 
 Q4 7.0 3.8 5.8 4.6 1.2 4.1 2.1 -2.0 0.9 
1971 Q1 7.2 3.6 5.9 4.7 1.2 3.2 2.0 -2.0 0.8 
 Q2 7.4 3.8 6.0 4.8 1.2 3.2 1.9 -2.1 0.7 
 Q3 7.6 3.9 6.2 5.0 1.2 2.5 1.9 -2.2 0.6 
 Q4 7.9 3.8 6.4 5.2 1.3 2.2 1.9 -2.4 0.6 
1972 Q1 8.6 3.8 6.9 5.5 1.4 2.0 1.9 -2.4 0.6 
 Q2 9.6 3.9 7.6 6.1 1.5 1.9 2.0 -2.4 0.7 
 Q3 10.0 4.1 7.9 6.3 1.6 1.8 2.1 -2.3 0.7 
 Q4 10.8 4.1 8.4 6.8 1.7 1.5 2.0 -2.2 0.7 
1973 Q1 11.7 4.2 9.1 7.3 1.8 1.3 2.0 -2.2 0.8 
 Q2 13.5 4.3 10.4 8.3 2.1 0.3 1.8 -1.9 0.7 
 Q3 13.8 4.5 10.6 8.5 2.1 1.0 1.6 -1.8 0.6 




  5 Year 20 Year Sim Sim Sim Sim 15 year 10yr F/C Sim 
  Inflation Trailing Inf L-T Inflation real rates Trailing Real L-T 
  Window Inflation Gap Inf. Exp. RP (Prior to '81) RG Growth Exp. 
           
1974 Q1 14.2 4.6 10.9 8.7 2.2 3.7 1.0 -0.7 0.5 
 Q2 14.2 4.9 11.0 8.8 2.2 4.9 0.7 -0.5 0.4 
 Q3 14.6 5.0 11.3 9.1 2.3 4.7 0.4 0.0 0.3 
 Q4 15.3 5.2 11.8 9.5 2.4 6.2 -0.2 0.9 0.1 
1975 Q1 16.0 5.3 12.4 9.9 2.5 1.9 -0.8 1.7 0.0 
 Q2 16.6 5.9 12.9 10.3 2.6 2.0 -1.2 2.2 -0.2 
 Q3 16.4 6.0 12.8 10.3 2.6 2.0 -1.4 2.4 -0.3 
 Q4 16.3 6.1 12.7 10.2 2.5 2.3 -1.7 2.8 -0.4 
1976 Q1 16.2 6.2 12.7 10.2 2.5 1.6 -2.0 3.0 -0.5 
 Q2 16.2 6.4 12.7 10.2 2.5 1.4 -1.9 3.3 -0.3 
 Q3 16.1 6.5 12.8 10.2 2.6 2.5 -1.7 3.3 -0.2 
 Q4 15.8 6.7 12.5 10.0 2.5 2.2 -1.8 3.8 -0.1 
1977 Q1 15.5 6.8 12.4 9.9 2.5 0.5 -1.8 4.2 0.0 
 Q2 15.1 7.0 12.2 9.7 2.4 1.0 -1.8 4.4 0.0 
 Q3 16.0 7.1 12.8 10.3 2.6 -1.9 -1.7 4.4 0.1 
 Q4 15.4 7.1 12.4 9.9 2.5 -1.7 -1.6 4.4 0.2 
1978 Q1 15.2 7.3 12.3 9.8 2.5 -0.7 -1.7 4.5 0.2 
 Q2 14.1 7.4 11.6 9.3 2.3 1.0 -1.7 4.8 0.2 
 Q3 14.0 7.5 11.5 9.2 2.3 1.0 -1.7 4.8 0.3 
 Q4 13.5 7.5 11.2 9.0 2.2 1.3 -1.8 4.8 0.2 
1979 Q1 13.5 7.7 11.3 9.0 2.3 -0.4 -1.8 5.0 0.3 
 Q2 13.7 8.0 11.4 9.1 2.3 0.1 -2.3 5.4 0.0 
 Q3 13.4 8.3 11.3 9.1 2.3 -0.5 -1.9 4.7 0.1 
 Q4 12.9 8.3 11.0 8.8 2.2 1.0 -1.9 5.0 0.2 
           
1980 Q1 12.3 8.5 10.6 8.5 2.1 2.2 -2.2 5.3 0.1 
 Q2 12.0 8.8 10.5 8.4 2.1 1.7 -2.2 5.4 0.1 
 Q3 11.7 8.9 10.3 8.3 2.1 1.5 -2.2 5.2 0.0 
 Q4 11.6 8.9 10.2 8.2 2.0 2.1 -2.3 5.5 0.1 
1981 Q1 11.3 8.9 10.1 8.1 2.0 2.2 -2.5 5.7 0.0 
 Q2 11.2 9.1 10.0 8.0 3.0 2.3 -2.5 6.0 0.0 
 Q3 11.1 9.3 10.0 8.0 3.5 3.1 -2.6 6.1 0.0 
 Q4 10.9 9.3 9.9 7.9 3.0 3.2 -2.6 6.2 0.1 
1982 Q1 10.4 9.4 9.5 7.6 2.3 2.9 -2.4 6.1 0.2 
 Q2 9.9 9.5 9.2 7.4 2.2 3.2 -2.2 5.8 0.2 
 Q3 8.8 9.6 8.5 6.8 0.9 3.2 -2.2 5.7 0.2 
 Q4 8.4 9.5 8.2 6.6 0.9 3.0 -2.0 5.7 0.3 
1983 Q1 7.7 9.4 7.7 6.2 1.4 2.8 -2.0 5.5 0.2 
 Q2 7.2 9.5 7.4 5.9 0.6 3.5 -1.8 5.3 0.3 
 Q3 6.9 9.6 7.2 5.7 1.1 3.4 -1.8 5.2 0.3 
 Q4 6.6 9.6 7.0 5.6 0.9 3.5 -1.9 5.1 0.2 
1984 Q1 6.1 9.6 6.6 5.3 1.0 3.7 -1.5 4.6 0.4 
 Q2 5.5 9.6 6.2 5.0 1.7 4.1 -1.4 4.5 0.4 
 Q3 5.2 9.7 6.0 4.8 2.0 3.4 -1.1 4.1 0.5 




  5 Year 20 Year Sim Sim Sim Sim 15 year 10yr F/C Sim 
  Inflation Trailing Inf L-T Inflation real rates Trailing Real L-T 
  Window Inflation Gap Inf. Exp. RP (Prior to '81) RG Growth Exp. 
           
1985 Q1 4.8 9.7 5.8 4.6 2.5 3.2 -0.6 3.8 0.7 
 Q2 4.5 9.7 5.6 4.5 2.5 3.4 -0.5 3.9 0.8 
 Q3 4.6 9.7 5.6 4.5 2.1 3.4 -0.3 3.8 0.9 
 Q4 4.6 9.7 5.6 4.5 1.9 3.6 -0.1 4.0 1.1 
1986 Q1 4.6 9.7 5.7 4.5 0.6 3.6 0.1 4.3 1.4 
 Q2 4.7 9.7 5.7 4.5 1.0 3.3 0.5 3.9 1.5 
 Q3 4.7 9.7 5.7 4.6 3.0 2.7 0.6 4.0 1.6 
 Q4 4.9 9.7 5.8 4.7 1.9 3.7 0.7 3.9 1.7 
1987 Q1 5.1 9.7 6.0 4.8 1.2 3.3 0.8 3.7 1.7 
 Q2 5.3 9.8 6.1 4.9 0.6 3.7 0.8 3.5 1.6 
 Q3 5.3 9.8 6.2 4.9 1.1 4.0 1.0 3.2 1.7 
 Q4 5.5 9.8 6.3 5.0 0.6 3.9 1.2 2.9 1.7 
1988 Q1 5.5 9.7 6.3 5.0 0.1 3.8 1.3 3.0 1.8 
 Q2 5.8 9.8 6.5 5.2 0.3 3.9 1.7 2.6 1.9 
 Q3 6.3 9.8 6.8 5.5 -0.1 3.9 1.8 2.4 2.0 
 Q4 6.2 9.8 6.8 5.4 0.0 3.8 2.1 2.3 2.2 
1989 Q1 6.3 9.8 6.9 5.5 0.0 3.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 
 Q2 6.5 9.9 7.0 5.6 0.3 3.7 2.4 2.0 2.3 
 Q3 6.5 10.0 7.0 5.6 0.4 3.6 2.6 2.0 2.4 
 Q4 6.4 10.0 6.9 5.5 0.7 3.6 3.2 1.7 2.7 
           
1990 Q1 6.3 10.0 6.9 5.5 1.8 4.1 3.7 0.9 2.9 
 Q2 6.5 10.1 7.0 5.6 1.0 4.1 4.0 0.8 3.0 
 Q3 6.4 10.2 7.0 5.6 1.5 4.3 3.9 0.9 3.0 
 Q4 6.1 10.0 6.8 5.4 1.2 4.1 4.2 0.8 3.2 
1991 Q1 6.0 10.0 6.7 5.3 0.7 4.2 4.3 1.2 3.3 
 Q2 5.8 9.9 6.5 5.2 0.9 4.4 4.2 0.6 3.2 
 Q3 5.5 9.9 6.3 5.1 0.5 4.2 4.1 0.8 3.1 
 Q4 5.2 9.8 6.1 4.8 0.7 4.4 4.3 0.8 3.3 
1992 Q1 4.9 9.8 5.9 4.7 0.7 4.5 4.4 1.0 3.4 
 Q2 4.6 9.8 5.7 4.5 0.5 4.2 4.2 1.1 3.3 
 Q3 4.5 9.7 5.5 4.4 1.0 4.1 4.0 0.9 3.1 
 Q4 4.2 9.5 5.3 4.3 0.3 3.9 3.9 0.8 3.0 
1993 Q1 4.0 9.4 5.1 4.1 0.6 3.6 3.8 0.9 2.9 
 Q2 3.4 9.3 4.7 3.8 0.5 3.7 3.7 1.0 2.9 
 Q3 3.1 9.3 4.5 3.6 0.4 3.2 3.5 1.0 2.8 
 Q4 3.0 9.1 4.4 3.5 -0.9 3.9 3.5 1.0 2.7 
1994 Q1 2.9 8.9 4.3 3.4 1.1 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.7 
 Q2 2.7 8.6 4.0 3.2 1.6 3.9 3.8 1.1 3.0 
 Q3 2.7 8.5 4.0 3.2 1.6 3.9 3.3 1.1 2.6 
 Q4 2.6 8.3 3.9 3.1 1.7 3.9 3.2 1.2 2.6 
1995 Q1 2.6 8.0 3.8 3.1 1.5 3.9 3.5 1.2 2.8 
 Q2 2.5 7.6 3.6 2.9 1.8 3.8 3.6 1.4 3.0 
 Q3 2.7 7.5 3.8 3.0 1.7 3.7 3.6 1.6 3.0 




  5 Year 20 Year Sim Sim Sim Sim 15 year 10yr F/C Sim 
  Inflation Trailing Inf L-T Inflation real rates Trailing Real L-T 




'81) RG Growth Exp. 
           
1996 Q1 2.9 7.1 3.8 3.1 1.5 3.8 4.3 1.5 3.5 
 Q2 3.0 7.0 3.8 3.1 1.3 3.8 4.6 1.5 3.6 
 Q3 3.0 6.9 3.8 3.0 1.3 3.7 4.8 1.3 3.7 
 Q4 3.0 6.7 3.8 3.0 1.2 3.6 5.0 1.2 3.9 
1997 Q1 2.9 6.4 3.6 2.9 1.4 3.7 4.9 1.3 3.8 
 Q2 2.7 6.3 3.5 2.8 0.8 3.6 4.9 1.3 3.8 
 Q3 2.8 6.3 3.5 2.8 0.6 3.3 4.8 1.5 3.8 
 Q4 2.8 6.2 3.5 2.8 0.6 3.0 4.7 1.6 3.8 
1998 Q1 2.7 6.2 3.4 2.7 0.4 2.9 4.8 1.4 3.8 
 Q2 2.7 6.1 3.4 2.7 0.5 2.6 4.7 1.6 3.8 
 Q3 2.7 6.1 3.4 2.7 -0.3 2.5 4.7 1.6 3.8 
 Q4 2.7 5.9 3.4 2.7 -0.2 2.0 4.7 1.7 3.8 
1999 Q1 2.6 5.8 3.3 2.6 0.4 1.8 4.4 1.6 3.6 
 Q2 2.7 5.6 3.3 2.6 0.4 2.0 4.2 1.9 3.5 
 Q3 2.6 5.3 3.1 2.5 0.6 2.1 4.0 1.8 3.3 
 Q4 2.3 5.2 2.9 2.4 0.9 1.8 3.8 1.8 3.2 
           
2000 Q1 2.3 5.0 2.9 2.3 0.9 1.8 3.2 2.4 3.0 
 Q2 2.3 4.8 2.8 2.2 1.0 1.7 3.0 2.7 2.9 
 Q3 2.2 4.7 2.7 2.2 1.0 1.9 2.9 2.7 2.9 
 Q4 2.2 4.6 2.7 2.2 0.8 1.8 2.9 2.7 2.8 
2001 Q1 2.3 4.5 2.7 2.2 0.6 2.1 3.1 2.5 2.9 
 Q2 2.1 4.3 2.5 2.0 1.0 2.3 2.4 3.1 2.6 
 Q3 2.1 4.2 2.5 2.0 0.8 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.6 
 Q4 2.2 4.1 2.6 2.1 0.9 2.2 2.3 3.1 2.5 
2002 Q1 2.4 4.0 2.7 2.1 1.0 2.3 2.3 3.0 2.5 
 Q2 2.4 3.9 2.7 2.1 0.9 2.2 2.0 3.2 2.3 
 Q3 2.5 3.9 2.7 2.2 0.4 2.1 1.7 3.4 2.2 
 Q4 2.6 3.9 2.8 2.2 0.3 2.2 1.5 3.5 2.1 
2003 Q1 2.5 3.9 2.7 2.2 0.6 2.0 1.4 3.7 2.1 
 Q2 2.4 3.9 2.6 2.1 0.7 2.0 1.2 3.7 2.0 
 Q3 2.4 3.8 2.6 2.1 0.9 2.0 1.0 3.8 1.9 
 Q4 2.4 3.8 2.6 2.1 1.0 1.9 1.0 3.9 1.8 
2004 Q1 2.5 3.8 2.4 2.0 1.2 1.6 0.8 4.0 1.8 
 Q2 2.4 3.8 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.8 0.9 3.9 1.8 
 Q3 2.5 3.7 2.4 1.9 1.2 1.6 0.9 3.8 1.8 
 Q4 2.8 3.8 2.9 2.3 0.8 1.5 0.7 3.8 1.6 
2005 Q1 2.8 3.7 2.6 2.1 1.0 1.7 0.7 3.5 1.6 
 Q2 2.7 3.6 2.5 2.0 0.9 1.4 1.0 3.2 1.7 
 Q3 2.7 3.6 2.4 1.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 3.0 1.8 




Table C - Simulated equity risk premium    
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)    (6)   
  Historic Long-term 1st Year Expected  Expected  Ex-ante 
  Equity Exp div growth Expected 12 month - Bond   = Equity risk 
  Yield (nominal) Yield equity return  Return  Premium 
          
1963 Q4 4.08 5.3 4.30 9.6  5.8  3.8 
1964 Q1 4.29 5.0 4.51 9.6  5.9  3.7 
 Q2 4.49 5.4 4.73 10.1  6.1  4.0 
 Q3 4.50 5.5 4.75 10.2  6.1  4.2 
 Q4 5.18 5.2 5.45 10.7  6.3  4.4 
1965 Q1 5.36 5.2 5.64 10.8  6.4  4.4 
 Q2 5.69 5.0 5.97 11.0  6.7  4.3 
 Q3 5.40 4.9 5.66 10.5  6.2  4.3 
 Q4 5.23 4.6 5.47 10.0  6.5  3.6 
1966 Q1 5.24 4.4 5.47 9.8  6.7  3.2 
 Q2 4.94 4.7 5.17 9.9  6.9  3.0 
 Q3 5.84 4.9 6.13 11.1  7.0  4.0 
 Q4 5.79 5.0 6.08 11.1  6.7  4.4 
1967 Q1 5.48 5.0 5.76 10.8  6.4  4.4 
 Q2 5.00 5.0 5.25 10.3  6.8  3.5 
 Q3 4.65 5.1 4.89 10.0  6.9  3.2 
 Q4 4.38 5.3 4.61 9.9  7.1  2.8 
1968 Q1 3.92 5.5 4.14 9.6  7.2  2.5 
 Q2 3.47 5.2 3.65 8.9  7.8  1.1 
 Q3 3.31 5.2 3.48 8.7  7.5  1.3 
 Q4 3.24 5.3 3.41 8.7  8.0  0.7 
1969 Q1 3.44 5.3 3.62 9.0  8.7  0.3 
 Q2 4.02 5.2 4.23 9.5  9.2  0.3 
 Q3 4.09 5.4 4.31 9.7  8.9  0.8 
 Q4 3.85 5.3 4.05 9.3  8.9  0.5 
          
1970 Q1 4.07 5.2 4.28 9.5  8.6  0.9 
 Q2 4.72 5.3 4.97 10.2  9.2  1.1 
 Q3 4.31 5.6 4.55 10.2  9.4  0.8 
 Q4 4.39 5.5 4.63 10.2  9.9  0.3 
1971 Q1 4.20 5.5 4.43 9.9  9.1  0.8 
 Q2 3.64 5.5 3.84 9.3  9.2  0.1 
 Q3 3.40 5.6 3.59 9.2  8.7  0.5 
 Q4 3.25 5.7 3.44 9.2  8.6  0.5 
1972 Q1 2.96 6.2 3.14 9.3  8.9  0.4 
 Q2 3.22 6.8 3.44 10.2  9.5  0.7 
 Q3 3.40 7.1 3.64 10.7  9.7  1.0 
 Q4 3.15 7.5 3.39 10.9  10.0  0.9 
1973 Q1 3.69 8.1 3.99 12.0  10.4  1.7 
 Q2 3.67 9.0 4.00 13.0  10.6  2.3 
 Q3 3.93 9.1 4.29 13.4  11.6  1.8 




  Historic Long-term 1st Year Expected  Expected  Ex-ante 
  Equity Exp div growth Expected 12 month - Bond   = Equity risk 
  Yield (nominal) Yield equity return  Return  Premium 
          
1974 Q1 6.17 9.2 6.74 16.0  14.6  1.3 
 Q2 7.31 9.2 7.98 17.1  15.9  1.3 
 Q3 10.15 9.4 11.10 20.5  16.1  4.4 
 Q4 11.71 9.6 12.83 22.4  18.0  4.4 
1975 Q1 6.70 9.9 7.36 17.2  14.3  2.9 
 Q2 6.51 10.1 7.17 17.3  14.9  2.4 
 Q3 5.91 10.0 6.50 16.5  14.9  1.6 
 Q4 5.47 9.8 6.01 15.8  15.0  0.8 
1976 Q1 5.35 9.7 5.87 15.6  14.3  1.2 
 Q2 5.91 9.9 6.49 16.4  14.1  2.3 
 Q3 7.12 10.0 7.83 17.8  15.3  2.6 
 Q4 6.42 9.9 7.06 17.0  14.7  2.3 
1977 Q1 5.69 9.9 6.25 16.1  12.9  3.3 
 Q2 5.53 9.8 6.07 15.8  13.2  2.6 
 Q3 4.89 10.4 5.40 15.8  10.9  4.9 
 Q4 5.28 10.1 5.81 15.9  10.7  5.2 
1978 Q1 5.64 10.0 6.21 16.3  11.6  4.6 
 Q2 5.65 9.5 6.19 15.7  12.6  3.1 
 Q3 5.43 9.5 5.94 15.4  12.5  2.9 
 Q4 5.79 9.2 6.32 15.5  12.5  3.0 
1979 Q1 4.94 9.3 5.40 14.7  10.9  3.8 
 Q2 5.32 9.2 5.81 15.0  11.6  3.4 
 Q3 5.96 9.1 6.51 15.7  10.8  4.8 
 Q4 6.87 9.0 7.49 16.5  12.0  4.5 
          
1980 Q1 6.91 8.5 7.50 16.0  12.8  3.2 
 Q2 6.40 8.4 6.94 15.4  12.2  3.2 
 Q3 6.12 8.3 6.63 14.9  11.8  3.1 
 Q4 6.10 8.2 6.60 14.8  12.3  2.5 
1981 Q1 5.78 8.0 6.24 14.3  12.3  2.0 
 Q2 5.66 8.0 6.12 14.2  13.3  0.9 
 Q3 6.57 8.1 7.10 15.2  14.6  0.5 
 Q4 5.89 8.0 6.36 14.3  14.1  0.2 
1982 Q1 5.80 7.8 6.25 14.1  12.8  1.3 
 Q2 6.09 7.6 6.55 14.1  12.8  1.3 
 Q3 5.50 7.0 5.88 12.9  10.9  2.0 
 Q4 5.26 6.8 5.62 12.5  10.4  2.1 
1983 Q1 4.94 6.4 5.26 11.7  10.3  1.3 
 Q2 4.56 6.2 4.84 11.1  10.0  1.1 
 Q3 4.80 6.0 5.09 11.1  10.2  0.9 
 Q4 4.62 5.8 4.89 10.7  10.0  0.7 
1984 Q1 4.38 5.7 4.63 10.3  10.0  0.3 
 Q2 4.87 5.4 5.13 10.5  10.8  -0.3 
 Q3 4.68 5.3 4.93 10.3  10.3  0.0 




  Historic Long-term 1st Year Expected  Expected  Ex-ante 
  Equity Exp div growth Expected 12 month - Bond   = Equity risk 
  Yield (nominal) Yield equity return  Return  Premium 
          
1985 Q1 4.47 5.4 4.71 10.1  10.3  -0.2 
 Q2 4.80 5.3 5.05 10.4  10.4  -0.1 
 Q3 4.63 5.4 4.88 10.3  10.0  0.3 
 Q4 4.34 5.7 4.59 10.2  10.0  0.2 
1986 Q1 3.69 5.9 3.91 9.8  8.8  1.0 
 Q2 3.87 6.1 4.10 10.2  8.9  1.3 
 Q3 4.17 6.2 4.43 10.6  10.3  0.3 
 Q4 3.98 6.3 4.23 10.6  10.3  0.3 
1987 Q1 3.41 6.5 3.63 10.1  9.2  0.9 
 Q2 3.08 6.5 3.28 9.8  9.2  0.7 
 Q3 3.03 6.6 3.23 9.8  10.0  -0.2 
 Q4 4.33 6.7 4.62 11.4  9.5  1.9 
1988 Q1 4.31 6.8 4.60 11.4  9.0  2.5 
 Q2 4.22 7.1 4.52 11.7  9.4  2.3 
 Q3 4.47 7.5 4.80 12.3  9.3  3.0 
 Q4 4.69 7.6 5.05 12.7  9.2  3.5 
1989 Q1 4.19 7.9 4.52 12.4  9.0  3.4 
 Q2 4.20 7.9 4.53 12.5  9.5  2.9 
 Q3 4.07 8.0 4.40 12.4  9.6  2.8 
 Q4 4.19 8.3 4.54 12.8  9.8  3.0 
1990 Q1 4.74 8.4 5.14 13.5  11.4  2.1 
 Q2 4.67 8.6 5.07 13.7  10.7  3.0 
 Q3 5.76 8.6 6.25 14.8  11.3  3.5 
 Q4 5.46 8.6 5.93 14.6  10.7  3.9 
1991 Q1 4.77 8.7 5.18 13.9  10.2  3.7 
 Q2 5.00 8.3 5.42 13.8  10.5  3.3 
 Q3 4.62 8.2 5.00 13.2  9.7  3.5 
 Q4 4.93 8.1 5.33 13.4  10.0  3.4 
1992 Q1 5.04 8.1 5.45 13.5  10.0  3.6 
 Q2 4.81 7.8 5.19 13.0  9.3  3.7 
 Q3 4.88 7.5 5.25 12.8  9.5  3.2 
 Q4 4.31 7.3 4.62 11.9  8.5  3.4 
1993 Q1 4.13 7.0 4.42 11.5  8.3  3.2 
 Q2 4.06 6.7 4.33 11.0  8.0  3.0 
 Q3 3.87 6.4 4.12 10.5  7.3  3.2 
 Q4 3.46 6.3 3.68 9.9  6.5  3.4 
1994 Q1 3.76 6.1 3.99 10.1  8.0  2.1 
 Q2 4.09 6.2 4.34 10.6  8.8  1.7 
 Q3 4.00 5.9 4.23 10.1  8.6  1.5 
 Q4 4.02 5.8 4.25 10.0  8.7  1.3 
1995 Q1 4.15 5.8 4.39 10.2  8.4  1.8 
 Q2 4.04 5.9 4.28 10.2  8.5  1.7 
 Q3 3.85 6.0 4.08 10.1  8.4  1.7 




  Historic Long-term 1st Year Expected  Expected  Ex-ante 
  Equity Exp div growth Expected 12 month - Bond   = Equity risk 
  Yield (nominal) Yield equity return  Return  Premium 
          
1996 Q1 3.86 6.5 4.11 10.7  8.4  2.2 
 Q2 3.91 6.7 4.17 10.9  8.2  2.7 
 Q3 3.82 6.8 4.08 10.9  8.0  2.8 
 Q4 3.76 6.9 4.02 10.9  7.8  3.1 
1997 Q1 3.64 6.7 3.89 10.6  8.0  2.6 
 Q2 3.55 6.6 3.79 10.4  7.2  3.2 
 Q3 3.17 6.6 3.38 10.0  6.8  3.2 
 Q4 3.23 6.6 3.44 10.0  6.5  3.6 
1998 Q1 2.36 6.6 2.51 9.1  6.0  3.1 
 Q2 2.41 6.5 2.57 9.1  5.8  3.3 
 Q3 2.84 6.5 3.02 9.5  4.9  4.6 
 Q4 2.50 6.5 2.66 9.1  4.5  4.6 
1999 Q1 2.34 6.2 2.48 8.7  4.8  3.9 
 Q2 2.26 6.1 2.40 8.5  5.0  3.5 
 Q3 2.41 5.8 2.55 8.4  5.2  3.1 
 Q4 2.12 5.5 2.24 7.8  5.0  2.8 
          
2000 Q1 2.11 5.3 2.22 7.5  4.9  2.6 
 Q2 2.16 5.1 2.27 7.4  4.9  2.5 
 Q3 2.17 5.0 2.28 7.3  5.1  2.2 
 Q4 2.23 5.0 2.34 7.3  4.7  2.6 
2001 Q1 2.53 5.0 2.66 7.7  4.9  2.8 
 Q2 2.42 4.6 2.53 7.2  5.4  1.8 
 Q3 2.87 4.6 3.00 7.6  5.1  2.5 
 Q4 2.63 4.6 2.75 7.3  5.2  2.1 
2002 Q1 2.66 4.6 2.78 7.4  5.5  1.9 
 Q2 2.98 4.5 3.11 7.6  5.2  2.4 
 Q3 3.73 4.4 3.89 8.3  4.7  3.6 
 Q4 3.55 4.4 3.70 8.1  4.7  3.3 
2003 Q1 3.87 4.2 4.03 8.3  4.8  3.5 
 Q2 3.43 4.0 3.57 7.6  4.8  2.8 
 Q3 3.36 4.0 3.49 7.4  5.0  2.5 
 Q4 3.10 3.9 3.22 7.2  5.0  2.1 
2004 Q1 3.13 3.7 3.25 7.0  4.7  2.2 
 Q2 3.16 3.7 3.28 7.0  4.9  2.1 
 Q3 3.16 3.7 3.28 6.9  4.7  2.2 
 Q4 3.05 3.9 3.17 7.1  4.5  2.6 
2005 Q1 3.09 3.6 3.20 6.8  4.7  2.1 
 Q2 3.10 3.7 3.22 6.9  4.3  2.6 
 Q3 2.99 3.7 3.10 6.8  4.4  2.5 




Table D - Analysis of the ex-ante equity risk premium  
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
  First year  Simulated  Simulated  Simulated  Ex-ante 
  Expected  + Long-term real  - Real rates  -  Inflation  = Equity risk 
  div yield  Dividend growth  (actual from '81)  Risk Premium  Premium 
           
1963 Q4 4.30  2.6  2.4  0.7  3.8 
1964 Q1 4.51  2.5  2.8  0.6  3.7 
 Q2 4.73  2.6  2.6  0.7  4.0 
 Q3 4.75  2.7  2.5  0.7  4.2 
 Q4 5.45  2.6  3.0  0.7  4.4 
1965 Q1 5.64  2.5  3.1  0.7  4.4 
 Q2 5.97  2.2  3.2  0.7  4.3 
 Q3 5.66  2.1  2.8  0.7  4.3 
 Q4 5.47  1.9  3.1  0.7  3.6 
1966 Q1 5.47  1.7  3.4  0.7  3.2 
 Q2 5.17  1.8  3.3  0.7  3.0 
 Q3 6.13  1.9  3.3  0.8  4.0 
 Q4 6.08  1.9  2.8  0.8  4.4 
1967 Q1 5.76  1.9  2.5  0.8  4.4 
 Q2 5.25  1.9  2.9  0.8  3.5 
 Q3 4.89  2.1  3.0  0.8  3.2 
 Q4 4.61  2.2  3.2  0.8  2.8 
1968 Q1 4.14  2.3  3.1  0.8  2.5 
 Q2 3.65  2.0  3.7  0.8  1.1 
 Q3 3.48  1.9  3.3  0.8  1.3 
 Q4 3.41  1.8  3.6  0.9  0.7 
1969 Q1 3.62  1.6  4.0  0.9  0.3 
 Q2 4.23  1.3  4.3  1.0  0.3 
 Q3 4.31  1.4  3.8  1.0  0.8 
 Q4 4.05  1.2  3.8  1.0  0.5 
           
1970 Q1 4.28  1.1  3.4  1.0  0.9 
 Q2 4.97  1.0  3.8  1.1  1.1 
 Q3 4.55  1.0  3.6  1.2  0.8 
 Q4 4.63  0.9  4.1  1.2  0.3 
1971 Q1 4.43  0.8  3.2  1.2  0.8 
 Q2 3.84  0.7  3.2  1.2  0.1 
 Q3 3.59  0.6  2.5  1.2  0.5 
 Q4 3.44  0.6  2.2  1.3  0.5 
1972 Q1 3.14  0.6  2.0  1.4  0.4 
 Q2 3.44  0.7  1.9  1.5  0.7 
 Q3 3.64  0.7  1.8  1.6  1.0 
 Q4 3.39  0.7  1.5  1.7  0.9 
1973 Q1 3.99  0.8  1.3  1.8  1.7 
 Q2 4.00  0.7  0.3  2.1  2.3 
 Q3 4.29  0.6  1.0  2.1  1.8 




  First year  Simulated  Simulated  Simulated  Implied 
  Expected  + Long-term real  - Real rates  -  Inflation  = Equity risk 
  div yield  Dividend growth  (actual from '81)  Risk Premium  Premium 
           
1974 Q1 6.74  0.5  3.7  2.2  1.3 
 Q2 7.98  0.4  4.9  2.2  1.3 
 Q3 11.10  0.3  4.7  2.3  4.4 
 Q4 12.83  0.1  6.2  2.4  4.4 
1975 Q1 7.36  0.0  1.9  2.5  2.9 
 Q2 7.17  -0.2  2.0  2.6  2.4 
 Q3 6.50  -0.3  2.0  2.6  1.6 
 Q4 6.01  -0.4  2.3  2.5  0.8 
1976 Q1 5.87  -0.5  1.6  2.5  1.2 
 Q2 6.49  -0.3  1.4  2.5  2.3 
 Q3 7.83  -0.2  2.5  2.6  2.6 
 Q4 7.06  -0.1  2.2  2.5  2.3 
1977 Q1 6.25  0.0  0.5  2.5  3.3 
 Q2 6.07  0.0  1.0  2.4  2.6 
 Q3 5.40  0.1  -1.9  2.6  4.9 
 Q4 5.81  0.2  -1.7  2.5  5.2 
1978 Q1 6.21  0.2  -0.7  2.5  4.6 
 Q2 6.19  0.2  1.0  2.3  3.1 
 Q3 5.94  0.3  1.0  2.3  2.9 
 Q4 6.32  0.2  1.3  2.2  3.0 
1979 Q1 5.40  0.3  -0.4  2.3  3.8 
 Q2 5.81  0.0  0.1  2.3  3.4 
 Q3 6.51  0.1  -0.5  2.3  4.8 
 Q4 7.49  0.2  1.0  2.2  4.5 
           
1980 Q1 7.50  0.1  2.2  2.1  3.2 
 Q2 6.94  0.1  1.7  2.1  3.2 
 Q3 6.63  0.0  1.5  2.1  3.1 
 Q4 6.60  0.1  2.1  2.0  2.5 
1981 Q1 6.24  0.0  2.2  2.0  2.0 
 Q2 6.12  0.0  2.3  3.0  0.9 
 Q3 7.10  0.0  3.1  3.5  0.5 
 Q4 6.36  0.1  3.2  3.0  0.2 
1982 Q1 6.25  0.2  2.9  2.3  1.3 
 Q2 6.55  0.2  3.2  2.2  1.3 
 Q3 5.88  0.2  3.2  0.9  2.0 
 Q4 5.62  0.3  3.0  0.9  2.1 
1983 Q1 5.26  0.2  2.8  1.4  1.3 
 Q2 4.84  0.3  3.5  0.6  1.1 
 Q3 5.09  0.3  3.4  1.1  0.9 
 Q4 4.89  0.2  3.5  0.9  0.7 
1984 Q1 4.63  0.4  3.7  1.0  0.3 
 Q2 5.13  0.4  4.1  1.7  -0.3 
 Q3 4.93  0.5  3.4  2.0  0.0 
 Q4 4.66  0.7  3.1  2.3  -0.1 
1985 Q1 4.71  0.7  3.2  2.5  -0.2 
 Q2 5.05  0.8  3.4  2.5  -0.1 
 Q3 4.88  0.9  3.4  2.1  0.3 




  First year  Simulated  Simulated  Simulated  Implied 
  Expected  + Long-term real  - Real rates  -  Inflation  = Equity risk 
  div yield  Dividend growth  (actual from '81)  Risk Premium  Premium 
           
1986 Q1 3.91  1.4  3.6  0.6  1.0 
 Q2 4.10  1.5  3.3  1.0  1.3 
 Q3 4.43  1.6  2.7  3.0  0.3 
 Q4 4.23  1.7  3.7  1.9  0.3 
1987 Q1 3.63  1.7  3.3  1.2  0.9 
 Q2 3.28  1.6  3.7  0.6  0.7 
 Q3 3.23  1.7  4.0  1.1  -0.2 
 Q4 4.62  1.7  3.9  0.6  1.9 
1988 Q1 4.60  1.8  3.8  0.1  2.5 
 Q2 4.52  1.9  3.9  0.3  2.3 
 Q3 4.80  2.0  3.9  -0.1  3.0 
 Q4 5.05  2.2  3.8  0.0  3.5 
1989 Q1 4.52  2.4  3.5  0.0  3.4 
 Q2 4.53  2.3  3.7  0.3  2.9 
 Q3 4.40  2.4  3.6  0.4  2.8 
 Q4 4.54  2.7  3.6  0.7  3.0 
1990 Q1 5.14  2.9  4.1  1.8  2.1 
 Q2 5.07  3.0  4.1  1.0  3.0 
 Q3 6.25  3.0  4.3  1.5  3.5 
 Q4 5.93  3.2  4.1  1.2  3.9 
1991 Q1 5.18  3.3  4.2  0.7  3.7 
 Q2 5.42  3.2  4.4  0.9  3.3 
 Q3 5.00  3.1  4.2  0.5  3.5 
 Q4 5.33  3.3  4.4  0.7  3.4 
1992 Q1 5.45  3.4  4.5  0.7  3.6 
 Q2 5.19  3.3  4.2  0.5  3.7 
 Q3 5.25  3.1  4.1  1.0  3.2 
 Q4 4.62  3.0  3.9  0.3  3.4 
1993 Q1 4.42  2.9  3.6  0.6  3.2 
 Q2 4.33  2.9  3.7  0.5  3.0 
 Q3 4.12  2.8  3.2  0.4  3.2 
 Q4 3.68  2.7  3.9  -0.9  3.4 
1994 Q1 3.99  2.7  3.5  1.1  2.1 
 Q2 4.34  3.0  3.9  1.6  1.7 
 Q3 4.23  2.6  3.9  1.6  1.5 
 Q4 4.25  2.6  3.9  1.7  1.3 
1995 Q1 4.39  2.8  3.9  1.5  1.8 
 Q2 4.28  3.0  3.8  1.8  1.7 
 Q3 4.08  3.0  3.7  1.7  1.7 




  First year  Simulated  Simulated  Simulated  Implied 
  Expected  + Long-term real  - Real rates  -  Inflation  = Equity risk 
  div yield  Dividend growth  (actual from '81)  Risk Premium  Premium 
           
1996 Q1 4.11  3.5  3.8  1.5  2.2 
 Q2 4.17  3.6  3.8  1.3  2.7 
 Q3 4.08  3.7  3.7  1.3  2.8 
 Q4 4.02  3.9  3.6  1.2  3.1 
1997 Q1 3.89  3.8  3.7  1.4  2.6 
 Q2 3.79  3.8  3.6  0.8  3.2 
 Q3 3.38  3.8  3.3  0.6  3.2 
 Q4 3.44  3.8  3.0  0.6  3.6 
1998 Q1 2.51  3.8  2.9  0.4  3.1 
 Q2 2.57  3.8  2.6  0.5  3.3 
 Q3 3.02  3.8  2.5  -0.3  4.6 
 Q4 2.66  3.8  2.0  -0.2  4.6 
1999 Q1 2.48  3.6  1.8  0.4  3.9 
 Q2 2.40  3.5  2.0  0.4  3.5 
 Q3 2.55  3.3  2.1  0.6  3.1 
 Q4 2.24  3.2  1.8  0.9  2.8 
           
2000 Q1 2.22  3.0  1.8  0.9  2.6 
 Q2 2.27  2.9  1.7  1.0  2.5 
 Q3 2.28  2.9  1.9  1.0  2.2 
 Q4 2.34  2.8  1.8  0.8  2.6 
2001 Q1 2.66  2.9  2.1  0.6  2.8 
 Q2 2.53  2.6  2.3  1.0  1.8 
 Q3 3.00  2.6  2.4  0.8  2.5 
 Q4 2.75  2.5  2.2  0.9  2.1 
2002 Q1 2.78  2.5  2.3  1.0  1.9 
 Q2 3.11  2.3  2.2  0.9  2.4 
 Q3 3.89  2.2  2.1  0.4  3.6 
 Q4 3.70  2.1  2.2  0.3  3.3 
2003 Q1 4.03  2.1  2.0  0.6  3.5 
 Q2 3.57  2.0  2.0  0.7  2.8 
 Q3 3.49  1.9  2.0  0.9  2.5 
 Q4 3.22  1.8  1.9  1.0  2.1 
2004 Q1 3.25  1.8  1.6  1.2  2.2 
 Q2 3.28  1.8  1.8  1.3  2.1 
 Q3 3.28  1.8  1.6  1.2  2.2 
 Q4 3.17  1.6  1.5  0.8  2.6 
2005 Q1 3.20  1.6  1.7  1.0  2.1 
 Q2 3.22  1.7  1.4  0.9  2.6 
 Q3 3.10  1.8  1.3  1.2  2.5 




Table E- Analysis of equity returns    
  (1)     (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
  Unexpected    Unexpected return due to: …....Contributions to 12m re-rating………… 
  Equity Unexpected Unexpected Change in Change in Change in Change in 
  Return div growth re-rating Real rates Real growth IRP ERP 
         
1963 Q4 9.1 2.0 7.1 -6.3 0.9 0.2 12.2 
1964 Q1 9.9 10.4 -0.5 -12.1 -0.4 1.9 10.1 
 Q2 3.2 7.5 -4.3 -17.9 1.7 0.3 11.6 
 Q3 5.4 15.0 -9.6 -15.0 1.5 -0.1 4.0 
 Q4 -11.7 13.4 -25.1 -12.1 -0.1 0.2 -13.2 
1965 Q1 -10.8 12.6 -23.4 -6.3 -0.6 -0.8 -15.6 
 Q2 -18.1 5.2 -23.3 -10.0 -7.2 -0.2 -5.8 
 Q3 -14.2 4.0 -18.2 -4.9 -10.6 0.2 -3.0 
 Q4 1.6 2.7 -1.0 -2.6 -13.3 -0.3 15.1 
1966 Q1 1.6 -0.8 2.4 -6.4 -14.8 0.0 23.7 
 Q2 13.9 -1.8 15.7 -2.0 -8.5 -0.6 26.8 
 Q3 -10.9 -3.2 -7.7 -8.1 -3.0 -1.0 4.4 
 Q4 -14.1 -4.4 -9.7 6.1 0.0 -1.7 -14.1 
1967 Q1 -11.5 -7.3 -4.3 15.8 2.6 -2.1 -20.6 
 Q2 -9.5 -8.3 -1.2 6.1 2.6 -0.8 -9.1 
 Q3 16.3 -8.5 24.8 4.3 3.6 -0.2 17.1 
 Q4 23.5 -7.9 31.4 -9.5 6.1 0.3 34.5 
1968 Q1 35.0 -4.9 39.9 -15.7 8.8 -0.4 47.2 
 Q2 40.6 -4.0 44.6 -22.1 2.5 -0.8 65.0 
 Q3 38.7 -2.8 41.5 -8.1 -5.0 -1.9 56.5 
 Q4 38.1 0.8 37.3 -13.6 -11.9 -3.1 65.9 
1969 Q1 14.1 -0.6 14.6 -26.1 -19.4 -3.8 64.0 
 Q2 -13.6 0.9 -14.5 -13.7 -18.2 -4.5 21.9 
 Q3 -20.3 -0.3 -20.0 -12.7 -13.7 -4.3 10.6 
 Q4 -20.6 -4.6 -16.0 -3.0 -14.8 -3.8 5.6 
         
1970 Q1 -17.6 -1.5 -16.1 15.6 -12.8 -2.4 -16.5 
 Q2 -16.8 -1.4 -15.4 9.7 -6.6 -1.9 -16.6 
 Q3 -6.0 -0.6 -5.3 5.7 -8.5 -3.4 0.7 
 Q4 -12.8 0.2 -13.0 -6.9 -6.9 -3.1 3.9 
1971 Q1 -6.3 -3.1 -3.2 4.1 -6.7 -3.1 2.5 
 Q2 28.3 -2.3 30.6 17.1 -8.8 -3.6 25.8 
 Q3 25.0 -2.6 27.6 32.7 -10.7 -2.8 8.4 
 Q4 36.4 -0.5 36.9 57.8 -9.7 -3.9 -7.3 
1972 Q1 47.2 2.2 45.0 42.7 -4.6 -6.8 13.7 
 Q2 17.5 3.4 14.2 41.6 0.7 -9.3 -18.8 
 Q3 4.3 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Q4 7.2 3.7 3.5 22.6 4.7 -12.2 -11.6 
1973 Q1 -19.0 2.5 -21.5 20.4 3.0 -11.5 -33.4 
 Q2 -13.8 -0.8 -13.0 45.3 -1.0 -13.9 -43.4 
 Q3 -16.0 -1.7 -14.2 20.9 -3.5 -12.4 -19.2 





  Unexpected    Unexpected return due to: …....Contributions to 12m re-rating………… 
  Equity Unexpected Unexpected Change in Change in Change in Change in 
  Return div growth re-rating Real rates Real growth IRP ERP 
1974 Q1 -45.8 -3.8 -41.9 -38.2 -3.8 -5.2 5.2 
 Q2 -54.1 0.4 -54.4 -63.5 -4.1 -1.7 14.8 
 Q3 -66.7 0.4 -67.1 -36.5 -3.1 -1.4 -26.1 
 Q4 -64.5 0.5 -65.0 -36.7 -3.1 -1.7 -23.6 
1975 Q1 -9.3 -0.7 -8.6 26.9 -8.5 -4.2 -22.7 
 Q2 12.5 -0.8 13.3 44.4 -8.7 -5.4 -16.9 
 Q3 78.7 0.2 78.6 45.6 -9.6 -4.8 47.5 
 Q4 126.8 0.9 125.9 72.2 -9.4 -3.2 66.3 
1976 Q1 29.3 1.3 28.0 6.6 -8.6 -1.4 31.4 
 Q2 11.1 -0.1 11.2 10.7 -1.7 0.4 1.7 
 Q3 -16.5 2.6 -19.1 -6.8 1.2 0.2 -13.7 
 Q4 -13.5 3.2 -16.7 1.7 4.3 0.6 -23.3 
1977 Q1 -2.2 4.6 -6.8 20.4 8.9 1.4 -37.4 
 Q2 13.1 5.2 7.9 6.4 6.3 2.0 -6.8 
 Q3 56.5 4.5 52.1 94.0 6.5 -0.1 -48.3 
 Q4 31.6 6.6 25.1 76.7 5.5 0.6 -57.7 
1978 Q1 6.7 5.7 1.0 21.6 4.1 0.3 -25.0 
 Q2 0.9 3.3 -2.4 0.3 3.9 2.0 -8.6 
 Q3 -8.5 2.7 -11.2 -55.6 2.8 4.5 37.0 
 Q4 -7.3 2.6 -9.9 -53.0 0.8 3.8 38.5 
1979 Q1 19.9 3.8 16.1 -6.2 1.0 4.0 17.3 
 Q2 8.2 1.3 6.9 16.3 -4.0 0.6 -6.0 
 Q3 2.8 13.7 -10.9 28.7 -3.3 0.6 -36.9 
 Q4 -4.0 15.5 -19.5 5.3 -0.8 0.6 -24.5 
1980 Q1 -18.2 17.8 -36.0 -43.6 -3.3 2.0 9.0 
 Q2 0.7 22.8 -22.1 -29.9 0.8 3.3 3.7 
 Q3 5.3 8.3 -3.1 -35.1 -0.9 3.2 29.8 
 Q4 18.5 4.2 14.3 -19.0 -1.7 2.5 32.5 
1981 Q1 20.3 -0.8 21.1 -0.6 -1.4 1.7 21.4 
 Q2 10.3 -3.5 13.8 -10.2 -0.8 -15.0 39.8 
 Q3 -12.7 -5.6 -7.1 -24.1 0.2 -20.7 37.6 
 Q4 -1.4 -5.1 3.7 -17.8 0.3 -16.4 37.6 
1982 Q1 -2.7 -2.3 -0.4 -10.7 3.5 -4.6 11.5 
 Q2 -7.3 0.3 -7.6 -13.9 2.5 11.6 -7.9 
 Q3 21.9 0.7 21.2 -1.5 2.6 46.8 -26.7 
 Q4 14.2 1.1 13.1 3.4 3.9 41.9 -36.2 
1983 Q1 18.3 -0.4 18.7 1.1 1.3 18.1 -1.8 
 Q2 34.5 -1.2 35.7 -7.9 2.9 34.7 6.0 
 Q3 16.2 0.5 15.7 -4.6 2.0 -4.1 22.4 
 Q4 16.3 1.3 15.0 -12.8 -1.3 -0.4 29.4 
1984 Q1 21.1 6.7 14.4 -22.9 2.9 9.9 24.6 
 Q2 0.4 7.6 -7.2 -14.6 1.9 -23.2 28.6 
 Q3 14.8 11.8 3.0 -1.7 5.1 -21.0 20.6 
 Q4 20.9 15.4 5.5 9.7 11.6 -37.2 21.3 
1985 Q1 12.5 14.9 -2.4 12.9 10.2 -39.1 13.6 
 Q2 17.5 15.7 1.8 16.6 10.9 -21.0 -4.6 
 Q3 12.0 10.8 1.2 1.8 10.2 -2.7 -7.9 




  Unexpected    Unexpected return due to: …....Contributions to 12m re-rating………… 
  Equity Unexpected Unexpected Change in Change in Change in Change in 
  Return div growth re-rating Real rates Real growth IRP ERP 
         
1986 Q1 26.3 3.3 23.0 -11.5 16.7 52.0 -34.2 
 Q2 31.9 5.4 26.5 3.1 18.2 41.1 -35.8 
 Q3 17.6 5.4 12.2 16.1 16.8 -22.3 1.7 
 Q4 17.0 6.8 10.1 -1.2 13.5 0.9 -3.0 
1987 Q1 18.3 8.9 9.4 12.3 9.1 -17.7 5.7 
 Q2 35.5 6.7 28.9 -11.1 4.0 15.3 20.7 
 Q3 51.4 8.4 43.0 -43.2 2.0 68.3 15.9 
 Q4 -1.9 7.3 -9.2 -4.8 1.0 32.5 -37.8 
1988 Q1 -16.9 6.6 -23.6 -13.7 3.8 25.3 -39.0 
 Q2 -22.8 8.1 -30.9 -5.0 7.3 7.6 -40.8 
 Q3 -28.0 9.2 -37.2 2.7 8.0 28.6 -76.6 
 Q4 0.1 9.0 -8.9 4.2 10.6 13.6 -37.3 
1989 Q1 13.6 10.2 3.3 9.5 14.1 4.0 -24.3 
 Q2 7.5 7.0 0.5 6.0 9.0 1.0 -15.4 
 Q3 16.4 5.3 11.1 8.0 10.8 -12.7 5.0 
 Q4 22.8 8.9 13.9 4.7 14.0 -18.1 13.3 
         
1990 Q1 -3.9 9.7 -13.6 -12.6 11.0 -42.3 30.3 
 Q2 -1.2 10.7 -11.9 -8.5 16.2 -17.2 -2.3 
 Q3 -25.4 8.7 -34.2 -11.8 10.5 -20.3 -12.6 
 Q4 -22.5 3.5 -26.0 -8.8 8.3 -8.8 -16.6 
1991 Q1 -1.4 -0.7 -0.7 -1.6 9.8 23.6 -32.4 
 Q2 -9.6 -2.6 -7.0 -5.7 2.8 1.1 -5.2 
 Q3 22.8 -3.2 26.0 0.3 2.8 22.1 0.9 
 Q4 6.2 -5.0 11.2 -7.2 1.4 8.5 8.4 
1992 Q1 -10.7 -5.2 -5.6 -7.9 1.2 -0.5 1.6 
 Q2 -3.9 -7.9 4.0 2.1 2.2 7.6 -8.0 
 Q3 -13.3 -7.9 -5.4 1.6 -0.4 -10.7 4.1 
 Q4 6.3 -8.1 14.4 9.9 -5.0 8.3 1.3 
1993 Q1 11.6 -10.1 21.7 19.5 -9.5 3.4 8.3 
 Q2 9.5 -8.8 18.4 12.1 -7.3 -0.4 14.0 
 Q3 17.0 -8.9 25.9 20.1 -6.8 13.4 -0.8 
 Q4 15.7 -8.6 24.3 -1.0 -6.4 33.2 -1.4 
1994 Q1 3.6 -6.3 9.9 2.0 -4.3 -12.5 24.8 
 Q2 -4.7 -3.9 -0.8 -7.3 1.8 -26.1 30.8 
 Q3 -6.2 -2.8 -3.4 -15.8 -3.3 -27.3 43.1 
 Q4 -15.8 -1.2 -14.6 1.3 -2.4 -63.7 50.2 
1995 Q1 -7.5 2.7 -10.2 -8.7 1.1 -11.2 8.5 
 Q2 4.9 3.5 1.4 3.8 0.3 -4.3 1.6 
 Q3 9.1 4.8 4.3 4.2 10.5 -2.8 -7.6 




  Unexpected    Unexpected return due to: …....Contributions to 12m re-rating………… 
  Equity Unexpected Unexpected Change in Change in Change in Change in 
  Return div growth re-rating Real rates Real growth IRP ERP 
         
1996 Q1 14.2 5.8 8.4 2.0 18.6 -0.4 -11.9 
 Q2 8.6 5.0 3.7 -0.8 17.4 13.2 -26.1 
 Q3 6.4 5.5 0.9 2.1 19.2 9.2 -29.7 
 Q4 5.5 3.7 1.8 -0.6 15.8 0.2 -13.7 
1997 Q1 7.4 0.9 6.5 4.3 10.0 3.1 -11.0 
 Q2 11.0 0.1 10.8 5.8 5.3 15.6 -15.9 
 Q3 19.3 -2.1 21.5 10.0 1.2 21.1 -10.9 
 Q4 12.7 -4.2 16.9 17.6 -2.6 15.4 -13.5 
1998 Q1 25.7 -2.1 27.7 15.7 -0.4 21.2 -8.8 
 Q2 18.9 -2.7 21.6 18.4 -0.8 5.3 -1.3 
 Q3 -11.1 -2.3 -8.8 -20.0 0.1 -23.9 35.0 
 Q4 4.3 -2.0 6.2 8.0 -0.1 6.8 -8.5 
1999 Q1 -2.6 -3.5 0.9 42.8 -9.4 0.6 -33.0 
 Q2 0.7 -6.0 6.7 26.4 -12.2 2.7 -10.3 
 Q3 13.9 -4.3 18.2 15.8 -17.2 -36.6 56.2 
 Q4 14.7 -3.7 18.4 11.1 -25.8 -50.9 84.0 
         
2000 Q1 1.0 -9.5 10.6 2.8 -25.6 -22.3 55.7 
 Q2 -3.4 -8.0 4.6 8.3 -23.7 -23.8 43.7 
 Q3 1.2 -9.5 10.7 9.1 -18.6 -17.7 37.8 
 Q4 -13.7 -8.9 -4.8 -2.9 -14.0 5.5 6.5 
2001 Q1 -18.1 -0.8 -17.4 -15.5 -2.8 9.3 -8.3 
 Q2 -15.2 -4.3 -10.8 -23.4 -11.2 -3.4 27.2 
 Q3 -27.8 -2.9 -24.9 -16.2 -8.2 8.9 -9.4 
 Q4 -20.5 -5.3 -15.2 -15.9 -10.9 -3.7 15.3 
2002 Q1 -10.9 -6.0 -4.8 -6.7 -14.4 -13.5 29.8 
 Q2 -21.7 -2.6 -19.2 5.1 -8.6 5.7 -21.4 
 Q3 -27.8 -4.7 -23.1 7.3 -9.8 9.3 -29.9 
 Q4 -29.6 -3.4 -26.2 0.7 -9.9 15.9 -32.9 
2003 Q1 -36.9 -6.0 -30.9 7.1 -9.7 10.9 -39.3 
 Q2 -17.5 -4.3 -13.2 3.1 -10.6 5.7 -11.4 
 Q3 8.0 -3.1 11.2 1.2 -10.0 -13.9 33.8 
 Q4 12.1 -2.7 14.8 8.9 -9.2 -22.3 37.4 
2004 Q1 22.3 -1.9 24.2 11.7 -8.9 -18.6 40.1 
 Q2 9.0 0.1 8.9 8.7 -4.2 -19.2 23.7 
 Q3 8.1 1.5 6.7 12.0 -2.9 -11.2 8.7 
 Q4 5.4 3.6 1.8 15.6 -7.3 7.1 -13.6 
2005 Q1 8.4 6.9 1.4 -1.4 -6.6 6.6 2.8 
 Q2 11.5 9.3 2.2 11.6 -4.3 12.7 -17.8 
 Q3 17.6 11.1 6.5 13.3 0.9 2.1 -9.8 




Table F - Analysis of bond returns     
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   (5)   (6)   
  Bond  Expected  Unexpected  …...Unexpected bond return due to… 
  total  - bond return  = bond      Change in Change in Change in  
  return  (12 m ago)  return  RRR Inflation IRP 
           
1963 Q4 1.8  5.6  -3.8  -4.3 0.4 0.1 
1964 Q1 4.3  5.8  -1.5  -7.5 5.1 1.3 
 Q2 -5.8  5.4  -11.2  -12.2 0.9 0.2 
 Q3 -4.8  5.4  -10.2  -9.9 -0.3 -0.1 
 Q4 -2.1  5.8  -7.9  -8.7 0.7 0.2 
1965 Q1 -2.1  5.9  -8.0  -5.0 -2.5 -0.6 
 Q2 -2.8  6.1  -8.9  -8.1 -0.7 -0.2 
 Q3 3.5  6.1  -2.6  -3.8 1.0 0.2 
 Q4 3.7  6.3  -2.6  -1.7 -0.7 -0.2 
1966 Q1 2.0  6.4  -4.3  -4.7 0.3 0.1 
 Q2 3.3  6.7  -3.3  -1.4 -1.6 -0.4 
 Q3 -5.2  6.2  -11.4  -7.3 -3.6 -0.9 
 Q4 3.8  6.5  -2.7  5.8 -6.5 -1.6 
1967 Q1 10.9  6.7  4.2  15.8 -8.2 -2.0 
 Q2 8.2  6.9  1.3  4.9 -2.8 -0.7 
 Q3 9.3  7.0  2.3  3.1 -0.6 -0.1 
 Q4 1.0  6.7  -5.7  -6.4 0.6 0.2 
1968 Q1 -4.1  6.4  -10.5  -9.3 -1.0 -0.3 
 Q2 -5.5  6.8  -12.3  -10.6 -1.5 -0.4 
 Q3 -1.3  6.9  -8.2  -3.9 -3.6 -0.9 
 Q4 -4.6  7.1  -11.6  -5.8 -5.0 -1.2 
1969 Q1 -10.7  7.2  -17.8  -11.1 -6.1 -1.5 
 Q2 -8.0  7.8  -15.7  -6.6 -8.0 -2.0 
 Q3 -8.4  7.5  -15.9  -6.6 -8.1 -2.0 
 Q4 -1.9  8.0  -9.9  -1.5 -7.0 -1.7 
           
1970 Q1 10.5  8.7  1.7  8.0 -4.7 -1.2 
 Q2 9.2  9.2  0.0  5.3 -4.1 -1.0 
 Q3 3.6  8.9  -5.3  2.8 -6.4 -1.6 
 Q4 -1.3  8.9  -10.2  -3.4 -5.7 -1.4 
1971 Q1 3.0  8.6  -5.6  2.0 -6.0 -1.5 
 Q2 8.7  9.2  -0.5  7.4 -5.9 -1.5 
 Q3 16.9  9.4  7.5  13.8 -4.5 -1.1 
 Q4 24.2  9.9  14.3  23.6 -6.1 -1.5 
1972 Q1 11.3  9.1  2.3  15.6 -9.5 -2.3 
 Q2 6.5  9.2  -2.8  16.0 -13.4 -3.2 
 Q3 -1.7  8.7  -10.5  8.0 -14.2 -3.4 
 Q4 -4.8  8.6  -13.4  8.3 -16.7 -4.0 
1973 Q1 -5.8  8.9  -14.6  8.7 -18.0 -4.3 
 Q2 -1.0  9.5  -10.5  21.3 -22.1 -5.2 
 Q3 -6.3  9.7  -16.1  9.2 -19.4 -4.6 




  Bond  Expected  Unexpected …...Unexpected bond return due to… 
  total  - bond return  = bond      Change in Change in Change in  
  return  (12 m ago)  return  RRR Inflation IRP 
           
1974 Q1 -18.7  10.4  -29.1  -19.3 -9.9 -2.4 
 Q2 -22.5  10.6  -33.1  -30.4 -3.2 -0.8 
 Q3 -16.2  11.6  -27.8  -24.2 -3.8 -0.9 
 Q4 -16.8  12.7  -29.5  -25.3 -4.6 -1.1 
1975 Q1 16.8  14.6  2.2  14.0 -8.5 -2.1 
 Q2 22.6  15.9  6.7  22.3 -10.5 -2.5 
 Q3 24.1  16.1  8.0  20.0 -8.1 -2.0 
 Q4 38.3  18.0  20.3  27.8 -4.8 -1.2 
1976 Q1 14.3  14.3  0.0  2.5 -2.0 -0.5 
 Q2 20.4  14.9  5.6  4.5 0.8 0.2 
 Q3 12.3  14.9  -2.6  -3.1 0.4 0.1 
 Q4 16.8  15.0  1.9  0.7 0.9 0.2 
1977 Q1 25.8  14.3  11.5  8.4 2.2 0.6 
 Q2 20.8  14.1  6.7  2.5 3.3 0.8 
 Q3 55.3  15.3  40.1  40.9 -0.5 -0.1 
 Q4 51.8  14.7  37.1  35.3 1.1 0.3 
1978 Q1 23.5  12.9  10.6  9.9 0.5 0.1 
 Q2 17.8  13.2  4.6  0.1 3.5 0.9 
 Q3 -2.2  10.9  -13.1  -21.2 8.1 2.1 
 Q4 -3.7  10.7  -14.5  -21.8 7.4 1.9 
1979 Q1 18.3  11.6  6.7  -2.5 7.4 1.9 
 Q2 21.8  12.6  9.1  7.3 1.4 0.3 
 Q3 28.5  12.5  16.0  13.9 1.5 0.4 
 Q4 16.9  12.5  4.4  2.7 1.3 0.3 
           
1980 Q1 -4.1  10.9  -15.0  -19.2 4.2 1.1 
 Q2 6.4  11.6  -5.2  -12.1 6.2 1.6 
 Q3 2.4  10.8  -8.4  -15.6 6.7 1.7 
 Q4 9.6  12.0  -2.4  -8.4 5.2 1.3 
1981 Q1 17.0  12.8  4.2  -0.2 3.4 0.9 
 Q2 4.0  12.2  -8.2  -4.6 2.9 -6.5 
 Q3 -7.7  11.8  -19.5  -12.3 1.8 -9.7 
 Q4 -0.6  12.3  -12.9  -8.1 2.1 -7.1 
1982 Q1 8.6  12.3  -3.7  -4.9 3.4 -2.1 
 Q2 17.3  13.3  4.0  -5.9 4.6 5.6 
 Q3 49.1  14.6  34.4  -0.3 9.1 23.6 
 Q4 50.2  14.1  36.0  1.5 10.7 21.1 
1983 Q1 36.4  12.8  23.6  0.7 12.8 8.8 
 Q2 40.2  12.8  27.5  -2.4 12.6 16.0 
 Q3 17.4  10.9  6.5  -1.7 10.4 -1.8 
 Q4 14.5  10.4  4.2  -5.0 9.8 -0.1 
1984 Q1 14.0  10.3  3.6  -8.2 8.3 4.2 
 Q2 3.3  10.0  -6.8  -5.9 9.8 -9.7 
 Q3 10.0  10.2  -0.3  -0.5 9.7 -8.6 
 Q4 8.5  10.0  -1.5  4.1 10.4 -14.2 
1985 Q1 6.7  10.0  -3.2  5.4 7.6 -14.7 
 Q2 14.0  10.8  3.2  6.8 5.4 -8.2 
 Q3 13.1  10.3  2.8  0.7 3.3 -1.2 




  Bond  Expected  Unexpected …...Unexpected bond return due to… 
  total  - bond return  = bond      Change in Change in Change in  
  return  (12 m ago)  return  RRR Inflation IRP 
           
1986 Q1 28.1  10.3  17.8  -4.0 1.2 21.2 
 Q2 27.3  10.4  16.9  0.9 -0.9 16.9 
 Q3 6.5  10.0  -3.5  6.6 -0.8 -8.8 
 Q4 8.0  10.0  -2.0  -0.7 -1.5 0.2 
1987 Q1 3.5  8.8  -5.3  4.4 -3.3 -6.1 
 Q2 6.1  8.9  -2.8  -3.7 -3.7 4.8 
 Q3 13.8  10.3  3.5  -10.6 -2.9 19.2 
 Q4 18.2  10.3  7.9  -2.0 -3.3 13.9 
1988 Q1 11.9  9.2  2.7  -5.8 -2.2 11.4 
 Q2 6.8  9.2  -2.4  -2.3 -3.1 3.2 
 Q3 17.8  10.0  7.9  0.8 -5.1 12.8 
 Q4 13.2  9.5  3.7  1.6 -4.1 6.5 
1989 Q1 9.3  9.0  0.3  3.8 -5.0 1.7 
 Q2 7.7  9.4  -1.6  2.3 -4.2 0.4 
 Q3 5.6  9.3  -3.7  3.2 -1.6 -5.2 
 Q4 2.4  9.2  -6.8  1.8 -1.3 -7.2 
1990 Q1 -12.6  9.0  -21.5  -6.0 -0.4 -16.2 
 Q2 -1.1  9.5  -10.6  -3.9 0.0 -6.9 
 Q3 -5.5  9.6  -15.1  -6.3 0.3 -9.7 
 Q4 2.0  9.8  -7.9  -4.7 1.1 -4.4 
1991 Q1 23.4  11.4  12.0  -0.8 1.6 11.1 
 Q2 12.7  10.7  2.0  -2.6 4.1 0.6 
 Q3 27.8  11.3  16.4  0.3 4.8 10.8 
 Q4 17.5  10.7  6.8  -3.2 5.6 4.4 
1992 Q1 12.6  10.2  2.4  -3.7 6.6 -0.2 
 Q2 23.0  10.5  12.6  1.3 6.6 4.3 
 Q3 11.7  9.7  1.9  1.1 7.0 -5.8 
 Q4 27.1  10.0  17.1  5.2 6.5 4.5 
1993 Q1 29.8  10.0  19.8  10.2 6.7 1.9 
 Q2 25.8  9.3  16.5  6.5 9.5 -0.1 
 Q3 40.8  9.5  31.3  10.2 10.5 7.8 
 Q4 38.8  8.5  30.3  0.0 9.6 18.8 
1994 Q1 12.5  8.3  4.2  1.3 9.5 -6.1 
 Q2 -1.6  8.0  -9.6  -3.5 7.1 -12.5 
 Q3 -8.6  7.3  -15.9  -8.0 4.9 -12.9 
 Q4 -18.0  6.5  -24.5  1.1 6.3 -29.8 
1995 Q1 2.6  8.0  -5.4  -4.1 4.2 -5.3 
 Q2 12.6  8.8  3.7  1.8 3.8 -1.9 
 Q3 11.8  8.6  3.1  1.8 2.6 -1.3 




  Bond  Expected  Unexpected …...Unexpected bond return due to… 
  total  - bond return  = bond      Change in Change in Change in  
  return  (12 m ago)  return  RRR Inflation IRP 
           
1996 Q1 8.9  8.4  0.4  0.6 0.1 -0.3 
 Q2 11.7  8.5  3.2  -0.7 -1.8 5.9 
 Q3 12.7  8.4  4.3  0.6 -0.4 4.1 
 Q4 7.8  7.8  0.0  -0.5 0.5 0.0 
1997 Q1 13.8  8.4  5.4  1.8 2.1 1.4 
 Q2 22.9  8.2  14.6  2.6 3.7 7.7 
 Q3 26.5  8.0  18.5  4.3 3.2 10.1 
 Q4 28.4  7.8  20.6  8.4 3.0 8.0 
1998 Q1 41.0  8.0  33.0  10.8 2.2 17.4 
 Q2 31.3  7.2  24.1  16.9 1.0 5.1 
 Q3 44.5  6.8  37.7  13.4 1.8 19.3 
 Q4 49.5  6.5  43.0  18.3 1.7 18.9 
1999 Q1 30.6  6.0  24.6  21.0 2.7 0.3 
 Q2 22.6  5.8  16.8  12.4 2.5 1.4 
 Q3 -0.9  4.9  -5.8  9.1 4.7 -17.5 
 Q4 -5.5  4.5  -10.0  6.1 8.9 -22.1 
           
2000 Q1 2.3  4.8  -2.5  1.7 6.9 -10.3 
 Q2 5.9  5.0  0.9  4.4 8.7 -11.1 
 Q3 8.1  5.2  2.8  4.6 7.0 -8.1 
 Q4 10.8  5.0  5.8  -1.2 4.0 2.9 
2001 Q1 4.8  4.9  -0.1  -7.3 2.8 4.8 
 Q2 -3.9  4.9  -8.8  -10.5 3.5 -1.5 
 Q3 4.0  5.1  -1.1  -8.5 2.7 5.2 
 Q4 -3.4  4.7  -8.2  -8.3 2.1 -1.9 
2002 Q1 -4.7  4.9  -9.6  -3.5 0.6 -6.9 
 Q2 9.9  5.4  4.5  3.1 -1.9 3.4 
 Q3 15.7  5.1  10.6  6.0 -3.2 7.8 
 Q4 14.7  5.2  9.6  0.6 -3.1 12.4 
2003 Q1 20.2  5.5  14.8  5.8 -0.9 9.5 
 Q2 13.1  5.2  8.0  2.4 1.1 4.3 
 Q3 -2.0  4.7  -6.6  1.1 2.1 -9.5 
 Q4 -1.5  4.7  -6.2  6.6 2.5 -14.1 
2004 Q1 5.1  4.8  0.3  8.7 5.4 -12.4 
 Q2 2.1  4.8  -2.7  6.2 4.4 -12.3 
 Q3 10.1  5.0  5.1  8.3 4.7 -7.3 
 Q4 15.5  5.0  10.5  10.1 -4.0 4.6 
2005 Q1 5.8  4.7  1.1  -0.8 -2.1 4.1 
 Q2 18.0  4.9  13.1  7.2 -2.6 8.4 
 Q3 13.0  4.7  8.2  8.2 -1.3 1.3 




Table G - Ex-post -v- ex-ante risk premia   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
  Ex-ante Unexpected 
                       
…....Due to.....  Unexpected Ex-post Unexpected 
  ERP Equity return Unexp Unexp Bond return ERP Risk premium 
  (12M ago) (Last 12M) DG RR (Last 12M) (Last 12M) (Last 12M) 
         
1963 Q4 4.2 9.1 2.0 7.1 -3.8 17.1 12.9 
1964 Q1 4.1 9.9 10.4 -0.5 -1.5 15.5 11.4 
 Q2 4.5 3.2 7.5 -4.3 -11.2 19.0 14.4 
 Q3 4.3 5.4 15.0 -9.6 -10.2 20.0 15.6 
 Q4 3.8 -11.7 13.4 -25.1 -7.9 0.0 -3.8 
1965 Q1 3.7 -10.8 12.6 -23.4 -8.0 0.8 -2.8 
 Q2 4.0 -18.1 5.2 -23.3 -8.9 -5.2 -9.2 
 Q3 4.2 -14.2 4.0 -18.2 -2.6 -7.4 -11.6 
 Q4 4.4 1.6 2.7 -1.0 -2.6 8.6 4.3 
1966 Q1 4.4 1.6 -0.8 2.4 -4.3 10.3 5.9 
 Q2 4.3 13.9 -1.8 15.7 -3.3 21.6 17.3 
 Q3 4.3 -10.9 -3.2 -7.7 -11.4 4.9 0.6 
 Q4 3.6 -14.1 -4.4 -9.7 -2.7 -7.8 -11.4 
1967 Q1 3.2 -11.5 -7.3 -4.3 4.2 -12.6 -15.7 
 Q2 3.0 -9.5 -8.3 -1.2 1.3 -7.8 -10.8 
 Q3 4.0 16.3 -8.5 24.8 2.3 18.0 13.9 
 Q4 4.4 23.5 -7.9 31.4 -5.7 33.6 29.2 
1968 Q1 4.4 35.0 -4.9 39.9 -10.5 49.9 45.5 
 Q2 3.5 40.6 -4.0 44.6 -12.3 56.3 52.8 
 Q3 3.2 38.7 -2.8 41.5 -8.2 50.1 46.9 
 Q4 2.8 38.1 0.8 37.3 -11.6 52.6 49.8 
1969 Q1 2.5 14.1 -0.6 14.6 -17.8 34.4 31.9 
 Q2 1.1 -13.6 0.9 -14.5 -15.7 3.3 2.1 
 Q3 1.3 -20.3 -0.3 -20.0 -15.9 -3.1 -4.4 
 Q4 0.7 -20.6 -4.6 -16.0 -9.9 -10.0 -10.7 
         
1970 Q1 0.3 -17.6 -1.5 -16.1 1.7 -19.1 -19.3 
 Q2 0.3 -16.8 -1.4 -15.4 0.0 -16.5 -16.8 
 Q3 0.8 -6.0 -0.6 -5.3 -5.3 0.2 -0.7 
 Q4 0.5 -12.8 0.2 -13.0 -10.2 -2.1 -2.6 
1971 Q1 0.9 -6.3 -3.1 -3.2 -5.6 0.2 -0.7 
 Q2 1.1 28.3 -2.3 30.6 -0.5 29.8 28.7 
 Q3 0.8 25.0 -2.6 27.6 7.5 18.3 17.5 
 Q4 0.3 36.4 -0.5 36.9 14.3 22.3 22.0 
1972 Q1 0.8 47.2 2.2 45.0 2.3 45.7 44.9 
 Q2 0.1 17.5 3.4 14.2 -2.8 20.4 20.3 
 Q3 0.5 4.3 4.3 0.0 -10.5 15.3 14.8 
 Q4 0.5 7.2 3.7 3.5 -13.4 21.1 20.6 
1973 Q1 0.4 -19.0 2.5 -21.5 -14.6 -3.9 -4.4 
 Q2 0.7 -13.8 -0.8 -13.0 -10.5 -2.6 -3.3 
 Q3 1.0 -16.0 -1.7 -14.2 -16.1 1.1 0.1 




  Ex-ante Unexpected 
                       
…....Due to.....  Unexpected Ex-post Unexpected 
  ERP Equity return Unexp Unexp Bond return ERP Risk premium 
  (12M ago) (Last 12M) DG RR (Last 12M) (Last 12M) (Last 12M) 
         
1974 Q1 1.7 -45.8 -3.8 -41.9 -29.1 -15.0 -16.7 
 Q2 2.3 -54.1 0.4 -54.4 -33.1 -18.6 -20.9 
 Q3 1.8 -66.7 0.4 -67.1 -27.8 -37.1 -38.9 
 Q4 1.7 -64.5 0.5 -65.0 -29.5 -33.3 -35.0 
1975 Q1 1.3 -9.3 -0.7 -8.6 2.2 -10.1 -11.5 
 Q2 1.3 12.5 -0.8 13.3 6.7 7.0 5.7 
 Q3 4.4 78.7 0.2 78.6 8.0 75.1 70.7 
 Q4 4.4 126.8 0.9 125.9 20.3 111.0 106.6 
1976 Q1 2.9 29.3 1.3 28.0 0.0 32.2 29.3 
 Q2 2.4 11.1 -0.1 11.2 5.6 7.9 5.5 
 Q3 1.6 -16.5 2.6 -19.1 -2.6 -12.3 -13.9 
 Q4 0.8 -13.5 3.2 -16.7 1.9 -14.5 -15.4 
1977 Q1 1.2 -2.2 4.6 -6.8 11.5 -12.5 -13.7 
 Q2 2.3 13.1 5.2 7.9 6.7 8.7 6.4 
 Q3 2.6 56.5 4.5 52.1 40.1 19.1 16.5 
 Q4 2.3 31.6 6.6 25.1 37.1 -3.2 -5.5 
1978 Q1 3.3 6.7 5.7 1.0 10.6 -0.6 -3.9 
 Q2 2.6 0.9 3.3 -2.4 4.6 -1.1 -3.7 
 Q3 4.9 -8.5 2.7 -11.2 -13.1 9.4 4.6 
 Q4 5.2 -7.3 2.6 -9.9 -14.5 12.3 7.2 
1979 Q1 4.6 19.9 3.8 16.1 6.7 17.8 13.2 
 Q2 3.1 8.2 1.3 6.9 9.1 2.2 -0.9 
 Q3 2.9 2.8 13.7 -10.9 16.0 -10.3 -13.2 
 Q4 3.0 -4.0 15.5 -19.5 4.4 -5.4 -8.4 
         
1980 Q1 3.8 -18.2 17.8 -36.0 -15.0 0.6 -3.2 
 Q2 3.4 0.7 22.8 -22.1 -5.2 9.3 5.9 
 Q3 4.8 5.3 8.3 -3.1 -8.4 18.5 13.6 
 Q4 4.5 18.5 4.2 14.3 -2.4 25.3 20.9 
1981 Q1 3.2 20.3 -0.8 21.1 4.2 19.3 16.1 
 Q2 3.2 10.3 -3.5 13.8 -8.2 21.7 18.5 
 Q3 3.1 -12.7 -5.6 -7.1 -19.5 9.9 6.8 
 Q4 2.5 -1.4 -5.1 3.7 -12.9 14.1 11.6 
1982 Q1 2.0 -2.7 -2.3 -0.4 -3.7 2.9 1.0 
 Q2 0.9 -7.3 0.3 -7.6 4.0 -10.4 -11.3 
 Q3 0.5 21.9 0.7 21.2 34.4 -12.0 -12.5 
 Q4 0.2 14.2 1.1 13.1 36.0 -21.7 -21.9 
1983 Q1 1.3 18.3 -0.4 18.7 23.6 -4.0 -5.3 
 Q2 1.3 34.5 -1.2 35.7 27.5 8.4 7.1 
 Q3 2.0 16.2 0.5 15.7 6.5 11.6 9.7 
 Q4 2.1 16.3 1.3 15.0 4.2 14.2 12.2 
1984 Q1 1.3 21.1 6.7 14.4 3.6 18.9 17.5 
 Q2 1.1 0.4 7.6 -7.2 -6.8 8.2 7.1 
 Q3 0.9 14.8 11.8 3.0 -0.3 15.9 15.0 
 Q4 0.7 20.9 15.4 5.5 -1.5 23.1 22.4 
1985 Q1 0.3 12.5 14.9 -2.4 -3.2 16.1 15.7 
 Q2 -0.3 17.5 15.7 1.8 3.2 14.0 14.2 
 Q3 0.0 12.0 10.8 1.2 2.8 9.2 9.2 




  Ex-ante Unexpected 
                       
…....Due to.....  Unexpected Ex-post Unexpected 
  ERP Equity return Unexp Unexp Bond return ERP Risk premium 
  (12M ago) (Last 12M) DG RR (Last 12M) (Last 12M) (Last 12M) 
         
1986 Q1 -0.2 26.3 3.3 23.0 17.8 8.3 8.5 
 Q2 -0.1 31.9 5.4 26.5 16.9 14.9 15.0 
 Q3 0.3 17.6 5.4 12.2 -3.5 21.4 21.1 
 Q4 0.2 17.0 6.8 10.1 -2.0 19.2 19.0 
1987 Q1 1.0 18.3 8.9 9.4 -5.3 24.6 23.6 
 Q2 1.3 35.5 6.7 28.9 -2.8 39.6 38.3 
 Q3 0.3 51.4 8.4 43.0 3.5 48.2 47.9 
 Q4 0.3 -1.9 7.3 -9.2 7.9 -9.5 -9.9 
1988 Q1 0.9 -16.9 6.6 -23.6 2.7 -18.7 -19.6 
 Q2 0.7 -22.8 8.1 -30.9 -2.4 -19.7 -20.4 
 Q3 -0.2 -28.0 9.2 -37.2 7.9 -36.1 -35.9 
 Q4 1.9 0.1 9.0 -8.9 3.7 -1.7 -3.6 
1989 Q1 2.5 13.6 10.2 3.3 0.3 15.7 13.3 
 Q2 2.3 7.5 7.0 0.5 -1.6 11.5 9.2 
 Q3 3.0 16.4 5.3 11.1 -3.7 23.1 20.1 
 Q4 3.5 22.8 8.9 13.9 -6.8 33.1 29.6 
1990 Q1 3.4 -3.9 9.7 -13.6 -21.5 21.1 17.7 
 Q2 2.9 -1.2 10.7 -11.9 -10.6 12.4 9.4 
 Q3 2.8 -25.4 8.7 -34.2 -15.1 -7.5 -10.3 
 Q4 3.0 -22.5 3.5 -26.0 -7.9 -11.6 -14.6 
1991 Q1 2.1 -1.4 -0.7 -0.7 12.0 -11.3 -13.4 
 Q2 3.0 -9.6 -2.6 -7.0 2.0 -8.6 -11.6 
 Q3 3.5 22.8 -3.2 26.0 16.4 9.9 6.4 
 Q4 3.9 6.2 -5.0 11.2 6.8 3.3 -0.6 
1992 Q1 3.7 -10.7 -5.2 -5.6 2.4 -9.5 -13.2 
 Q2 3.3 -3.9 -7.9 4.0 12.6 -13.2 -16.5 
 Q3 3.5 -13.3 -7.9 -5.4 1.9 -11.8 -15.2 
 Q4 3.4 6.3 -8.1 14.4 17.1 -7.3 -10.8 
1993 Q1 3.6 11.6 -10.1 21.7 19.8 -4.6 -8.2 
 Q2 3.7 9.5 -8.8 18.4 16.5 -3.3 -7.0 
 Q3 3.2 17.0 -8.9 25.9 31.3 -11.1 -14.3 
 Q4 3.4 15.7 -8.6 24.3 30.3 -11.2 -14.5 
1994 Q1 3.2 3.6 -6.3 9.9 4.2 2.6 -0.5 
 Q2 3.0 -4.7 -3.9 -0.8 -9.6 7.9 4.9 
 Q3 3.2 -6.2 -2.8 -3.4 -15.9 12.9 9.7 
 Q4 3.4 -15.8 -1.2 -14.6 -24.5 12.1 8.7 
1995 Q1 2.1 -7.5 2.7 -10.2 -5.4 0.0 -2.1 
 Q2 1.7 4.9 3.5 1.4 3.7 2.8 1.1 
 Q3 1.5 9.1 4.8 4.3 3.1 7.4 5.9 




  Ex-ante Unexpected 
                       
…....Due to.....  Unexpected Ex-post Unexpected 
  ERP Equity return Unexp Unexp Bond return ERP Risk premium 
  (12M ago) (Last 12M) DG RR (Last 12M) (Last 12M) (Last 12M) 
         
1996 Q1 1.8 14.2 5.8 8.4 0.4 15.6 13.8 
 Q2 1.7 8.6 5.0 3.7 3.2 7.1 5.5 
 Q3 1.7 6.4 5.5 0.9 4.3 3.8 2.1 
 Q4 2.6 5.5 3.7 1.8 0.0 8.1 5.5 
1997 Q1 2.2 7.4 0.9 6.5 5.4 4.3 2.0 
 Q2 2.7 11.0 0.1 10.8 14.6 -1.0 -3.7 
 Q3 2.8 19.3 -2.1 21.5 18.5 3.7 0.9 
 Q4 3.1 12.7 -4.2 16.9 20.6 -4.8 -7.9 
1998 Q1 2.6 25.7 -2.1 27.7 33.0 -4.7 -7.4 
 Q2 3.2 18.9 -2.7 21.6 24.1 -2.0 -5.2 
 Q3 3.2 -11.1 -2.3 -8.8 37.7 -45.6 -48.8 
 Q4 3.6 4.3 -2.0 6.2 43.0 -35.2 -38.8 
1999 Q1 3.1 -2.6 -3.5 0.9 24.6 -24.1 -27.2 
 Q2 3.3 0.7 -6.0 6.7 16.8 -12.7 -16.0 
 Q3 4.6 13.9 -4.3 18.2 -5.8 24.3 19.7 
 Q4 4.6 14.7 -3.7 18.4 -10.0 29.3 24.7 
2000 Q1 3.9 1.0 -9.5 10.6 -2.5 7.4 3.6 
 Q2 3.5 -3.4 -8.0 4.6 0.9 -0.8 -4.3 
 Q3 3.1 1.2 -9.5 10.7 2.8 1.4 -1.7 
 Q4 2.8 -13.7 -8.9 -4.8 5.8 -16.7 -19.5 
2001 Q1 2.6 -18.1 -0.8 -17.4 -0.1 -15.4 -18.0 
 Q2 2.5 -15.2 -4.3 -10.8 -8.8 -3.9 -6.4 
 Q3 2.2 -27.8 -2.9 -24.9 -1.1 -24.5 -26.7 
 Q4 2.6 -20.5 -5.3 -15.2 -8.2 -9.8 -12.4 
2002 Q1 2.8 -10.9 -6.0 -4.8 -9.6 1.5 -1.2 
 Q2 1.8 -21.7 -2.6 -19.2 4.5 -24.5 -26.2 
 Q3 2.5 -27.8 -4.7 -23.1 10.6 -35.9 -38.4 
 Q4 2.1 -29.6 -3.4 -26.2 9.6 -37.0 -39.2 
2003 Q1 1.9 -36.9 -6.0 -30.9 14.8 -49.7 -51.6 
 Q2 2.4 -17.5 -4.3 -13.2 8.0 -23.0 -25.5 
 Q3 3.6 8.0 -3.1 11.2 -6.6 18.3 14.7 
 Q4 3.3 12.1 -2.7 14.8 -6.2 21.7 18.3 
2004 Q1 3.5 22.3 -1.9 24.2 0.3 25.5 21.9 
 Q2 2.8 9.0 0.1 8.9 -2.7 14.5 11.7 
 Q3 2.5 8.1 1.5 6.7 5.1 5.5 3.0 
 Q4 2.1 5.4 3.6 1.8 10.5 -3.0 -5.1 
2005 Q1 2.2 8.4 6.9 1.4 1.1 9.5 7.3 
 Q2 2.1 11.5 9.3 2.2 13.1 0.4 -1.7 
 Q3 2.2 17.6 11.1 6.5 8.2 11.5 9.3 
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